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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

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U.S. POLICY OPTIONS TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1989

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Helms, Kassebaum, Pressler, and McConnell.

Also present: Senator Edward Kennedy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This morning, we are holding a hearing on United States policy options with regard to South Africa. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 sent an important and much needed signal to South Africans, both black and white, of the American people's unequivocal opposition to apartheid. By our willingness to cease doing business as usual, we demonstrated our determination to act to bring an end to South Africa's inherently racist, unjust system.

The message sent by the Anti-Apartheid Act could have been even stronger and more effective if the Reagan administration had lent its support. For then, neither the South African Government nor its supporters could have doubted where the U.S. Government stood on the question of apartheid.

The Bush administration has made it clear, it wants to work with Congress to forge a bipartisan policy toward South Africa, a policy that would unite both branches of government. I hope this goal can be achieved. For the last several months the administration has been conducting a review of American policy toward South Africa. Today we will hear the outcome of that review from the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Herman Cohen.

On the surface, the situation in South Africa appears to be calmer, less violent, and more stable than it was a few years ago. Beneath the surface, though, tensions continue to mount and the determination of South African blacks to acquire basic political rights and freedoms continues to grow. The new government in South Africa, under the leadership of F.W. de Klerk, appears to have some understanding of these aspirations. The government has allowed peaceful antiapartheid demonstrations to take place in the last few weeks, and President de Klerk has talked about a "new South Africa."

The South African Government has a window of opportunity over the next several months. The United States and other members of the international community are watching to see if the new

South African Government has the courage and the political will to take the necessary steps to dismantle the foundations of apartheid and to open negotiations with legitimate representatives of the black community. If it does not, then it will be incumbent on us to consider what action we must take. One option, which our panel of public witnesses will discuss, is that of new financial sanctions affecting the rescheduling of the South African debt.

I would like to welcome as our first witness this morning, Senator Kennedy. But, first, do any of my colleagues care to make a statement?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, I would like to.

Senator SIMON. I would like to also.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I welcome this opportunity to reexamine U.S. policy toward the Republic of South Africa, and to explore the opportunities for encouraging positive nonviolent change.

South Africa's new President, F.W. De Klerk, campaigned on a promise of dialog and hoped for progress in the fight to enfranchise black South Africa. Yet the new president has begun on uncertain footing. He has yet to express clearly, let alone demonstrate by deeds, the breadth and depth of the changes that he promises will come. He assures his country of gradual, moderate change, at a time when pressure continues to mount for the rapid and comprehensive dismantling of the apartheid regime.

It is clear that President De Klerk has an extraordinarily difficult job before him. He must convince the extreme right in the Afrikaaner Party, as well as the more conservative elements of his own party, that change is inevitable and change is necessary.

He has taken a few very modest steps, such as abolishing some petty apartheid laws, thus permitting integration of some public parks and pools and other facilities. He has also made limited attempts to open some avenues for peaceful dissent.

Yet, at the same time, fundamental human rights abuses continue. Indeed, these abuses are institutionalized in the obscene apartheid regime as follows:

Many are still the victims of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.

Church and labor groups remain banned.

Housing remains segregated and unequal.

The homelands policy, which compels blacks to live in the least desirable areas, remains intact.

The black majority still has no vote and no representation.

These deplorable abuses will continue so long as apartheid remains the foundation of South African society.

I believe we should do our utmost to support those who respond to the urgent demands for change in South Africa. Yet we must remain vigilant in our efforts to combat the evils of apartheid. We cannot settle for partial solutions. We need to demonstrate America's unshakable commitment to the forces of democracy.

In 1986, Congress enacted sanctions legislation against South Africa. These sanctions have worked. They have pressed the South African Government to move, albeit slowly, toward a policy of change. I am pleased to work with Senator Simon on this committee in co-sponsoring legislation designed to expand upon the 1986 sanctions and to underscore the need for multilateral cooperation.

We are here today to examine how United States policy can best achieve these goals. We must continue to pressure the South African regime to widen the scope and pace of change and to completely dismantle the abhorrent system of apartheid. We must continue to negotiate with other industrialized democracies to ensure a strong multilateral approach.

We must continue to support the black leaders who will one day have a strong voice in governing South Africa. We must convince the white minority that we will resume normal relations with their regime only when substantial progress has been made.

Our commitment must continue to be to human rights, freedom, and democracy for all South Africans, black and white.

I want to applaud the leadership that Senator Simon is providing on this committee and in this arena, as we come to grips once again with the problems of apartheid. And I welcome Senator Ted Kennedy, who has provided such leadership over so many years on this vitally important human rights front.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank Senator Cranston for his generous words and his leadership.

I want to join in applauding Senator Kennedy for his leadership.

Let me just quote a few sentences from the British Commonwealth Foreign Minister's Committee. This is from about 30 days ago.

> Recent developments in South Africa have reaffirmed the committee's belief that sanctions are having an increasing economic and political impact. The committee was united in the belief that sanctions would need to be sustained and intensified until progress in that direction became irreversible.

I am taking a few sentences out of context, but I do not think I am distorting anything here.

> The committee reiterated its conviction, confirmed by further consultations with several black South African leaders, that most black South Africans continue to look principally to sanctions for pressure on Pretoria for peaceful change. Sanctions, in the committee's view, remain the most effective peaceful path to the ending of apartheid.
>
> The ministers share the overall conclusions of the report that existing sanctions adopted by the Commonwealth, the United States, the Nordic States, and other countries, have, through their impact on South Africa's economy and policies, confirmed the legitimacy of sanctions as an instrument of policy to induce dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and, in the circumstances, the urgency of even stronger signals to the new government in South Africa.

There is a new government, and the tone of the new government is better. But I am reminded, and I have an idea I am not alone in this, when I was in college and I would get birthday greetings, I welcomed the greetings, but I always opened those greetings and looked to see if there was anything concrete in those greetings.

We are a little bit that way in terms of where we are with South Africa. I read the opening speech of State President De Klerk and, frankly, the tone is one I applaud. I think what we are looking for now from South Africa are the concrete things that really will move us away from this massive injustice that is a part of South Africa, and nothing would please us more than to see these concrete signals coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Simon.

Now, we are all very glad, indeed, to welcome the Senator from Massachusetts.

STATEMENT OF HOH. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to say what a pleasure it is to have a chance to appear again before this committee that has really made such an extraordinary difference, in terms of our country's foreign policy toward South Africa.

You, Mr. Chairman, have been an inspirational figure in bringing an end to constructive engagement. Senator Cranston was so active in terms of this committee and also in the conference, and also helping in overriding President Reagan's veto.

And Senator Simon has been a consistent and ongoing and persistent leader in the House of Representatives as well, and now, as the chairman of the subcommittee that really bears the responsibility for fashioning and shaping these new initiatives, and hopefully working with the administration.

So, I want to say what a pleasure it is to be before this committee and also with three individuals who have made such an important difference, in terms of American policy in that part of the world.

To come quickly to the point, we have a new Congress, a new President of the United States, and a new President of South Africa. The question is what the United States should do now to hasten the end of apartheid and the beginning of a new South Africa.

We all agree that the United States cannot end apartheid by itself; that is a challenge for South Africa, South Africans, blacks and whites together. But the United States also has a role to play. In the recent past, Congress had to take the lead in 1984–86, when Congress debated the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement and found it wanting.

And out of those deliberations came strong and principled American action against apartheid for the first time in the 40-year history of that abhorrent system. Our action was all the more unprecedented because we succeeded in adopting a major foreign policy initiative, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, over the veto of President Reagan.

If we have learned from that history, we may not have to repeat it. But the signs are ominous. We are now nearly 9 months into the Bush administration, all of us hope that the divisions of the past 8 years over South Africa are behind us.

For many months, instead of rushing to refight old battles, we have sought new possibilities, including the prospect of a realistic, bipartisan effort by the President and the Congress to take new steps to end apartheid.

I would welcome such an effort, because in foreign policy American helps most when America speaks with one voice, works with one heart, and thinks with one mind.

For nearly 9 months, however, we have been ready and willing to move forward against apartheid, under the leadership of President

Bush, but nothing has happened. There has been no leadership. The administration appears to believe that the United States should offer a grace period to the new president of South Africa. I believe that a grace period sends the wrong signal about the policy of the United States.

We should not be lulled into the belief that "new" means "improved," when it comes to those who administer the abhorrent system of apartheid in South Africa.

Sanctions are effective; constructive engagement was not. There is no question that the sanctions we enacted in 1986 are working today to promote an end to apartheid, and the Bush administration knows it.

Last June, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen spoke of the positive effects of sanctions on South Africa, when he said, "Sanctions have had a very major impact, I believe, on the development of new thinking in South Africa." I welcome that statement as a sign of the needed new direction in American foreign policy.

Sanctions have had a clear and moderating effect on the Government of South Africa; they were a catalyst for progress toward a peaceful settlement in Namibia. Faced with the pressure of the sanctions and the arms boycott, South Africa agreed to permit the people of Namibia to start on the road to independence.

The effect of the sanctions has also been acknowledged by the highest financial official in South Africa. The reserve bank governor, Gerhard de Kock, admitted in May of this year that the economy cannot recover without political reform.

Fear of additional sanctions has also forced South Africa to scale back its attacks on frontline states and its support for terrorist activities in those states.

Slowly South Africa is moving from destabilization toward negotiation in the region.

Sanctions played a similar role in convincing the South African Government to release several hundred detainees who conducted a hunger strike earlier this year.

Parties to the negotiations have made it clear that the government was concerned that the international outrage over deaths of hunger strikers might lead to stronger sanctions.

We have all followed closely the courageous defiance of the unjust laws campaign, which challenges the brutal rules of apartheid. Thousands of brave men, women, and children have taken to the streets to demand their rights. Hundreds have endured arrest, intimidation and repression by a regime that has not yet realized that its time has come to step aside and let justice reign.

But so far the progress has been too slow. If President De Klerk and his government have a genuine interest in dismantling apartheid, then it is incumbent upon them to take significant steps that constitute realistic advances toward that goal.

There is no mystery about the kind of steps that would be regarded as significant. They include the immediate lifting of the current state of emergency; the release of Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners; the unbanning of all political organizations; and a commitment to convene a constitutional conference as soon as possible between recognized black and white leaders to agree upon an apartheid-free future for South Africa.

These steps can and should be taken at once by the rulers in South Africa.

In addition, there are steps that the Bush administration should take as well in order to make it clear that our policy is designed to continue the progress we have made since 1986. We should do more to mobilize our allies and all other nations of the world in the battle against apartheid.

The United States should support a United Nations resolution calling for international sanctions against South Africa, comparable to those imposed by the United States in 1986. We should make clear that we are prepared to impose additional United States sanctions against South Africa if there is no progress.

Such action should specifically include financial sanctions relating to South Africa's debt, $9 billion, that is owed to United States banks and that must be rescheduled by June 1990.

Above all, the Bush administration should end its unacceptable footdragging and act in good faith to enforce the 1986 sanctions. The General Accounting Office has documented a shocking lapse in responsible enforcement by the Customs Service.

Gold and other South African products banned by the 1986 legislation continue to enter the United States. Three years after the sanction law was signed, the State Department and Customs Service still have not made the efforts to determine which products are banned, and South Africa does not tell us.

As I have indicated, Congress wants to work with the administration to achieve satisfactory bipartisan policy for the future, but the administration has to do more than nothing. In effect, the administration has already provided a grace period of 9 months; the time for waiting is over.

Mr. Chairman, I think we realize that within the antiapartheid legislation, there was a very clear expression in that legislation for international leadership to try and gather support from the industrial nations and other nations around the world, and that the United States should make every effort to do so. I do not think that we have really reflected, certainly in the past months, that kind of initiative.

And second, I think it is extremely difficult to believe that we can shape and fashion the kind of a bipartisan policy, working with the Congress, when the legislative initiatives of the Congress are not being adhered to.

The GAO report was quite clear about the failings of the enforcement of the Customs Service. And I believe that it is incumbent for the administration to comply with that legislation. Maybe they do not like it, maybe they do not want it, maybe they do not believe in it, but it is the law, and I think we have every right to expect that it is going to be complied with.

Certainly it ought to be the basis to have that compliance before we are able to reach a kind of a joint accommodation, which I would hope could be the expression of American policy.

It is time to formulate a policy worthy of the United States and worthy of our commitment to human rights. If the administration insists on further delay before taking reasonable action, I would ask how long? How long must America stand silent while blacks

continue to be beaten, arrested and deprived of their most basic rights?

Who among us here would trade places with a black South African and then dare to suggest that a grace period for apartheid is a responsible foreign policy for the United States?

Instead we should label it for what it is, a grace period for apartheid is a gross violation of human rights.

"Son of constructive engagement" is unacceptable. Symbols are no substitute for substance. Procrastination is no alternative for action. Kinder and gentler is no answer to apartheid.

If we stand in place, we fall behind in the endless struggle against racism in our society or any other place on Earth. Now is the time, now is always the time to move forward against apartheid.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY

Mr. Chairman, I commend your leadership in convening these hearings on U.S. policy toward apartheid in South Africa. To come quickly to the point, we have a new Congress, a new President of the United States, and a new President of South Africa. The question is what the United States should do now to hasten the end of apartheid and the beginning of a new South Africa.

We all agree that the United States cannot end apartheid by itself. That is a challenge for South Africa and South Africans, blacks and whites together.

But the United States also has a role to play. In the recent past, it is Congress that had to take the lead. In 1984, 1985, and 1986, Congress debated the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement and found it wanting.

Out of those deliberations came strong and principled American action against apartheid, for the first time in the 40-year history of that abhorrent system. Our action was all the more unprecedented because we succeeded in adopting a major foreign policy initiative, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, over the veto of President Reagan.

If we have learned from that history, we may not have to repeat it. But the signs are ominous.

We are now nearly 9 months into the Bush administration. All of us hope that the divisions of the past 8 years over South Africa are behind us. For many months, instead of rushing to refight old battles, we have sought new possibilities, including the prospect of a realistic bipartisan effort by the President and the Congress to take new steps together on apartheid.

I would welcome such an effort, because in foreign policy, America helps most when America speaks with one voice, works with one heart, and thinks with one mind. For nearly 9 months, however, we have been ready and willing to move forward against apartheid under the leadership of President Bush. But nothing has happened. There has been no leadership.

The administration appears to believe that the United States should offer a grace period to the new President of South Africa. But I believe that a grace period sends the wrong signal about the policy of the United States. We should not be lulled into the belief that "new" means "improved" when it comes to those who administer the abhorrent system of apartheid in South Africa.

Sanctions are effective; constructive engagement was not. There is no question that the sanctions we enacted in 1986 are working today to promote an end to apartheid. And the Bush administration knows it. Last June, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen spoke of the positive effects of sanctions on South Africa. "Sanctions have had a very major impact, I believe, on the development of new thinking in South Africa," he said. I welcome that statement as a sign of the needed new direction in American foreign policy.

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The effect of the sanctions has also been acknowledged by the highest financial official in South Africa. The Reserve Bank Governor Gerhard DeKlerk admitted in May of this year that "the economy cannot recover without political reform."

Fear of additional sanctions has also forced South Africa to scale back its attack on front lines states and its support for terrorist activities in those states. Slowly, South Africa is moving from destabilization toward negotiations in the region.

Sanctions played a similar role in convincing the South African Government to release several hundred detainees who conducted a hunger strike earlier this year. Parties to the negotiations have made it clear that the Government was concerned that international outrage over the deaths of hunger strikers might lead to stronger sanctions.

We have all followed closely the courageous defiance of unjust laws campaign, which challenges the brutal rules of apartheid. Thousands of brave men, women, and children have taken to the streets to demand their rights. Hundreds have endured arrest, intimidation and repression by a regime that has not yet realized that its time has come to step aside and let justice reign.

But so far, the progress has been too slow. If President DeKlerk and his Government have a genuine interest in dismantling apartheid, then it is incumbent upon them to take significant steps that constitute realistic advances toward that goal. There is no mystery about the kind of steps that would be regarded as significant. They include:

1. The immediate lifting of the current state of emergency;
2 The release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners;
3. The unbanning of all political organizations; and
4. A commitment to convene a constitutional conference as soon as possible between recognized black and white leaders to agree upon an apartheid-free future for South Africa.

These steps can and should be taken at once by the rulers in South Africa. In addition, there are steps that the Bush administration should take as well, in order to make clear that our policy is designed to continue the progress we have made since 1986.

1. We should do more to mobilize our allies and all other nations of the world in the battle against apartheid. The United States should support a United Nations resolution calling for international sanctions against South Africa, comparable to those imposed by the United States in 1986.

2 We should make clear that we are prepared to impose additional U.S. sanctions against South Africa, if there is no progress. Such action should specifically include financial sanctions relating to South Africa's debt of $9 billion that is owed to U.S. banks, and that must be rescheduled by June of 1990.

3. Above all, the Bush administration should end its unacceptable foot-dragging and act in good faith to enforce the 1986 sanctions.

The General Accounting Office has documented a shocking lapse in responsible enforcement by the Customs Service. Gold and other South African products banned by the 1986 legislation continue to enter the United States. Three years after the sanctions law was signed, the State Department and the Customs Service still have not made the effort to determine which products are banned—and South Africa doesn't tell us.

As I have indicated, Congress wants to work with the administration to achieve a satisfactory bipartisan policy for the future. But the administration has to do more than nothing. In effect, the administration has already provided a grace period of 9 months. The time for waiting is over. It is time to formulate a policy worthy of the United States and worthy of our commitment to human rights.

If the administration insists on further delay before taking reasonable action, I would ask now long—how long must America stand silent while blacks continue to be beaten, arrested, and deprived of their most basic rights?

Who among us here would trade places with a black South African, and they dare to suggest that a grace period for apartheid is a responsible foreign policy for the United States? Instead, we should label it for what it is—a grace period for apartheid is a gross violation of human rights.

"Son of constructive engagement" is unacceptable. Symbols are no substitute for substance. Procrastination is no alternative for action. Kinder and gentler is no answer to apartheid.

If we stand in place, we fall behind in the endless struggle against racism in our own society or any other place on Earth. Now is the time, now is always the time, to move forward against apartheid.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, for a strong and compelling statement.

There has just come out in the last couple of days a report that the administration is supposed to make in accordance with the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. It says in the executive summary, "The report concludes that the additional U.S. economic sanctions mandated by the act have not to date been successful in moving the South African Government toward the goals outlined in title I of the act, goals that are shared by the administration and Congress. However, recent events, including the September 6 election mandate for change claimed by President de Klerk and subsequent government cooperation in the holding of peaceful demonstrations, give some reason for hope."

I was wondering if that reflected your own thoughts, or if you would disagree with that report?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, if you read down a little further in that executive summary, it says, "The slowing of the South Africa economy as the result of sanctions has clearly demonstrated the economic well-being of the white minority, and will depend increasingly on reaching political accommodation."

It is not a very enthusiastic indication of the results, but it certainly does take some note about the effectiveness of the sanctions.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And further on in that report, on page 2, it says, "Despite recent positive signs, we are unable to report tangible progress toward the end of apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa during the period under review. There has as yet been no major changes in the present constellation of apartheid laws despite official suggestions that such may occur."

So, I guess you could say this report comes out squarely on both sides of the issue.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, Mr. Chairman, one point that I have to take serious exception with the report, and that is, we have gone through 40 years effectively of constructive engagement, and to try and relate the sanctions legislation against a 40-year history of tacit support for apartheid, and to try and measure it and think that there is going to be the monumental exceptions, I think, is blatant intellectual dishonesty.

And I think we have, all those, and the members of this committee have expressed very well, but no one thought that the imposition of this legislation was going to bring the end of apartheid; no one suggested it.

And to measure their report against that particular rule really is, I find, an absolute, gross distortion in terms of what any of us who supported that legislation represented.

What we understood is that the United States should not be apartheid in continuing American interest and support in stabilizing that regime, and there should be a clear expression, No. 1.

And, second, we have understood that the real changes were going to have to come about in terms of the internal actions within those countries.

And, third, we thought, to really be effective that we had to mobilize international support.

And so the administration to come up with warmed over, either some modest expression about the effect of, and then to indicate that they do not believe in it, when they have not attempted to follow what was the mandate of that legislation, internationally, and failed to have supported what the Congress has passed domestically, I find is quite unacceptable, and I think would be insulting to this committee and to the U.S. Congress and Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Would you care to join us on the panel here?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I would be honored to for a brief period.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions of Senator Kennedy, and I want to hear from Secretary Cohen. But I would be remiss, I think, if I did not say just a few words about the very strong, vigorous, and perceptive leadership which Senator Kennedy has exercised on this issue.

I am convinced that some day, and hopefully sooner rather than later, all of the people of South Africa will be able to participate in shaping their destiny. And when that day comes, I think a great deal of the credit for it happening will be due to Senator Kennedy.

I might say, Senator Weicker, who is not here with us any longer, also joined with him over the years in a very effective advocacy of basic and essential human rights to millions of people who have been denied them in one of the world's most grossly abusive systems, perhaps the most grossly abusive system that exists in the world today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to simply add my voice to that. The Kennedy name has been synonymous with struggles for human rights for a long, long time, but there is no struggle with which it has been closer allied and attached than the struggle in South Africa. And I think for all of us who went through the period of the sixties, the trip of Robert Kennedy is something that will, for always, stand out as a starting journey for many of us with respect to this issue.

And Senator Kennedy and members of his family have carried on that effort, and I think it is clear that his force of personality and his commitment to this have had just an extraordinary impact on what is taking place.

And I agree with his statement and his testimony that the landmark 1986 override of the veto, which Senator Kennedy and Senator Weicker led, is working to bring an end to apartheid, and I certainly congratulate my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

And I concur—our colleague from Massachusetts has been the beacon on this matter for many years.

We have with us now, Mr. Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and maybe he would care to make a presentation to us, and then we will ask questions.

Could you identify your two colleagues, please?

STATEMENT OF HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY, ROBERT PERITO, DIRECTOR FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND JOHN BYERLY, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. COHEN. I have with me Mr. Perito, on my right, who is Director for Southern African Affairs.

I have Mr. Byerly, who is the Assistant Legal Advisor for African Affairs; both in the State Department.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I make my remarks, I would like to add my own personal tribute to Senator Kennedy for his work on apartheid. I was privileged to be a guest at his home when he gave a dinner party in honor of Bishop Tutu and Allen Boesak, and I can see the way the Africans from South Africa honored him for his work on behalf of freedom there, and it is quite clear that his work is well appreciated there.

I am particularly glad to be here now, as part of our continuing effort to build a bipartisan approach for United States policy on South Africa. Along with Central America, South Africa was highlighted at the outside by Secretary Baker as an area where the breakdown of bipartisan support undercut the ability of the United States to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy.

We want to be able to send a clear signal of broad bipartisan support for a policy premised on unequivocal abhorrence of apartheid, reflected in a sustained United States commitment to promoting negotiations between the government in Pretoria and legitimate black representatives leading to a nonracial and democratic South Africa. Our intention now is to proceed in close consultation with Congress.

We have heard your views and those of many others. Throughout, we have kept a careful eye on the events unfolding during the last several months in South Africa; some of which have given us reason to believe that the possibility for a peaceful end to apartheid is increasing. We have also kept before us a clear sense of the moral outrage of the American people in this 41st year of South Africa's government-imposed, repressive apartheid. This outrage at apartheid is shared by this administration and is the impetus for our according priority attention to change in South Africa.

Outrage alone, of course, is not enough. It must be put into guiding principles and translated into a program of sustained and comprehensive effort. An accurate understanding of events on the ground is also necessary.

I would like to take this opportunity briefly to lay out for you these elements as we see them.

The basic principles which will guide United States policy toward South Africa in this administration are clear:

Our commitment to an end to apartheid and to fundamental political change, leading to a nonracial, democratic South Africa; full enforcement of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act; expanding assistance to black South Africans; active U.S. diplomacy to resolve conflicts and support economic development throughout Southern

Africa; intensive consultations with other nations, especially South Africa's major trading partners and the front line states; and closer cooperation with the Congress on a bipartisan approach.

The process of translating these principles into policy will be taken against the backdrop of perceptible political evolution in South Africa, amidst signs of nascent movement on both sides toward dialog.

On the one side, we saw several interesting developments beginning with the July meeting between P.W. Botha and Nelson Mandela. To many, this historic meeting was a clear indication that the South African Government had come to recognize that the future of South Africa could not be settled without dialog with credible leaders like Mandela.

More recently, we saw the new President of South Africa, F.W. De Klerk, declare that the white electorate had given him a mandate for change. He then moved quickly to allow, contrary to the previous government, several peaceful political demonstrations to take place despite emergency restrictions.

On the other side, we saw that black South Africans, inside and outside South Africa, were taking the possibility of dialog seriously enough to begin formulating their positions on possible negotiations. There was much that was encouraging and worth further discussion in the ANC proposals released in Harare last August.

Of course, nothing about the move toward dialog is assured. During this same period, for example, detention of political activists again increased, and some demonstrations were blocked, though without bloodshed. It is still too early to say whether the first steps of the new De Klerk government will lead to a process of dialog and an end to the state of emergency, but they offer reason to hope.

For our part, we view the commencement of dialog between the government and credible representatives of the black majority as the most important first step in the process of change. We, therefore, welcomed President De Klerk's affirmation that the door is open to such a process. We also made clear our view of the conditions which would facilitate dialog. These are:

The release of all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, and the return of political exiles; lifting the state of emergency and associated restrictions on political activity and freedom of association for the black opposition; the unbanning of all political organizations, including the ANC; and an end to violence from all sources.

We know that it is unreasonable to expect that everything can be done at once. But we believe that the new South African Government should move quickly on this agenda to begin creating the conditions for dialog to begin. And we call on all parties to reexamine their previous ways of reacting to each other and thereby prepare themselves to take advantage of all opportunities which arise to pursue negotiations on a peaceful process of constitutional change. This is primarily a process for South Africans. But we are prepared to assist where we can be useful.

Our policy will balance pressure and incentives. We have broadened and deepened our dialog with black South Africans, both inside and outside their country. In this respect, I want to pay trib-

ute to Ambassador Ed Perkins, who opened many doors for us in South Africa.

We will continue to denounce apartheid and identify with the aspirations of black South Africans. We are committed to active expansion of our program of "positive measures" designed to strengthen multiracial resistance to apartheid, build black bargaining power, and help blacks not to endure apartheid but to prepare themselves for leadership in a postapartheid, nonracial democracy.

To accomplish this we intend to increase assistance for university scholarships, human rights, and community leadership. We will seek to upgrade VOA transmissions to South Africa, provide targeted assistance to universities in South Africa that are open to all students regardless of race, and stimulate private sector aid for bursaries and training—perhaps via mechanisms such as Congressman Dymally's proposal to establish a U.S. commission on Southern Africa.

At the same time, we are committed to maintaining access to South Africa's white leadership and actively supporting the U.S. business presence, which has helped lead the way toward better race relations.

Secretary Baker met earlier this year with the CEO's of major U.S. companies in South Africa and told them they are an integral part of our effort to be a force for positive change in South Africa.

Our aim in all of this is to position the United States so as to maximize our ability to promote dialog leading to full-fledged negotiations on a nonracial democratic future for South Africa.

Regionally, though there are ups and downs, efforts to resolve conflict through negotiations are underway in Angola and Mozambique, and the independence process is well underway in Namibia.

We helped create these opportunities and we will remain active in seeing them through to success. We will base our approach on United States interests in the region keeping our opposition to apartheid at the center of our policy, and coordinating as closely as possible with South Africa's important trading partners, the Front Line States, and other interested parties.

In this regard, I call upon the Congress to remove sanctions on Namibia immediately after U.N. certification of the November elections, and thus show a United States commitment to the successful emergence of this new nation.

In terms of our relations with South Africa, we have long used diplomatic and other pressure to promote forward motion in South Africa's internal policies.

The administration is committed to effective enforcement of existing sanctions—the most comprehensive of South Africa's major trading partners. At the same time, it is important to maintain a level of official representation that enables us to sustain contact with all communities in South Africa. We intend to maintain this policy, and will not move toward full normalization of our diplomatic relations in the absence of significant progress toward ending apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy.

We will also continue to work with the other states in Southern Africa to strengthen their independence and reduce their vulnerability to external pressure. At the same time, we will promote regional cooperation in order to reduce inefficiencies, allow greater

play to market forces, give all parties an increased material stake in regional stability, and establish the groundwork for postapartheid regional economic integration.

For the first time in years, it is possible to be somewhat hopeful that a negotiation scenario may be just beyond the horizon. The great pressures, internal and external, on South African whites to accept change are growing and are helping to convince the South African Government that it must move beyond its current position and accept fundamental change.

Sanctions have played a role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure. It is now increasingly clear to that government that the well being of the white minority cannot be sustained without a negotiated political settlement that results in political equality for all South Africans.

In fact, the new De Klerk government has indicated it is prepared to take concrete steps to address this need. For this reason, the administration recommends that no new sanctions be considered at the present time, while existing measures be maintained in the hope and expectation that positive signs of a commitment to change will emerge in the near future.

You can be assured that we will be working actively toward this goal, and we trust that we can continue to find common ground with you in our mutual effort.

I believe the newly elected political leaders of the white minority understand fully the necessity for a political settlement, and are developing a strategy for negotiations. It would be appropriate, therefore, to allow that leadership reasonable time to demonstrate—mindful of outside expectations but without increased outside pressure at the present time—the will, the capability, and the courage to launch the dismantling of apartheid on an inevitable course.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Cohen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. COHEN

GOOD MORNING AND THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME HERE TODAY.

I AM PARTICULARLY GLAD TO BE HERE NOW, AS PART OF OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO BUILD A BIPARTISAN APPROACH FOR U.S. POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA. ALONG WITH CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA WAS HIGHLIGHTED AT THE OUTSET BY SECRETARY BAKER AS AN AREA WHERE THE BREAKDOWN OF BIPARTISAN SUPPORT UNDERCUT THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. WE WANT TO BE ABLE TO SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL OF BROAD, BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR A POLICY PREMISED ON UNEQUIVOCAL ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID, REFLECTED IN A SUSTAINED U.S. COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT IN PRETORIA AND LEGITIMATE BLACK REPRESENTATIVES LEADING TO A NON-RACIAL AND DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA. OUR INTENTION NOW IS TO PROCEED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.

WE HAVE HEARD YOUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF MANY OTHERS. THROUGHOUT WE HAVE KEPT A CAREFUL EYE ON THE EVENTS UNFOLDING DURING THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOME OF WHICH HAVE GIVEN US REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY FOR A PEACEFUL END TO APARTHEID IS INCREASING. BUT WE HAVE ALSO KEPT BEFORE US A CLEAR SENSE OF THE MORAL OUTRAGE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS 41ST YEAR OF SOUTH AFRICA'S GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED, REPRESSIVE APARTHEID. THIS OUTRAGE AT APARTHEID IS SHARED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION AND IS THE IMPETUS FOR OUR ACCORDING PRIORITY ATTENTION TO CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

OUTRAGE ALONE, OF COURSE, IS NOT ENOUGH. IT MUST BE PUT INTO GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND TRANSLATED INTO A PROGRAM OF SUSTAINED AND COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT. AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING

OF EVENTS ON THE GROUND IS ALSO NECESSARY. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY BRIEFLY TO LAY OUT FOR YOU THESE ELEMENTS AS WE SEE THEM.

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH WILL GUIDE U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IN THIS ADMINISTRATION ARE CLEAR:

-- OUR COMMITMENT TO AN END TO APARTHEID AND TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE, LEADING TO A NON-RACIAL, DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA;
-- FULL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAAA:
-- EXPANDING ASSISTANCE TO BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS;
-- ACTIVE U.S. DIPLOMACY TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS AND SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA;
-- INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS, ESPECIALLY SOUTH AFRICA'S MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS AND THE FRONT LINE STATES; AND
-- CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE CONGRESS ON A BIPARTISAN APPROACH.

THE PROCESS OF TRANSLATING THESE PRINCIPLES INTO POLICY WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PERCEPTIBLE POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA, AMIDST SIGNS OF NASCENT MOVEMENT ON BOTH SIDES TOWARDS DIALOGUE. ON THE ONE SIDE, WE SAW SEVERAL INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS BEGINNING WITH THE JULY MEETING BETWEEN P. W. BOTHA AND NELSON MANDELA. TO MANY, THIS HISTORIC MEETING WAS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT BE SETTLED WITHOUT DIALOGUE WITH CREDIBLE LEADERS LIKE MANDELA. MORE RECENTLY WE SAW THE NEW PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, F.W. DE KLERK, DECLARE THAT THE WHITE ELECTORATE HAD GIVEN HIM A MANDATE FOR CHANGE. HE THEN MOVED

QUICKLY TO ALLOW, CONTRARY TO THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, SEVERAL PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS TO TAKE PLACE DESPITE EMERGENCY RESTRICTIONS. ON THE OTHER SIDE, WE SAW THAT BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA, WERE TAKING THE POSSIBILITY OF DIALOGUE SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO BEGIN FORMULATING THEIR POSITIONS ON POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WAS MUCH THAT WAS ENCOURAGING AND WORTH FURTHER DISCUSSION IN THE ANC PROPOSALS RELEASED IN HARARE LAST AUGUST.

OF COURSE NOTHING ABOUT THE MOVE TOWARDS DIALOGUE IS ASSURED. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD, FOR EXAMPLE, DETENTION OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AGAIN INCREASED AND SOME DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BLOCKED, THOUGH WITHOUT BLOODSHED. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER THE FIRST STEPS OF THE NEW DE KLERK GOVERNMENT WILL LEAD TO A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE AND AN END TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, BUT THEY OFFER REASON TO HOPE.

FOR OUR PART, WE VIEW THE COMMENCEMENT OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND CREDIBLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK MAJORITY AS THE MOST IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE. WE THEREFORE WELCOMED PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S AFFIRMATION THAT THE "DOOR IS OPEN" TO SUCH A PROCESS. WE ALSO MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE DIALOGUE:

-- THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING NELSON MANDELA AND WALTER SISULU, AND THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXILES;
-- LIFTING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND ASSOCIATED RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR THE BLACK OPPOSITION;
-- THE UNBANNING OF ALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE ANC; AND
-- AN END TO VIOLENCE FROM ALL SOURCES.

WE KNOW THAT IT IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT EVERYTHING CAN BE DONE AT ONCE. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY ON THIS AGENDA TO BEGIN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE TO BEGIN. AND WE CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR PREVIOUS WAYS OF REACTING TO EACH OTHER AND THEREBY PREPARE THEMSELVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES WHICH ARISE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A PEACEFUL PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THIS IS PRIMARILY A PROCESS FOR SOUTH AFRICANS. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST WHERE WE CAN BE USEFUL.

OUR POLICY WILL BALANCE PRESSURE AND INCENTIVES. WE HAVE BROADENED AND DEEPENED OUR DIALOGUE WITH BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRY. IN THIS RESPECT, I WANT TO PAY TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR ED PERKINS WHO OPENED MANY DOORS FOR US IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DENOUNCE APARTHEID AND IDENTIFY WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO ACTIVE EXPANSION OF OUR PROGRAM OF "POSITIVE MEASURES" DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN MULTI-RACIAL RESISTANCE TO APARTHEID, BUILD BLACK BARGAINING POWER, AND HELP BLACKS NOT TO ENDURE APARTHEID BUT TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR LEADERSHIP IN A POST-APARTHEID, NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WE INTEND TO INCREASE ASSISTANCE FOR UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP. WE WILL SEEK TO UPGRADE VOA TRANSMISSIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA, PROVIDE TARGETED ASSISTANCE TO UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT ARE OPEN TO ALL STUDENTS REGARDLESS OF RACE, AND STIMULATE PRIVATE SECTOR AID FOR BURSARIES AND TRAINING -- PERHAPS VIA MECHANISMS SUCH AS CONGRESSMAN DYMALLY'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A U.S. COMMISSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING ACCESS TO SOUTH AFRICA'S WHITE LEADERSHIP AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE U.S. BUSINESS PRESENCE, WHICH HAS HELPED LEAD THE WAY TOWARD BETTER RACE RELATIONS. SECRETARY BAKER MET EARLIER THIS YEAR WITH THE CEO'S OF MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND TOLD THEM THEY ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORT TO BE A FORCE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM IN ALL OF THIS IS TO POSITION THE UNITED STATES SO AS TO MAXIMIZE OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE LEADING TO FULL-FLEDGED NEGOTIATIONS ON A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRATIC FUTURE FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

REGIONALLY, THOUGH THERE ARE UPS AND DOWNS, EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS WELL UNDERWAY IN NAMIBIA. WE HELPED CREATE THESE OPPORTUNITIES AND WE WILL REMAIN ACTIVE IN SEEING THEM THROUGH TO SUCCESS. WE WILL BASE OUR APPROACH ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION, KEEPING OUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AT THE CENTER OF OUR POLICY, AND COORDINATING AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNERS, THE FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. IN THIS REGARD, I CALL UPON THE CONGRESS TO REMOVE SANCTIONS ON NAMIBIA IMMEDIATELY AFTER UN CERTIFICATION OF THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS AND THUS SHOW A U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCE OF THIS NEW NATION.

IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WE HAVE LONG USED DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER PRESSURE TO PROMOTE FORWARD MOTION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLICIES. THE ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING SANCTIONS -- THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THAT ENABLES US TO SUSTAIN CONTACT WITH

ALL COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN THIS POLICY, AND WILL NOT MOVE TOWARD FULL NORMALIZATION OF OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID AND ESTABLISHING A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY.

WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE OTHER STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA TO STRENGTHEN THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND REDUCE THEIR VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL PRESSURE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE INEFFICIENCIES, ALLOW GREATER PLAY TO MARKET FORCES, GIVE ALL PARTIES AN INCREASED MATERIAL STAKE IN REGIONAL STABILITY AND ESTABLISH THE GROUNDWORK FOR POST-APARTHEID REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE SOMEWHAT HOPEFUL THAT A NEGOTIATION SCENARIO MAY BE JUST BEYOND THE HORIZON. THE GREAT PRESSURES, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, ON SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES TO ACCEPT CHANGE ARE GROWING AND ARE HELPING CONVINCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT MUST MOVE BEYOND ITS CURRENT POSITION AND ACCEPT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. SANCTIONS HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN STIMULATING NEW THINKING WITHIN THE WHITE POWER STRUCTURE. IT IS NOW INCREASINGLY CLEAR TO THAT GOVERNMENT THAT THE WELL BEING OF THE WHITE MINORITY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT RESULTS IN POLITICAL EQUALITY FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS. IN FACT THE NEW DE KLERK GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED IT IS PREPARED TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO ADDRESS THIS NEED. FOR THIS REASON, THE ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDS THAT NO NEW SANCTIONS BE CONSIDERED AT THE PRESENT TIME, WHILE EXISTING MEASURES BE MAINTAINED IN THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT POSITIVE SIGNS OF A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE WILL EMERGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL BE WORKING ACTIVELY TOWARD THIS GOAL, AND WE TRUST THAT

WE CAN CONTINUE TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH YOU IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORT.

I BELIEVE THE NEWLY ELECTED POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE WHITE MINORITY UNDERSTAND FULLY THE NECESSITY FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND ARE DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE THEREFORE TO ALLOW THAT LEADERSHIP REASONABLE TIME TO DEMONSTRATE -- MINDFUL OF OUTSIDE EXPECTATIONS BUT WITHOUT INCREASED OUTSIDE PRESSURE AT THE PRESENT TIME -- THE WILL, THE CAPABILITY, AND THE COURAGE TO LAUNCH THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID ON AN INEVITABLE COURSE.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I would suggest that in view of the large panel that will follow you and our time constraints that we limit ourselves to 8 minutes in this round of questioning.

I have just one question and that is, the administration's report suggested that the obstacles to inhibiting movement toward negotiations in South Africa is the negative attitudes toward change in segments of both the white and black communities.

What segments of the black community oppose change? Are these Zulus or what group are you talking about?

Mr. COHEN. I think what that means, Mr. Chairman, is that there are some elements of the black community that really are not ready for negotiations. They feel that power should just be handed over by the white minority without a negotiation. I think that is what the report is referring to, a disinclination to negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN. Also in your testimony you said we will not move toward full normalization of our diplomatic relations in the absence of significant progress toward ending apartheid.

Do we not have full, normal diplomatic relations now with South Africa?

Mr. COHEN. They are not quite normal, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is abnormal about them?

Mr. COHEN. We have limitations on personnel, limitations especially on military attaches and intelligence personnel. We have limitations on official people who can travel to the United States. We are very stingy on visas, especially for military visitors. It clearly is not the same as full diplomatic relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, and I would now turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cohen, your appearance before the committee this morning coincides, as you probably know, with the visit here of Dr. Jonas Savimbi, with whom I met at some length yesterday morning. I do not have to identify Mr. Savimbi to you, do I?

Mr. COHEN. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me say at the outset in all candor I am troubled by some comments attributed to you this summer dealing with the conference held in Zaire and specifically with your interpretation of the future role of Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA forces following any settlement of the civil war in Angola.

Specifically, unless the press misquoted you—and that is not an entire rarity in our business—you stated that, "Dr. Savimbi had accepted the concept of a government headed by the Communist MPLA president Dos Santos."

The precise quotation attributed to you is, "He," meaning Savimbi, "has already conceded that the president of Angola will be the current president, President Dos Santos. He is not looking to take over that job, but he would have to think something very big, such as prime minister, I think."

Now, my question to you is, when was it that Jonas Savimbi told you that he would make such a concession?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, about a year ago Dr. Savimbi said two things: that he would not be the head of a UNITA delegation in a negotiation, and he said that in the transitional government he would not participate. And, if there were a negotiated settlement, he would recognize President Dos Santos as the president of all of Angola in a transitional government. So, I was accurately quoting him at that time.

Senator HELMS. Where did he make these statements?

Mr. COHEN. He made them in his own press releases at that time. I believe we have that.

I am sorry, sir. This was called "The UNITA Peace Initiative" of March 13, 1989, in which he said he is prepared not to participate in the government of national unity, but he will put forward his candidacy for elections proposed to take place in 2 years after the formation of the government of national unity.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is a far cry from what you said.

Mr. COHEN. Excuse me?

Senator HELMS. That is a far cry from what you said. You said that he had conceded that the president will be the current president, that he is not looking to take over that job. Even your own testimony contradicts that assertion?

Mr. COHEN. Yes. I am saying for a transitional government he was willing to concede that President Dos Santos——

Senator HELMS. But you did not make that clear.

Mr. COHEN. Excuse me?

Senator HELMS. You did not make that clear. You made it appear that Jonas Savimbi said, "Well, everything is OK. I am going to concede," this was not so.

Mr. COHEN. Well, I am making it clear now that he is talking only about a transitional government.

Senator HELMS. You are making it clear now?

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Well, Jonas and I have talked about this, and he says he does not have the faintest idea how you came to any conclusions such as you stated publicly.

Now, I have found him to be a truthful man. Do you agree to that?

Mr. COHEN. Sure.

Senator HELMS. Well, in the same interview you also speculated that the resulting peace settlement will provide a government "in a typical African situation, probably a one-party government with a parliament, but the two parties, UNITA and MPLA, will probably merge into something new."

Now, is it not a fact, Mr. Cohen, that UNITA has consistently rejected the idea of merging into or with the MPLA?

Mr. COHEN. They have rejected merging into the MPLA; that is correct.

Senator HELMS. Well, what was the basis for your assertion that there would be a one-party government?

Mr. COHEN. I said they would merge into something new.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know what the State Department said when I called attention to your remarks. They said, well, Secretary Cohen was being speculative.

Mr. COHEN. That is correct, Senator. I was being speculative.

Senator HELMS. It was the dodge of the year.

Mr. COHEN. Dr. Savimbi has said he wants multiparty system. That is certainly something he will wish to negotiate.

Senator HELMS. It has also been reported that in staff briefings you have referred to the concept of one-party democracy. Now, that is a contradiction of itself particularly as the likely outcome in Angola. Those terms, "one party" and "democracy" just run head-on into each other.

What are you talking about when you use such a term?

Mr. COHEN. I do not remember, Senator, but I would like to refer you to our most recent statement on Angola which came out on September 17, which says we favor free and fair elections in Angola. That is basically what we are in favor of.

Senator HELMS. Well, you do not recall ever having said anything about a one-party democracy?

Mr. COHEN. I do not recall it. I may have. But, our basic policy toward the Angola settlement is that there should be free and fair elections on the basis of negotiations between the two parties.

Senator HELMS. Well, there has been a great contradiction to me at least, including from a lot of U.S. officials who ought to be listening instead of talking. They seem to suggest that Dr. Savimbi has accepted the concept of a settlement in Angola which provides something less than the holding of free and fair elections.

Now, Jonas Savimbi told me yesterday morning that he has never wavered from his commitment to free elections.

Under your understanding, Mr. Ambassador, are free and fair elections a part of the settlement being discussed?

Mr. COHEN. I believe that this should be on the table for negotiations between the two parties when they do start to negotiate.

Senator HELMS. Do you think free and fair elections ought to be negotiable, really?

Mr. COHEN. I said I think it should be on the table for negotiations.

That means that they cannot come up with a new constitutional system for Angola without negotiating it.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, how much more time do I have? I do not want to get into another line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. You have 3½ minutes.

Senator HELMS. OK. Then I am going faster than I thought.

I will take additional time on my next round, Mr. Chairman, because I want to get a little more deeply into it than I have with my limited time, so I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I just want to be clear on the line of questioning Senator Helms put to you. I thought that the Savimbi position, and the positions you stated at the time, was that he himself would not participate as part of the delegation engaged in the effort to reach a settlement. Is that correct, as point one?

Mr. COHEN. He would not head the UNITA delegation, and this has already been demonstrated. In the negotiations that have taken place so far, Dr. Savimbi was not the head of the delegation.

Senator SARBANES. That second, in the transition period he anticipated that Dos Santos would head the government in Angola. Is that correct?

Mr. COHEN. This is what he has said, yes.

Senator SARBANES. That third, he anticipated that at the end of the transition period, assuming some process for determining political leadership, he would then be a contestant in that process?

Mr. COHEN. He would want elections in which he would be eligible to be a candidate, that is correct.

Senator SARBANES. Well, did you say anything at the time contrary to those three propositions?

Mr. COHEN. No sir, I did not.

Senator SARBANES. I did not think you had. That was my understanding of what the situation was, and I thought it reflected Savimbi's positions as I understood them. Is that correct?

Mr. COHEN. As I understood them too, sir, yes.

Senator SARBANES. What is it that the new South African Government could do, or should do, to indicate that it really is serious about changing the situation in South Africa?

Mr. COHEN. Well, I would put those in three categories, Senator. First of all, they could carry out what is indicated in the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, which I do not think are terribly onerous requirements and which I have mentioned in my statement on banning political parties, allowing them to operate, hold meetings, allowing exiles to come back, lifting the state of emergency. This general category, which I call creating a climate for progress and democratizing the country.

Second——

Senator SARBANES. Let me just stop you right there. None of those items seems to me to be far reaching in its ultimate determination. They are all process items. They are all an effort to, as you say, create a climate and begin a process—you know, the unban-

ning of parties, the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners. None of that guarantees you a substantive result, but it does at least open up important channels of communication, the ability for the opposition to be organized and more visible and in fact simply legitimate.

Why are they resistant to doing things that to many of us seem relatively tentative first steps in trying to move this process forward, particularly if one is to accept the general statements that the new government, including the President, have made about the need to recognize change and the need to understand that they now live in a different time and the necessity to respond to those changed circumstances.

Mr. COHEN. Well, it is hard for me to speak for them. I can only give you my analysis, Senator. I believe that the previous government, which went out of office just a few weeks ago, was looking at the situation from the point of view of the confrontational politics that began in 1984.

Between 1984 and 1987, or early 1988, the mass democratic movement, the black leadership, essentially was engaged in a confrontational mode and the white leadership at that time felt that for their own domestic political reasons they must respond more with repression rather than conciliation, and therefore did not consider any of these steps to be appropriate at the time. Incorrectly, in my view, but this is my analysis of their reasoning.

I think that the new administration which has just come into office 2 weeks ago has rethought the entire situation and is also reacting to certain signals being sent by the black leadership, which is that negotiations would be better than confrontation.

I believe that they are right now in the process of developing a methodology for implementing all of these preliminary steps to create the climate, at least I am hoping they will, and from everything that they have said to us, this is the first step in the process.

Senator SARBANES. Is it accurate historically to say that Botha, when he first came in, made some general statements that seemed to be encouraging and forthcoming but that that was the end of it and subsequent actions belied the words and the rhetoric?

Mr. COHEN. I would say, "Yes and no" to that. He did make some statements and he actually took some measures, but this was with a different framework in mind. This was what I would call ending petty apartheid and coopting the blacks into the apartheid system in terms of political——

Senator SARBANES. Framework in mind different from what framework?

Mr. COHEN. From the ones that the new leadership is contemplating, in my view.

Senator SARBANES. You are satisfied on that point; are you?

Mr. COHEN. I am satisfied in terms of the rhetoric. I will have to wait and see that there will be actual different behavior.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it is the action that determines the framework, not the rhetoric, in the last analysis; is it not?

Mr. COHEN. Of course. But the beginning looks promising.

Senator SARBANES. Would you develop the other two dimensions that you were about to address?

Mr. COHEN. Yes. Dimension No. 2 would be the removal of all discriminatory legislation, the key ones being: the Group Areas Act, which prevents people from living wherever they can afford to buy a house; the Land Act of 1913, which prohibits people from buying land wherever they can afford to buy land; the Population Registration Act, which in effect says that every child born in South Africa must have his or her race registered on a document, and the Separate Amenities Act, which in effect permits municipalities to have segregation in public places like swimming pools, park benches, and that sort of thing.

The removal of all of this discriminatory legislation is key to changing the apartheid system. I would expect that much of this would be done in the next parliamentary session, which begins in February in Cape Town.

Now the third and probably the most important, in my view, would be the beginning of a negotiation. In effect, sitting down at the same table with credible black leaders, not with black leaders who come out of the old cooption system that I just mentioned, to in effect talk about the future of South Africa and the new constitutional order for South Africa.

Senator SARBANES. Would you indicate what you think is a reasonable timetable for moving on these three dimensions in order to demonstrate that, in fact, a new government is genuinely moving to establish a different framework?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, I hate to set deadlines for a very complex situation. I would like to see progress every step of the way, beginning almost immediately as soon as the government gets organized. I would say a reasonable timetable would be by the end of the next parliamentary session, which begins in February.

Senator SARBANES. When does it end?

Mr. COHEN. It usually ends about June.

Senator SARBANES. Are not some of these measures things that could be done prior to the beginning of the parliamentary session through government action?

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. I understand, and it seems to me not unreasonable for those measures that require parliamentary action, obviously to place them in the parliamentary session. The parliament can hardly act if it is not there, and that is the period from February to June.

But a number of the measures that you discuss are, as I understand it, and perhaps if I am wrong you could correct me, within the control of the government and could be changed or remedied and corrected by the government immediately, or in the very near future, well ahead of the parliamentary session.

Mr. COHEN. The first category of changes that I mentioned—the lifting of the state of emergency and unbanning political parties—could be done by executive order, so it is quite reasonable to expect that they would be done in the near future, or at least some of those things.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize in the audience Helen

Sussman, who for some 30 years has been a member of the South African Parliament, just retiring this year, but has been a courageous voice against apartheid for those 30 some years.

The CHAIRMAN. We would ask her to arise so that we can applaud her. [Applause.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. My apologies, Mr. Chairman, for being in and out and to you, Secretary Cohen, for missing some of your statement and trying to juggle a couple of committee hearings today. But I felt it was a very thoughtful statement, I think a very realistic analysis not only of what is happening but of our role at this particular time.

It is going to be a difficult time and it is a time of transition as you have pointed out, and it seems to me we continue to play I hope a very important role and a supportive role through what I think is going to be a difficult time for all sides.

As you have stated, it is important for us, I believe, to keep the pressure on, to do what we can to encourage negotiations for national reconciliation.

I would like to ask you a question regarding the rescheduling of South African debt. It is my understanding that these discussions between the South African Government and the international banking community are ongoing, and I believe that the South Africans total international bank exposures is about $21 billion, with United States bank debts ranging between $2 and $2.6 billion.

About $1.7 billion of the U.S. bank loans remain to be scheduled by June 1990. Does the administration anticipate playing any role in trying to encourage the U.S. banks to use these negotiations as leverage for political reform either through direct linkage to reform, to rescheduling, or by encouraging the banks to hang tough on the terms of rescheduling agreements themselves?

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator, for your opening remarks. I appreciate them.

On the question of bank loans, I think you are quite correct. Our estimate is that it is approximately $2.5 billion of the $21 billion outstanding that are owed to American banks.

On the basis of what I have heard in recent weeks, a significant portion of the American bank loans have been converted from short-term loans to medium-term, which are fully due and payable in 1997.

Interest would be paid from 1987 to 1997 and the principal would be repaid in 10 equal installments, 10 equal semiannual installments beginning in 1992.

I believe that all U.S. loans have been converted to this medium term except for approximately $700 million, which is still being carried on a very short-term basis.

Now, from what the banks tell me, the interim arrangements under which South Africa continues to repay these loans, and by that I mean what interest rate and what amount of principal is repaid annually, the terms are effectively dictated by the South African Government.

The banks would like to get their money back immediately because they feel that South Africa is not a good political risk, and the faster they can get it back the better. That is why some of

them converted to a 10-year agreement, because they felt that this would in effect assure them that they would get their money back.

So, it is hard for the banks to use this as leverage, when in effect the South African Central Bank is dictating the terms, and in effect they say we will repay this over a certain period at a certain interest rate and a certain amount of principal, with the banks constantly arguing for more—or greater principal payments and greater interest payments—and the Central Bank of South Africa informing them what the terms will be.

So, the banks really feel that they do not have leverage of a political nature, since the South Africans hold all the cards.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. I would like to pursue a bit further the Angola issue. It is my understanding that Dr. Savimbi has asked us to play a mediating role in the talks. Is that correct?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, he has not used the word "mediator." He has said he would want us to play a greater role. By that, he means that our initial response to the Gbadolite Agreements was that this was an African initiative led by President Mobutu supported by the other countries neighboring Angola. We supported that. We thought it should be an African initiative, an African solution for African problems.

When the Gbadolite Agreements started to unravel because of misunderstandings about what was actually agreed to, we started to play a larger role.

I have done some extensive traveling, trying to talk to various parties since mid-August, and I believe that our greater role is already evident, and if Dr. Savimbi and others feel that we can make a contribution through our technical assistance—for example, we have experts on cease-fires; we have some military people who really know what a cease-fire is all about and how to implement it—we would be glad to provide that.

We have extensive experience in negotiating with the MPLA through the Angola-Namibia Accords, and we would be glad to provide support to the mediator if he asks us for it, so we have no problems with Dr. Savimbi's proposal.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why do you think that the talks have begun to unravel? Perhaps I should not put it quite that way, but they seem to have reached a stumbling block.

Mr. COHEN. There are a number of reasons for that, Senator. First, there are misunderstandings as to what was agreed to at the Gbadolite summit.

There was a communique which was clear, and no one disputes what was in the communique, but there was some claims that there were other agreements that were reached orally and not publicized, which is the cause of confusion.

Dr. Savimbi says he did not agree to many things that other chiefs of state say he agreed to. So, that has to be cleared up.

Second, the Government of Angola seems to want to have a number of preconditions to negotiation, in effect deciding certain key political issues before a negotiation such as what is Dr. Savimbi's role and what will be the new constitution of Angola.

What they are saying is Dr. Savimbi should go into exile and that the new constitution of Angola should be the old constitution of Angola. There should be no change.

These are clearly important political issues which cannot be decided ahead of a negotiation. This has caused the negotiation, the whole process, to unravel.

I feel on the basis of what I have heard in recent days that it can come back together again on the basis of negotiations without preconditions and a cease-fire to precede those negotiations.

I believe that in the next few weeks it can come together.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is encouraging. If I may, just before time runs out, I would express continued support for our policy in strengthening and assisting the front line states.

I have always believed that was an important component of our South Africa policy and would hope that you would continue to lead those efforts in strengthening our work with the front line states.

Mr. COHEN. I agree with you, Senator, 100 percent. I also would like to clarify my previous mark on Angola, that we fully support the role of President Mobutu as the mediator. We have no problems with that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum, the ranking member of the subcommittee, and now I would turn to the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say to Secretary Cohen even though from time to time it may not seem like it, there really is a lot of good will on this committee for you personally.

Mr. COHEN. I know that, Senator.

Senator SIMON. One comment on the Angola situation, there is a very fundamental thing that you and I have discussed before where we, I hope, someday will make a policy determination and, Mr. Chairman, I hope someday maybe we will have hearings on just this question. Should we be trying to overthrow governments we do not like?

My feeling is we want to exert peaceful means for achieving change, and with the exception of where you have an invasion, like in Afghanistan where we supply weapons, where we have supplied weapons, I am not sure that continuing supply is wise at this point.

But, with that kind of exception I do not think we should be supplying weapons in Angola or South Africa or Nicaragua or any other place where I think we are not effective politically. We hurt ourselves politically. We cause thousands of needless deaths. That is just a general observation.

Now, you mentioned—if I might get to South Africa, you mentioned that you liked the rhetoric you hear from the new leadership in South Africa, but you are looking for concrete specifics.

You will forgive me for saying that is almost exactly the position we are in with the administration. We like the rhetoric. We are looking for concrete specifics.

As I followed your reading of your statement, you inserted one sentence in what is page 8 of my speech notes here in reference to sanctions. Do you want to repeat that one sentence? It was not part of your advance text and was not inserted.

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Mr. COHEN. The sentence referred to, Senator, is—and I quote—"Sanctions have played a role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure." I believe that is it.

Senator SIMON. That is correct. And I welcome that insertion because I think it is an ace-like modification of administration policy.

Then we go down a few sentences further and you say the administration recommends that no new sanctions be considered at the present time.

Now, that strikes me as a shift in position also, one that I welcome.

I know my colleague from North Carolina would not welcome it, but am I reading a shift in position here correctly or am I not?

Mr. COHEN. Well, Senator, I would not want to characterize it as a change. Perhaps the best thing I can do is quote Secretary Baker and his conversation with the Foreign Minister of South Africa when they met in Rome a few months ago.

He said to the Foreign Minister, "It is very important that after you have your election and your new administration is put in place that you move quickly to implement your party platform that you are running on, which is the dismantling of apartheid. You must do it quickly because if you do not, pressures will build for more sanctions in the Congress and among the people of the United States and indeed in other countries of the world."

So, I think this is consistent with this administration's view that we cannot wait indefinitely. We have to see things happen quickly.

Senator SIMON. OK. Let me just say that I cannot imagine your predecessor administration making that particular statement where it says at the present time.

You talk about consultations with other nations. I think this is important. You do not mention the United Nations.

Have you been reflecting on what we might do through the United Nations?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, I have, Senator. As you know, there will be a special session on apartheid at the United Nations General Assembly in December. We are thinking very seriously about how we can make a positive contribution to that.

I discussed this yesterday with Mr. Thabo Mbeki of the ANC, and I have been discussing it with a number of foreign ministers that I met up in New York last week. And what we are thinking about is to have a resolution at that United Nations General Assembly which we could vote for.

And considering the fluid situation in South Africa at the present time, I would like to see a resolution that effectively focuses on negotiations and not on sanctions, focusing on promoting negotiations and the basic principles that we would like to see that govern a new South Africa.

I think if we could negotiate a resolution of that type on United States principles and what we would like to see postapartheid in South Africa are already on the record. Secretary Schultz made a speech about that a couple of years ago. If we could negotiate a resolution of that type—also working from the document that the ANC entered in Harare recently, which I thought had many constructive features—if we can work a resolution that we can vote for, I think that would be useful, and we will be actively consulting

with the leadership of the nonaligned movement and the front line states to see if we can work something out.

So, to answer your question, we are actively thinking of doing something positive at the U.N. this year.

Senator SIMON. And then in terms of, for example, Japan, it clearly moved in and filled part of the trade gap that we had in terms of—that is when we imposed sanctions.

I met with Ambassador Matsunaga here and other Japanese officials to discuss this. are you taking part in a dialog with Japan, if I could just pick an example, in terms of what is happening in this whole field of trade with South Africa?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, I have an appointment to go to Tokyo in mid-November to discuss this issue specifically, a coordination of policy not only to Southern Africa, but to all of Africa.

Senator SIMON. Well, let us forget Japan, then. What about the U.K.?

Mr. COHEN. We have had intensive discussions with the U.K. I have been to London several times. High level officials have come here. The new foreign secretary of the U.K. has discussed this with Secretary Baker, and we are talking about such things as positive measures in South Africa, how we can contribute jointly to certain advancement of black political rights and capabilities.

On the question of sanctions the British are maintaining their position that they do not wish to have any increased sanctions. They have even told us that they would veto a sanctions resolution at the U.N. if it came up.

In general, the Europeans that we discuss sanctions with say that they prefer to coordinate their sanctions in the common market context. Essentially they are talking about trade and investment which comes under the jurisdiction of the EC–12.

Senator SIMON. In terms of sanctions, also, the credit thing that Senator Kassebaum talked about is clearly important. My understanding is that about $8 billion of credit comes to you between now and next June and about $1.7 billion of that is with the United States or with U.S. banks.

Are you seriously looking at the credit situation?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, we have looked at it.

My personal opinion is there is really no area of leverage in these particular loans.

I believe that the maximum pressure on South Africa has already been exerted through financial sanctions. For example, the CAAA does not allow new investment or new loans.

Most banks in the world, especially the Europeans and the Japanese, have not been lending to South Africa since 1985. So, the pressure that is to be exerted through financial mechanisms is essentially no new money going in, lots of money coming out.

So, since 1985 $12 billion has flowed out of South Africa with nothing going in. This is what constitutes pressure and, in my view, has been part of the basis for new thinking in that country.

Now, you come to the loans that are still to be paid back. The banks tell me that in effect South Africa is dictating the terms of the repayment. They are happy that South Africa is paying, and they are paying at a rather good rate and fairly rapidly.

So, the only thing left for them to do would be to say we call your loans, and we want immediate payment, at which point the South Africans would say well, we either go into default, we will not pay you at all, or we will continue to pay you at the same rate through unilateral determinations.

I find it difficult to see how a political leverage can be exercised through this mechanism. I am open for argument on that.

It seems to me that the only thing that could be accomplished is to force South Africa into default.

Now, I have heard people say well, this would be a good thing to force them into default. But my analysis of that is that the only result would be the banks would not get their money.

And, to go back to my original statement, what is pressure—pressure is that money is coming out and nothing is going in.

If South Africa stops repaying its loans and money would stop coming out. So, I fail to see how leverage could be exerted on South Africa through this mechanism.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.

Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have an opening statement that I would like to have inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the record as if read.

[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCONNELL

I welcome the opportunity to hear the witnesses this morning, particularly in light of recent sighs of hope in South Africa. I have been interested to read accounts of recent, peaceful demonstrations in South Africa and was deeply affected by the images carried around the world of Frank Chikane exchanging his written demands for an end to apartheid with a handshake with the chief of police.

While there are some new players on the South African political field, I think it is imperative that we remember the fact that the majority involved has not changed, their demands for freedom have not changed, their call for the basic rights to choose where to live, work, and educate their children have not changed. I can understand why the administration suggests we give the new President, Mr. DeKlerk, the opportunity to develop and implement his agenda, but we must be confident of the undeniable commitment to change and that South Africa's course is one to freedom.

The majority in South Africa has been asked before to "give us a little time to work things out." From my perspective, a little time has turned into 32 years, from that unfortunate turn of events in 1947 when the national party began to legislate apartheid. I think we can ask for patience, but we must offer a commitment in return that we have a timetable and a specific understanding of what happens next in South Africa.

Senator MCCONNELL. I am sure you covered this earlier, though I was not here. What is your assessment of De Klerk's political position? What do you expect him to initiate? And how do you expect that to be received by the various factions in the country, from the conservatives all the way to those who currently do not have a chance to participate at all?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, of course it is always hard to predict what politicians are going to do.

Senator MCCONNELL. But I would like for you to try.

Mr. COHEN. We know what their platform was when they ran for election, which was to dismantle apartheid. And we approved of that platform. We thought that was very good. I have personally

talked to Mr. F.W. De Klerk, and I think his vision of a future South Africa has a great deal of merit.

A lot of what he says is still rather vague.

Senator MCCONNELL. What is his vision?

Mr. COHEN. He wants to have a nonracial, democratic system, where every South African is equal to every other South African.

Now, you still have to put a lot of meat on those bones.

Senator MCCONNELL. In all respects?

Mr. COHEN. That is what he has said; yes.

Senator MCCONNELL. Does that mean one man, one vote?

Mr. COHEN. I do not know if that means one man, one vote. But as a generic vision, I think it is not bad. But how he means to implement it, does he have the capability, does he have the political support to implement that, that is another question.

But what we are looking for is visible signs that he is moving in the right direction.

Now, what I would like to see is, first of all, the removal of restrictions on the blacks to engage in normal political life. It should be possible for them to get out of prison, to organize political parties, to communicate with their constituents openly and freely, without press censorship, without fear of being detained without trial, and that sort of thing, the lifting of emergencies.

This is absolutely a prerequisite for normal political life in any country, and especially in South Africa. I would hope that F.W. De Klerk would move quickly to do that. And, from what he has said, I think he wants to do that.

Second, he would have to remove the discriminatory legislation.

Senator MCCONNELL. But first let me ask you how soon is quickly?

Mr. COHEN. Well, the government has been in power for 2 weeks now, and you know, you cannot organize a government that quickly. Look at how it has happened in the United States since January. We have not gone too quickly. [Laughter.]

Senator MCCONNELL. But is has been 32 years since apartheid was put into legislation. So, a lot of people have gotten tired of waiting. And that is my question.

Mr. COHEN. I am speaking administratively now.

And I would say that between now and the end of the year I would hope to see some of these measures taken or some of these repressive measures lifted. Then you have the parliamentary session which begins in February. And I would hope that between now and February they would really prepare the legislation to lift all of the discrimination against racial groups.

Because you cannot have each South African equal to every other South African, if you cannot buy property in any place, you cannot buy a house wherever you can afford to buy it, if every child that is born has to have his or her race listed on a document of registration, and that type of thing.

So, I would hope in the parliamentary session that begins in February and ends in June, that they would get rid of that legislation.

And third and most important, to begin the negotiating process, to start talking to the real leaders of the black community about a new South Africa, a constitutional change to bring about this

vision of F.W. De Klerk's. I would hope that would happen fairly soon also.

Senator MCCONNELL. Let us assume that none of these things does happen. What should we do in that event? And, more broadly, does whatever we do make any difference?

Mr. COHEN. Well, I would like to assume that they will have, Senator. But OK, taking your hypothesis, I would say we should do two things.

First of all, we should consult around this table again, this committee and myself and perhaps at higher levels, as to, first of all, how we analyze the situation and what we think the next steps should be.

I think we are quite sincere in wanting to have congressional/executive branch dialog and consensus on this. So, we would want to consult closely.

Second, we would also want to consult with the other major trading partners.

We know that when F.W. De Klerk did his traveling around to many other countries, he was told that time is very short and he must act. So, if after the next parliamentary session there is very little to show for it, I think we would want to consult with them, especially the British and the Germans and the French and the Japanese, on that.

Senator MCCONNELL. The countries that you mentioned do not seem to have the same interest in this issue that we do, I gather, from several of the things that you said after I arrived. What chance is there for some kind of coordinated response with our allies and the major traders in that area, if these changes do not begin to occur?

Mr. COHEN. Well, Senator, I am now proposing and I have proposed to a number of the major trading partners that we do establish a consultative group on this issue, which would meet regularly, maybe three or four times a year, to at least begin talking about it on a structured basis. And I believe, right now, there is no interest among the other trading partners on coordinating policy.

There is a great deal of willingness to talk and exchange ideas, but I found very little interest in actual coordination of policy.

Senator MCCONNELL. So that if we acted unilaterally, in all likelihood, these other major trading partners would take advantage of our absence, I gather?

Mr. COHEN. Not necessarily. Well, first of all, I do not agree with the general analysis that they have done that. I think they have been rather cautious about filling in where we have left.

What we really want is mutually supporting policies, if we cannot get coordination. And I think, generally, they have been mutually supportive, especially in the political realm. The message has gone out to the new government that they have to make progress rapidly or else there will be a deterioration of relationships between the other trading partners and South Africa.

So, I would say, if your hypothesis is correct, and I hope it is not, that there is no progress, say, a year from now, that there would be a greater interest among the other trading partners in working with us on a coordinated basis.

Senator McCONNELL. Turning just for a moment to Namibia, the Anti-Apartheid Act imposes economic sanctions against Namibia. Do you have any view on whether we should now move to lift those sanctions, to move economic development along in that country?

Mr. COHEN. We have always opposed the extension of sanctions to Namibia. We always felt that it was not reasonable to cause the economy of Namibia to decline because of our problem with South Africa.

But I fully understand the congressional concern that Namibia might be used by the South African Government to evade sanctions.

However, I feel that as soon as Namibia goes through a free and fair election and this election is so certified by the United Nations, I would recommend that Congress lift sanctions immediately, because the economic problems caused by sanctions are now starting to bite in Namibia.

I refer specifically to the British-owned uranium operation there, which will have to proceed to lay off a considerable number of workers because they are unable to export uranium to the United States.

So, once the election is in place, I believe that it would no longer be conceivable that South Africa would utilize Namibia to evade sanctions. And we should move smartly to lift those sanctions.

Senator McCONNELL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sanford.

Senator SANFORD. Thank you very much.

Thank you for being here and for bringing us this good information.

I take it, basically, you are saying that for us to take drastic actions, such as additional sanctions right now, that that would be counterproductive and would weaken De Klerk's hand in dealing with the people that he has to bring along in his own government?

Mr. COHEN. I agree with that, Senator; yes.

Senator SANFORD. And I think it is a question of judgment that can easily be exercised as we go along, as to whether or not that judgement remains valid, in view of changing events, which will take some time.

Mr. COHEN. That is correct, Senator; yes.

Senator SANFORD. But sometime does not mean years, though it probably does mean months.

Mr. COHEN. That is correct.

Senator SANFORD. Now, we hear talk about postapartheid development and postapartheid programs. What does that concept mean to you?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, I believe it means a new constitutional order in which every individual South African can feel that he is fully a member of society in every respect, including full political rights and full human rights, and that no one can be subject to the arbitrary decisions of a minority in that country.

Senator SANFORD. You comment in your statement, not too specifically, but certainly a clear intention that there are things that you can do through the universities by targeted assistance, things

you can do for community development, maybe through the universities or otherwise.

Do you assume that if there were a restructuring of the constitution fairly soon there would still be a necessity for this kind of education and community responsibility in the kind of leadership roles that the people who have been deprived have not been accustomed to playing? Does postapartheid envision some kind of a transitional period of education and training?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, I believe the transition has already begun. And there will be a requirement for many nonwhites to assume positions of responsibility. There are not enough right now who have the required education because apartheid has deprived them of it, mainly through the nonallocation of resources or the misallocation of resources. So, that a major effort has to be made right now to put more resources into education.

For example, there are a number of universities in South Africa that have become multiracial, contrary to government policy. The University of Capetown, for example; the University of Witwatersrand. They are as much as 25 to 35 percent multiracial, with multiracial dormitories.

And lots of blacks want to go to those universities. They either do not have the money or they need remedial help because of the poor education they got in high school. So, that is where we want to put more resources in.

The government also understands this and wants to put more resources into it.

Senator SANFORD. But is the Government of South Africa putting any resources into that particular kind of effort?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, they are.

Senator SANFORD. To any degree?

Mr. COHEN. They are, but they claim that they are limited right now because of sanctions.

Senator SANFORD. You say the transition is in progress. Well, obviously the transition to change is surely in progress by all signs, but what does transition mean in that sense? What do you mean by transition?

Mr. COHEN. I would say, Senator, we are right now in what I would call a prenegotiating phase. There is a lot of maneuvering going on between the government and the black leadership, signals are being sent, leading up to what I call talks about talks.

And I think it is palpable, you can see it.

Senator SANFORD. Well, does postapartheid embrace the concept that there still is a lot of education in citizenship, in voting, in participation in government? Are we giving any thought to how we are going to see that come out?

Mr. COHEN. Well, we are not prescribing specific political results from a negotiation. It is a unique situation. They have to negotiate their own political framework I believe.

Senator SANFORD. But is there any way other countries can be of help in providing for the kind of broad citizenship education that it seems to me is essential?

Mr. COHEN. I think you are right. And I think this is where we want to put some resources, through our AID program in that country.

Senator SANFORD. And I suppose the last question would be, given that this policy now will be fairly well the policy of the administration, and I hope, at least in your words for the time being, the policy of the Congress, what can we expect to do effectively in bringing about the kind of postapartheid training and development that we have just talked about? Do we really have any influence much?

Mr. COHEN. I think we have influence because we talk to everyone. We talk to the black leadership, we talk to the white government. This is part of the argument that I made in my testimony, that we must maintain communications with everyone. And we do not want to break with the white leadership, we want to talk to them. And the same with the blacks, those who are in exile, those who are inside the country.

We have modest resources because of our own budgetary constraints, but we want to focus those resources on developing talent and developing aptitudes, which are out there in the black community, to help them assume the positions of leadership which they will be called upon to assume in the not too distant future.

Senator SANFORD. I am certainly glad to know that and I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Cohen, have UNITA supply lines through Zaire been cut off?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, this is a subject which is covered by another committee, and I am not permitted to talk about that in open session.

Senator HELMS. Why would it be a secret?

Mr. COHEN. Excuse me?

Senator HELMS. Why would it be a secret?

Mr. COHEN. It is effectively under our covert action category, and we are not permitted to discuss it outside the intelligence committees.

Now it is an open secret that we do this, but the details of what is happening, amounts, funding, I think, should not be discussed in open session.

Senator HELMS. Well, I did not ask you for any details; I just asked you yes or no. Have UNITA's supplies been interrupted?

Mr. COHEN. Well, that was a detail, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. When did George Bush get a haircut last? Is that a secret too?

Mr. COHEN. I do not know, sir.

Senator HELMS. I do not have any secret information, but I could say publicly that reliable information says that the supply lines have been cut, and you and I know why it was done and who did it.

Mr. Mobutu got his hackles up because Jonas Savimbi would not knuckle under and comply with that Zaire summit garbage.

Let us go to South Africa just a little bit. I spent 8 days there 2 or 3 years ago. The majority of the time was spent with the opposition leaders, the blacks, the coloreds. They were unanimous in their opposition to sanctions.

As a matter of fact, each one of them, without exception, volunteered to come to the United States and talk about this issue.

When I returned to Washington, I wrote to the Washington Post and the New York Times, and ABC and NBC and CBS, and said, "Why do you not invite these folks to come see you? They will come at their own expense." I said, "You are always trotting out Bishop Tutu as the spokesman for everybody in South Africa, when, as a matter of fact, Tutu's church does not even agree with him on the issue."

I am hearing from these opposition leaders in South Africa that the administration, our administration, is seen as being willing to meet only with and implicitly supporting only those South African blacks identified with the African National Congress and its policies of violence and revolution.

Now, that impression—that the administration is dealing only with the blacks identified with the ANC—was furthered yesterday by your meeting with Thabo Mbeki of the ANC. It is all right for you to meet with him, but I want to ask you why there was no attempt to meet with Chief Minister Buthelezi when he was in the United States recently? Why just a one-sided posture on the part of our Government? What is wrong with Mr. Buthelezi?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, there is nothing wrong with Buthelezi; he has been received at the White House many times. Just prior to his visit to the United States, I met with him in his headquarters city of Ulundi. In fact, I am wearing my Buthelezi tie this morning, Kwazulu, which he gave me.

And I think the reason he was not received at the White House during his visit was he came during the vacation period.

So, we consider Chief Buthelezi one of the main leaders of the black community; of course, not the only one. And we also consider the ANC to be very popular among a vast segment of the black community, so we talk to them. Our policy is to talk to all of the representative leaders of the black community, of which Buthelezi is one; which Thabo Mbeki of the ANC is another.

Senator HELMS. Was everybody on vacation when Mr. Buthelezi was here?

Mr. COHEN. The top people were. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Was he invited to the State Department?

Mr. COHEN. He did not come to Washington, he was in Atlanta, I believe, or some other city.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know, planes do operate.

Mr. COHEN. He was certainly welcome to come to the State Department if he came to Washington.

Senator HELMS. Did you invite him?

Mr. COHEN. He was invited. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. You sure about that?

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Well, Mr. Buthelezi is not sure about that.

Have you met with John Gogotya? Do you know who he is?

Mr. COHEN. John?

Senator HELMS. Gogotya.

Mr. COHEN. I do not know him.

Senator HELMS. He is the president of the Federal Independent Democratic Alliance in South Africa.

Mr. COHEN. I have not met with him. No.

Senator HELMS. This alliance is the largest black political party or coalition of such parties in South Africa today.

You do not even know him? Never heard of him?

Mr. COHEN. I have never heard of him. No.

Senator HELMS. Would you promise me that you will make it a point to look into him and see whether he is worthy of being talked with?

Mr. COHEN. I would be glad to make that promise.

Senator HELMS. Now, it is no secret that a lot of us have been concerned about the African National Congress and its ties to the South African Communist Party. Do you have any such concern?

Mr. COHEN. We are concerned with the fact that a number of members of the ANC executive committee are also simultaneously members of the Communist Party. We do not think this is a healthy situation.

Senator HELMS. Well, let's go back to your confirmation hearing and my written questions. In your response you stated that only 2 of the 34 members of the executive committee have been, using your words, "positively identified" as Communist.

But I will say this for you, Mr. Cohen, you acknowledged that experts estimate that approximately half of the ANC's executive committee members belong to the South African Communist Party.

A Central Intelligence Agency unclassified study identified eight members of the ANC executive who were clearly Communist. It further asserted that another five were clearly identified with Communist-front organizations or had written for Communist publications.

Another two ANC executives were believed by our own Government to be Communist, according to the CIA. And a bunch of the rest of them were trained—where? In the Soviet Union.

I just wonder if the State Department is aware that the CIA considers a greater number of executive committee members to be Communist. Are you now aware of that?

Mr. COHEN. I am aware of it, sir.

Senator HELMS. The question has got to be in the minds of a lot of people, including me, "Why is U.S. policy so focused on dealing with this obviously Communist backed organization rather than with the other non-Communist black opposition leaders?" You acknowledge you did not even know one of them.

Now, do you meet with the leaders of all opposition parties, as I did?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator HELMS. Have they stated to you their feelings about sanctions?

Mr. COHEN. Yes, they do, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Have you found one who is in favor of sanctions?

Mr. COHEN. I found many who are in favor of sanctions.

Senator HELMS. They told you they were in favor of sanctions?

Mr. COHEN. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Who were they?

Mr. COHEN. Well, I have met people in the United Democratic Front, for example. The United Democratic Front is a major umbrella organization of over 700 community organizations in South

Africa. And many of the leaders there have told me that they favor sanctions.

I have met with the Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU, and most of those leaders have told me they are in favor of sanctions. ANC have told me.

However, some of the comments I had——

Senator HELMS. Why do you suppose blacks told me to the contrary?

Mr. COHEN. You met with the same people?

Senator HELMS. You have not mentioned any names.

Mr. COHEN. I do not know, but I must say, Senator, it was not unanimous. For example, I met with someone from an organization called AZAPO, which has a certain amount of following, and that individual said to me, "I favor sanctions that hurt apartheid, but I do not favor sanctions that hurt black people." I said, "What do you mean by that?" And he said, "Disinvestment of American companies hurts black people, so I am opposed to that. But other types of sanctions which hurt apartheid, which refuse to sell computer equipment to the South African police," he says, "I like that."

So, it is not unanimous that they like—everyone likes blanket sanctions.

Senator HELMS. Well, you bet it is not. Because we are going to hear testimony this morning from the Gallup organization, on a poll which shows black South Africans overwhelmingly opposed to sanctions, over 60 percent are opposed to them.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a word of slight disagreement with my colleague from North Carolina here. First of all, on the ANC in the background here, I think it is of interest that Nelson Mandela, at one point, wanted to exclude Communists from the ANC. But he was persuaded that the ANC should be an umbrella organization that took in everyone. There is no question that there are Communists within the organization.

I also remember and, Mr. Secretary, you were there with the President, when the President of Zambia said, could he begin lunch with us, a small group of us who were there, with prayer, and I said, of course. And after we had the opening prayer and we sat down, he said, "I have lunch regularly with Oliver Tambo, the head of the ANC, and he said, 'one time, I say grace and the next time he says grace.' "

I have not met too many Communist leaders who say grace before lunch, I have to say. If we simply characterize the ANC as a Communist organization, we are just fooling ourselves. The reality is, to the extent that any one organization really does represent the hopes and aspirations of the people of South Africa, the blacks of South Africa, I think the ANC comes as close to that as any.

And as far as black leadership, when I was in South Africa, I met with the leaders of all three major trade unions who are nonwhites, all of whom were in favor of sanctions.

Now, specifically, if I may ask two questions of you. You say in your statement, "We intend to increase assistance for university

scholarships, human rights, and community leadership. We will seek to upgrade VOA transmissions to South Africa, provide targeted assistance to universities in South Africa that are open to all students, regardless of race."

Are you talking about fiscal year 1991? What kind of timetable are we talking about, and what kind of dollars are we talking about?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, we have a proposed budget of $24.9 million for fiscal year 1990 for our activities in South Africa.

I gather that the Congress has earmarked $10 million for bursaries out of the ESF fund. So, if that is the case, we will have a budget of $34.9 million in fiscal year 1990.

In fiscal year 1991, we would like to increase that in all of the categories—mainly, in the area of scholarships and assistance to education.

Now, I want to call your attention to the fact that, assisting the universities that have gone multiracial, that are effectively making a contribution to fighting apartheid, we would require congressional assistance. Because under the CAAA, we are not permitted to give assistance to any government organization or agency. These universities are effectively government schools, so we wanted to talk to you about getting Congress to cooperate with us on that particular issue.

Senator SIMON. I can only speak for myself, but I think you will find Congress very willing to work with you on that, as well as the lifting of sanctions on Namibia after the election, assuming that things go well.

You say the administration is committed to effective enforcement of existing sanctions. I guess what I am looking for is that strict enforcement and then, at the same time, carrots that we can give to—you know, I am also for lifting sanctions, you know, on a piece-by-piece basis, when we really see solid movement in South Africa.

In terms of effective enforcement, is there—you are aware of the GAO criticism of enforcement. What steps are being taken to see that we really are getting effective enforcement?

Mr. COHEN. Senator, we are aware of and we take very seriously the GAO criticism of the lack of a list of products coming from parastatal organizations, and we are now working with the Customs Department very actively to make sure that there is precise listings of products.

I might add that I do not believe that there has been any leaks of prohibited items coming in to the United States, but the GAO criticism is quite accurate, and we should move quickly to plug that leak and we are doing it—not the leak but the loophole.

Senator SIMON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sanford.

Senator SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I think that we have probably asked all the questions that I think need to be asked unless others disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I would concur in that view, and I thank you, Secretary Cohen, for being with us this morning.

We will now turn to our public panel and would ask them to come forward. They are Mr. Jim Martin, National Legislative Director of the Congress on Racial Equality; Ms. Gretchen Eick, National Director of IMPACT; Mr. Neil Upmeyer, Vice President of the Gallup Organization; and Dr. Pauline Baker, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Why do we not just go from left to right. We welcome Dr. Baker, who is an alumna of this committee.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAULINE BAKER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. BAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here and see old faces and old friends again.

I would like to open my remarks at the outset——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you bring the microphone a little closer, please.

Dr. BAKER. Yes, sir.

I would like to open my remarks at the outset by first putting, I think, the remarks that you heard earlier into context. Essentially that means identifying how the policy environment is different today compared to the Reagan administration for I feel that most of the factors that have emerged in the past couple of years set the parameters for U.S. policy in the 1990's.

Basically, there are three major developments that emerged during the 1980's that put a different cast on the United States approach to South Africa. The first is deepening involvement in the area diplomatically, militarily, and economically.

The United States brokered the Angola-Namibia Accords and is acting as a coguarantor, along with the Soviet Union, for their effective implementation.

The United States strongly backs the Mozambique Government and is encouraging negotiations to end the insurgency there.

Washington is also involved in Angola and negotiated the Angola-Namibia Accords with the MPLA, and even though the United States and Angola do not have formal diplomatic relations, it decided in 1985 to lift the ban on military supplies with the result that the United States is now the principal arms supplier to UNITA, and it supports a regional initiative aimed at bringing the warring parties together for national reconciliation.

Economically, too, the United States has increased aid to the countries in the region and to groups inside South Africa. Even disinvestment and sanctions, often portrayed as measures that diminish the United States presence in South Africa, are, in fact, symptoms of growing concern and activism. While not always consistent, coherent or well coordinated, these trends are indicators of a deepening American commitment to have an impact on events in the region.

The second major development is the higher salience which South Africa has gained as an issue in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me for interrupting, but I believe each of the witnesses were asked to confine their remarks around 5 minutes or so so that we could get into questions.

Dr. BAKER. Then what I will do is ask that this statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be submitted in full as if read.

Dr. BAKER. Thank you.

What I would like to then do in summing up is to say—I had not gotten that instruction, I might say. I just was asked if I would make a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for the error on the part of the committee.

Dr. BAKER. OK.

In response to what I think I have heard this morning, I think what I would like to say is that my view of events in South Africa is somewhat different than that presented by Assistant Secretary Cohen; that is, I am less optimistic that we are going to see a fundamental change in the near future.

I think we are going to see a zigzagging of developments, and that the zigzagging, in a sense, represents the contradictions that are occurring in the society.

To be sure, there are some very encouraging things that are happening. I think that, for example, the relaxation of restrictions on peaceful demonstrations is a very important development.

But, before we make the conclusion that this is a sign of real reform, I would like to see this right of peaceful protest be embedded in law as a basic, fundamental right of the people.

I do think there is some progress toward beginning negotiations. I also think the administration has taken some good first steps, particularly in opening up ties to leading apartheid figures and in the President receiving Mrs. Sisulu, Bishop Tutu, Alan Boesak.

I think the President was also right in refraining from meeting with Mr. deKlerk while he was involved in an internal election, because I think that would have been used for internal political purposes; and I think the administration was right to spell out very clearly, as Ambassador Cohen did this morning, the specific steps we would like to see in the months ahead to create the climate for negotiations.

But it would be a mistake to expect too much public relations to let things drift of their own accord. If we stand back and say, "let us just wait and see what happens," and not be in there trying to help set the agenda, then I think that would give the new government a chance to consolidate its position, to buy more time, and to come up with more of the same.

I do not agree with Ambassador Cohen that the new government stands for a nonracial democracy. I think that was the platform of the democratic party, which did extremely well in the last election. But the national party has rejected that idea and still clings to racial categories.

If you look at the intentions of the new government, I think that the only evidence you can find is the platform it actually ran on, a platform which was based on a 5-year plan that said, essentially, that there would be a new constitution based on new racial groups, the four which now exist, plus possibly a fifth—South Africans, a non-group group. The government proposes a constitution in which none of those groups would have the chance to outvote the other; this means that each group would have a veto over the other,

giving whites disproportionate control over the wishes of the majority.

It seems to me that this kind of thinking is still racial thinking. It may be a kinder, gentler apartheid, but apartheid nonetheless. It is not a move to what I would consider to be a nonracial democracy.

And, insofar as we do not see that kind of new thinking, insofar as we do not see the steps toward fundamental change which I think some of the members of the committee were suggesting this morning, that I would not be too hasty in concluding that this is a government which is fundamentally committed to a new agenda.

In conclusion, I would, therefore, say that I think that the justification for sanctions still exists. I think there is a possibility for creating a bipartisan consensus on this score.

I also have some reservations about some of the data which, as Senator Helms suggested and I think which subsequent witnesses are going to present, that argues that blacks overwhelmingly opposed to sanctions. However sophisticated the pollster and the polling methods, it seems to me that in a situation like South Africa, you cannot get honest answers while there is a jail sentence looming if, in fact, your answers are "wrong," in communities where there is a lot of fear and intimidation about police informers, and in a country where there is censorship and no real debate on this issue.

So, I would be skeptical of polling methods which use methods and procedures that are used in a free open society. In South Africa these conditions do not exist. There is not a free and open debate open debate on issues and, therefore, one cannot expect that the answers in a survey of this type is an accurate measure of real feelings and attitudes

In the absence of those conditions, the only thing we can do is rely on the opinions of those whom we regard as major black leaders to ask what they think about these issues. In that respect, I would say that the overwhelming majority of them do favor additional pressures.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Baker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BAKER

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, as you consider US policy towards South Africa. I believe that it would be useful, at the outset, to identify the main factors which now shape the US approach to South Africa, noting in particular how different the policy environment is today compared to the Reagan administration. These factors set the parameters for US policy in the 1990s.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Basically, there are three major developments that emerged during the 1980s that put a different cast on the US approach to the region of Southern Africa.

The first is deepening American involvement in the area -- diplomatically, militarily and economically. The US brokered the Angola-Namibia Accords and is acting as a co-guarantor, along with the Soviet Union, for their effective implementation. The US strongly backs the Mozambique government and is encouraging negotiations to end the insurgency there. Washington is also involved in Angola: it negotiated the Angola-Namibia with the MPLA government, even though the US and Angola do not have formal diplomatic relations; it decided in 1985 to lift the ban on military supplies to any group in the territory, with the result that the US is now the principle arms supplier to UNITA; and it supports a regional initiative aimed at bringing the warring parties together for national reconciliation.

Economically, too, the US has increased aid to the countries in the region and to groups inside South Africa. Even disinvestment and sanctions -- often portrayed as measures that

diminish the US presence in South Africa -- are, in fact, symptoms of growing concern and activism. While not always consistent, coherent or well-coordinated, these trends are indicators of a deepening American commitment to have an impact on events in the region.

The second major development is the higher salience which South Africa has gained as an issue in the US. Indeed, many Americans feel that the position which the United States takes on South Africa reflects America's most basic values -- including its attitude toward racial justice. This represents an important shift from the past. Traditionally, strategic and economic considerations have largely shaped Washington's response to apartheid. Since the mid-1980s, human rights have been the single most important criterion.

This differentiates the US position from that of most of its allies. In the US, South Africa is as much a domestic issue as it is a foreign policy issue. For Britain, West Germany, Japan and most others, economic and strategic considerations remain the primary considerations. While it certainly would be preferable to have a common multilateral position, the US has a strong domestic imperative to consider in pressing for an end to apartheid. It must strike its own pose, reflecting this vital domestic interest, not tag along behind a more cautious approach of allies who may have a different set of priorities.

The third major development arises from the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 -- a watershed event in US-South Africa relations. Congress established, for the first time, that South Africa would have to pay a price for suppressing black protest and withholding political rights from its citizens. The CAAA also overturned what used to be a main tenet of US

policy: namely, that the threat of sanctions is better than actual sanctions as a means to influence Pretoria. Congress concluded, to the contrary, that threatening South Africa was no longer sufficient and that a credible policy had to be based on tangible pressure. This notion was institutionalized in law and now can only be changed with the consent of Congress.

These three factors - heightened US involvement in Southern Africa, domestic pressure to promote human rights and racial justice, and the use of sanctions to press for democracy in South Africa -- are the foundation stones upon which a bipartisan consensus must be built if it is to be politically sustainable.

REGIONAL EVENTS

A fourth factor must also be taken into account at this stage: the fluidity of events in Southern Africa itself. Namibia is on the road to independence. The Cubans are withdrawing from Angola. The Soviet Union has adopted a more flexible and pragmatic policy toward Southern Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pretoria government are both offering initiatives that purport to move toward negotiations.

Within South Africa, a new president has been inaugurated. F.W. De Klerk has made some encouraging gestures, notably a greater tolerance of anti-apartheid protest. He has also made some sweeping promises to usher in "a new era." This sounds good, but observers may be expecting too much. As talk of the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners was being made, for example, some 240 more people were detained. As demonstrations were permitted in Cape Town, others were denied in Pretoria.

This zig-zagging will confuse observes about the real intentions of the government. What they show is the sharp internal divisions within the National Party about which way to go. In what may be the most significant signal De Klerk has sent to the international community yet, the new president warned in his inaugural speech that "we cannot accept responsibility for overenthusiastic or even twisted versions of our policy" -- a caveat that should not go unheeded.

Demographic and economic pressures are nevertheless mounting within the society; these represent genuine sources of hope. Urban communities, such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, are pressing for an end to segregation of public facilities. Another encouraging sign was the showing of the Democratic Party (DP) in the September elections. The DP called for a one-person, one-vote, non-racial democracy, the first time in South African history that such a clear pro-democracy stand was adopted as a party platform in a white election. Only two years ago, the liberal Progressive Federal Party, which was absorbed into the DP, was dealt a shattering blow at the polls, though it did not take nearly as forthright a position. The DP captured 20% of the white vote and has the biggest growth potential today.

By contrast, the National Party suffered a severe setback, with the loss of 29 seats. So narrow was its victory that 1,700 votes cast in key districts could have resulted in a hung parliament. The far right Conservative Party did not do as well as expected, but it cannot be dismissed. It would be too early to write it off as a party which has peaked in popularity. Its showing in the election showed instead that it has stabilized, with roughly 30% of the electorate. It represents a political constituency that the NP will not treat lightly. Indeed, the NP

and the CP, though political rivals, cling to the same "group concept" that is the fundamental cornerstone of apartheid.

Electoral trends suggest a continuing fragmentation of white politics and a disenchantment with the policies of the National Party. It is not accurate to conclude, as De Klerk has, that the DP and the NP vote together constitutes a 70% mandate for the government's reform program. The DP stood for something entirely different. The NP may put its own spin on the results, but that will not change the fundamental reality of its disintegrating electoral base. Some see this trend as a discouraging sign that will make the NP unduly cautious. However, this assumes that the NP is committed to fundamental change, which is by no means evident yet. Moreover, it dismisses the possibly that a narrow political base could be an incentive for change. The next few years represents the last chance the National Party has to reach a breakthrough or risk defeat at the next election.

Even more heartening has been the revival of the black resistance within South Africa. After four long, hard years under a harsh state of emergency, the anti-apartheid Defiance Campaign was launched in August, with peaceful demonstrations waged throughout the country. Resembling the American civil rights movement and including people of all races, the latest demonstrations have drawn the biggest crowds in 30 years. They have stimulated a "protest fever" that has been remarkably disciplined, despite pent-up frustrations and anger that persists just below the surface.

REFORM OR NEGOTIATIONS?

Does this mean that reform is inevitable, regardless of De Klerk's intentions, and that the US should stand back and let it

take place naturally? That depends what is meant by reform. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, reform has been so deep and so penetrating that observers wonder if the breathtaking transformations can be sustained. In South Africa, reform has been so modest and so tentative, that observers are concerned that they might be misleading, or even worse, meaningless.

Here is where consideration of "next steps" becomes critical. The US needs to avoid the trap of being too anxious to find progress where none or little exists. We did this previously, when we endorsed the 1984 constitution that even the government now considers a failure. The US endorsement of the tricameral legislature angered blacks and encouraged the South African government to continue along the track of race-based political dispensations that exclude blacks. A similar mistake could be made again if we endorse programs that may look like forward movement, but are really a step backwards.

The five-year plan announced by the National Party during the election campaign is such a step. It is based, like the current tricameral legislature, on race. At best, it is a "kinder, gentler apartheid;" at worst, a provocative act that could set off a new round of violent opposition.

President de Klerk's gestures must therefore be looked at with the closest scrutiny and set in proper context. The US should not accept any change and applaud it as encouraging; change can go backwards or forwards, resolving conflict or worsening it.

Take the example of the government's apparent relaxation of restrictions on dissent. This is, on the surface, welcome. But

peaceful protest should not be a privilege granted at the personal discretion of one man. Nor should it be tolerated as a tactic to improve the country's international image. Rather, it should be legally guaranteed as a fundamental right of the people. That is the basic difference between De Klerk's notion of reform and what the international community wants. His gestures represent the form, not substance, of change. They do not alter the structure of society or enhance the rights of individuals. Without fulfillment of these expectations, such measures could set matters back.

The focus, therefore, should not be on reform, but on negotiations -- with the ANC and other representative groups, and with an open agenda. Now is the time to press ahead toward this goal.

OPTIONS

President Bush has made a good start by seeing high level delegations, such as those led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Rev. Allan Boesak, and Albertina Sisulu. This helped set the right tone and corrected the impression given by the last administration that the US had titled toward the white regime. The president was also wise to refrain from seeing De Klerk during South Africa's electoral campaign, as that would have been used for internal political purposes. And the administration was right to state clearly that Pretoria should release political prisoners, end the state of emergency and unban proscribed organizations.

What concerns me is the lack of concerted effort to fortify these measures with tangible pressure at the time when it can

most make a difference. The administration took eight months to conclude its policy review, without reaching any firm conclusions on how to proceed. It argues, in its report to Congress, that we should adopt a wait-and-see approach "to allow South Africans an opportunity to negotiate their own solutions." But the administration itself confirms that "there is no negotiated settlement for the end of apartheid nor any negotiations."

If the US stands back now, when things are in flux, then it will be allowing the South African government to set the agenda, buy more time, and consolidate its plans. If we find, after giving Pretoria this time, that it is not prepared to move toward genuine negotiations nor take the steps necessary to end apartheid, then we will once again be confronted with the painful choice of either imposing "punitive sanctions" after the damage is done or doing nothing. That would likely revive the domestic debate over South Africa and undermine the chances for a sustainable bipartisan consensus.

We are no longer in the stage of debating whether sanctions should or should not be part of US policy. Sanctions already are institutionalized in law. Now we should build on the precedent set in the CAAA, by adopting "positive sanctions" for proactive measures that can reasonably be taken by the South African government.

This does not mean that there should be immediate, comprehensive measures. Rather, targeted financial sanctions should be tied to specific goals, such as those spelled out by the administration as necessary steps for negotiations -- lifting the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners and unbanning the ANC and other outlawed organizations. The

rescheduling of South Africa's debt is an opportunity to exert influence in this way. Approximately $8 billion out of $21 billion total debt is due for repayment by June 1990. Political conditions were placed on other regimes, such as Poland, before the West approved certain economic rewards. There is no reason why steps, tailored to met the South African situation, should not be taken to end apartheid just as they have been taken to end communism.

Existing sanctions already have had an effect. This is confirmed by South Africans themselves, including business and financial leaders. Their anti-sanctions lobbying demonstrates the leverage created by sanctions when little existed before. Moreoever, sanctions deprived the South African government of needed resources to carry on in Angola and Namibia; they helped pave the way for the peace agreements brokered by the Reagan administration. Sanctions have also affected the thinking of the white electorate, which swung to the left, not the right, as it began to feel the pinch. Most importantly, sanctions are introducing a note of realism, making whites realize that the sagging economy cannot be revived without giving political rights to blacks.

There are those who argue that blacks oppose sanctions, citing various polling data. None of them are very persuasive. It difficult for anyone to state with certainty that he knows what blacks think. No matter how sophisticated the pollster, it is patently impossible to determine, through conventional means used in a free and open society, the attitudes of people living under conditions of censorship, intimidation and fear.

In the black areas, there is widespread suspicion of outsiders seeking information, an honest answer is impossible

while the threat of a jail sentence looms, there is no public debate permitted on the pros and cons of the issue, and questions are frequently loaded in favor of the paying sponsors out to make a point. Until this situation changes, one can only take guidance on black attitudes from recognized leaders of popular organizations, such as the Mass Democratic Movement, the unions, the ANC and others, the overwhelming majority of whom favor additional pressures.

This is not to say that sanctions are a panacea. The most effective pressures for change are internal, as they always have been. Nor should sanctions be the central feature of American policy. But the US can assist democratic forces and strengthen their hand, by increasing the costs for Pretoria of resisting genuine negotiations, by providing assistance to black South Africans, and by offering our diplomatic services when appropriate.

Sanctions must be flexible. The terms for lifting these measures should be spelled out as precisely as the reasons for imposing them. In fact, the scope, timing and conditions for exercising various sanctions options should be the basis for bipartisan consultations between the executive and the legislative branches.

In fact, the precedent for co-ordinated action of this kind to end white minority rule in Africa was established by this committee in the late 1970s, when two Republicans authored what came to be known as the Case-Javits Amendment on Rhodesia. The amendment did not end tension between the Carter administration, which supported the maintenance of sanctions, and elements of Congress which tried to lift sanctions. But it did produce a

mechanism to press for negotiations to include all parties. That particular formula might not apply to South Africa, but the general principal certainly does.

By pursuing this course of action, the US Congress and the Bush administration can strike what, hopefully, will be a lasting bipartisan consensus that will meet two vital tests: it will reflect the deepening concern which Americans feel about this issue and it will play an effective role in shaping a new political order in South Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Upmeyer, maybe you could respond to that point that was just made by Dr. Baker.

STATEMENT OF NEIL UPMEYER, VICE PRESIDENT, THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., PRINCETON, NJ

Mr. UPMEYER. I would be happy to.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that your full statement will be inserted in the record as if read.

Mr. UPMEYER. Fine.

To get to the point that she just raised, then, I think that in our survey of South Africans, we have attempted to be as unbiased as possible in the wording of the questions and in the application of the research methodology to avoid the situation that the previous witness raised.

I was in South Africa during the administration of the survey and visited daily with the interviewers as they would come back from having conducted the interviews. It would have been inappropriate methodologically for me to actually go and witness the interviewing, but I spoke with the interviewers as they came back.

Remember now, that the interviewers are of the same race as the respondent interviewing the respondents in the language of their choice in order to make them feel as comfortable as possible.

I had no instance of any interviewer indicating to me that there was a significant amount of concern on the part of the respondents that forced them to modify their questions or modify their responses in some way for fear of the type of answer that they might get.

It is certainly the case that among young blacks in black townships such as Soweto there is a great deal of suspicion among the respondents or potential respondents about what this was all about, who are you and what are you doing here and why are you asking these questions.

But once the interviewers explained what they were doing there and what they were about, there was no hesitation on the part of

the respondents to answer the questions, and I think the evidence of that is in the survey results, which is to say that we ask—well, first let me say about the formulation of the questionnaire, the objective in any survey research is to make the respondent feel at ease with the situation.

You certainly would not open an interview with blacks in South Africa by immediately saying are you an ANC member? Do you believe in the ANC? So that the questionnaire is structured to make people feel at ease.

It opens by talking to people about what their concerns are, about themselves, people like themselves both in society and in their work and eases them into a discussion of sanctions and divestment. But it finishes by asking people their views with regard to political organizations.

And specifically we asked two questions right at the end of the interview. One was, "which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support most" and then we followed that with the question, "which other of these leaders or organizations do you support."

Now, these were in-person interviews, needless to say, so the respondents were actually shown a card that had names listed on it, and there were probably 12.

Among blacks the organization or leader most prominently mentioned was the ANC—13 percent said that they would support the ANC most. So, I think that the fact that blacks were willing to participate in this survey and were willing to freely say that they most support the ANC is an indication of the fact that they did not feel threatened by this.

Now, I want to reemphasize that the point here is that this was the last question of the survey. It was not the point of the survey. It was not the point to find out how people stand politically, but rather to talk about the subject of sanctions and divestment.

So, there are people, for instance, 20 percent of the blacks, who refused to answer to that specific question. So, it is certainly the case that among blacks there is some hesitancy to be forthcoming, forthright about very specific political issues, but that did not keep black respondents from participating and in our judgment did not affect the results of the survey as a whole.

[The prepared statement and survey of Mr. Upmeyer follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. UPMEYER

The Gallup survey of South Africans on the issues of sanctions and divestment was conducted by the Gallup Organization, Inc. headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey in conjunction with Markinor, the South African affiliate of Gallup International, on behalf of the South African Chamber of Mines, the mining industry trade association. I was responsible for overall management of the project including questionnaire development, sample design and analysis of the survey results.

I personally believe that apartheid is abhorrent. I believe that our government and Americans as individuals should do all we can to bring an end to these oppressive policies. But I also believe it is wrong for us to put in place policies of our own that affect the lives of oppressed people without taking into consideration the opinions of those affected. In a country where some twenty-nine million are denied the right to voice their opinions through the ballot, survey research provides a mechanism through which black South Africans can speak for themselves.

Because sanctions and divestment have been widely advocated in this country as a means of forcing an end to apartheid, I am certainly aware of the sensitive nature of the findings from our survey. We have, therefore, taken great care to ensure that the questions were written fairly and that the survey method would produce an accurate representation of black public opinion in South Africa. I believe we have been successful in both regards.

Our survey of South Africans, conducted in March of this year, indicates strong opposition to economic sanctions imposed on South Africa by foreign governments and equally strong opposition to the idea of foreign divestment of corporate investment in South Africa. South Africans overwhelmingly believe that sanctions (84%) and divestment (85%) are bad ideas, and blacks and whites are equally likely to hold these views.

The possibility that sanctions and divestment will lead to higher unemployment and poverty is the reason most frequently given for thinking such policies are a bad idea.

Despite the strength of opposition to sanctions among blacks there are approximately one in six who believe sanctions are a good idea. The largest proportion of this group holds this opinion because they believe such a policy will pressure their government to abolish apartheid.

Backing for sanctions is strongest among blacks who told us they support the ANC (35%) or the UDF (31%). Support is also greater among blacks who live in urban areas compared to rural (25% -vs- 12%) and among those who are best informed politically compared to those who are less knowledgeable (30% -vs- 10%). But it should also be noted that 65% or more of blacks in each of these groups say they believe sanctions are a "bad idea" (ANC supporters - 65%, UDF supporters - 69%, urban residents - 74%, well informed - 70%).

We have also sought to ask questions about support for sanctions and divestment in the real world context of how they might affect actions of the South African government and how they might affect the people of South Africa.

When a variety of scenarios concerning the consequences of sanctions are posed to the respondents, the basis for and degree of opposition to sanctions is evident. Approximately six in ten blacks, for example, say they would oppose all sanctions even if such sanctions might cause the government to resign within five years. Opposition increases to two-thirds of the black population when a more stringent condition, that "many people would lose their jobs," is introduced.

Given the possibility that the respondent might lose his or her own job because of sanctions, more than three-quarters of all South Africans, including 93% of whites and 76% of blacks, would oppose sanctions. The negative response to sanctions is also evident among the 73% of blacks who disagree that non-whites are "prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa."

Concerning the expected reaction of the South African government to sanctions imposed by foreign governments, eight in ten South Africans, including 77% of blacks, think their government will make only a few small changes (43%) or no changes (36%) in its apartheid policy. Only 16% believe sanctions will lead the government to end apartheid. Approximately the same proportion (17%), see sanctions as a very successful means of changing the apartheid policies of South Africa. One-third, on the other hand, including the majority of whites, believe a policy of sanctions would not be at all successful in this regard. Another third believe sanctions can only be somewhat successful in forcing change.

Opinion regarding divestment by foreign corporations follows the same pattern as that regarding sanctions. Eighty-three percent think overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. Sixteen percent believe companies should divest because the South African government does not want companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if they do. Eighteen percent of blacks compared to only 7% of whites agree that divestment will force an end to apartheid.

This Gallup survey of South Africans is based on face to face interviews with 2,192 individuals. The interviews were conducted in the preferred language of the respondent by interviewers of the same race as the respondent. We conducted 1,400 interviews with a representative national sample of black South Africans. In addition, interviews with 392 white respondents are representative of the metropolitan white population of the country. One hundred interviews each were conducted with colored and asian race groups residing in the Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas respectively.

A separate survey using the same questionnaire and sampling methodology was conducted during the same time period of a representative sample of the squatter population residing in the Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban

metropolitan areas. I went to South Africa while the survey was under way and talked at great length with the black, colored, asian, and white interviewers as they returned from their interviews. I have complete faith in their work and that of the methodology and research staff at Markinor.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to tell you about this survey. I have provided more detailed information about the survey findings in the attached summary.

Summary of Major Findings

Overall Opinion Concerning the Policies of Sanctions and Divestment

South Africans overwhelmingly believe that sanctions (84%) and divestment (85%) are bad ideas.

Blacks and whites are equally likely to think divestment (89% of whites and 85% of blacks) is a bad idea. But whites voice stronger opposition to the idea of sanctions (95%) than do black South Africans (82%).

The possibility that sanctions and disinvestment will lead to higher unemployment is the reason most frequently given for thinking such policies are a bad idea.

Among the 14% of blacks who think divestment is a good idea, one-third (35%) say they think so because divestment may help get rid of apartheid. Another 21% say divestment will put pressure on the government to bring about changes faster, and 13% say divestment will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

Among the 16% of blacks who think sanctions are a good idea, 35% say that such a policy puts pressure on their government to abolish apartheid. Another 18% say sanctions will bring change more quickly, 10% think sanctions will make all race groups suffer together, and 8% say that sanctions will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

Opinion of Sanctions Under Certain Conditions

While 83% think sanctions are generally a bad idea, six in ten South Africans, including 78% of whites and 58% of blacks oppose all sanctions conditioned on the possibility that such policies would cause the South African government to step down within five years.

Thirty-one percent support sanctions to some degree given the assumption that the government will resign as a consequence. This includes 16% who would support all sanctions and 16% who would support only sanctions that do not harm them personally.

Blacks (33%) are generally more supportive than whites (12%) of sanctions that would result in the government resigning.

Given a more stringent condition that "many people would lose their

jobs," more than two-thirds (69%) would oppose all sanctions. Ninety percent of whites and nearly two-thirds (65%) of blacks hold this view.

Given the possibility the respondent might lose his or her own job because of sanctions, more than three-quarters (including 93% of whites and 76% of blacks) would oppose these policies. But 14% of blacks say they would support sanctions and boycotts even under these conditions of personal hardship.

Only one-quarter (25%) of South Africans, regardless of race, agree that non-whites are "prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa."

More than three-quarters (79%) of South Africans think their government will make only a few small changes (43%) or no changes in policy (36%) in response to sanctions imposed by other countries.

Only 16% believe sanctions will lead the government to end apartheid. Half (50%) of all South Africans believe that sanctions imposed by the U.S. against South Africa would be at least somewhat successful in forcing changes to South Africa's apartheid policies.

Blacks (20%) are particularly likely compared to whites (2%) to think that sanctions would be very successful in changing apartheid. Only 28% of blacks think sanctions would not be successful at all. A majority of whites (57%), on the other hand, believe sanctions will not succeed in changing apartheid.

Opinion Regarding Divestment

83% think overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. Sixteen percent believe companies should divest because the South African government does not want companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if they do. Eighteen percent of blacks compared to only 7% of whites agree that divestment will force an end to apartheid.

South Africans who believe that divestment will force their government to abandon apartheid are almost evenly divided between those who think blacks will suffer only a little (53%) as a consequence and those who think they will suffer a great deal (47%).

A near majority (47%) think divestment by American companies would be very successful (16%) or somewhat successful (31%) as a policy to bring an end to apartheid, but 37% think divestment will not be at all successful.

Whites (64%) are twice as likely as blacks (32%) to believe that divestment will not succeed in forcing an end to apartheid.

Eighteen percent of blacks believe divestment could be very successful in bringing an end to apartheid. Only 2% of whites hold this opinion.

Role of American Companies

A substantial majority (58%) of South Africans (including 51% of whites and 59% of blacks) think that American companies in South Africa can help make the government change away from apartheid.

Three-quarters (75%) of South Africans (including 84% of whites and 73% of blacks) believe ending American business operations in South Africa would have a bad effect on the lives of blacks in that country.

Nearly three-quarters (73%) think that ending American business operations would seriously hurt the South African economy. But this view is more prevalent among blacks (77%) than among whites (50%). Forty-five percent of whites think such action by American companies will hurt their economy only a little.

While six in ten (60%) think divestment will seriously hurt the strength of the South African government, this view is most prevalent among blacks (69%). Whites are more likely to think divestment will effect the strength of the government only a little (42%) or not at all (37%).

A near majority (48%), regardless of race, have a worse opinion of American companies that have left their country.

Majorities of South Africans believe American business activity:

- contributes to a higher standard of living for black South Africans (78%);
- provides black workers with good jobs that would not otherwise exist (74%);
- does not contribute to the misuse of black workers (60%);
- does not help to continue racial segregation and discrimination (58%).

Problems Faced by South Africans

In open-ended or free-response questions, South Africans were asked to discuss what they think are the three most serious problems that people face in their country generally and the work-place specifically. In a third open-ended question, respondents were asked what changes they would like to see in the life and work of people like themselves.

Unemployment is most often cited by South Africans as being one of the most serious problems that people in their country face. Overall, half (49%) of the South Africans surveyed name unemployment, while 23% cite apartheid or racial discrimination, and 19% say housing is one of the most serious problems.

There are, however, significant differences in the perception of how important various problems are according to the race of the respondent. Non-white South Africans are much more concerned than whites about matters of day to day living such as unemployment, housing, and education. A majority of non-whites (55%) name unemployment as one of the most serious problems for South Africans. This is the problem named by the largest proportion of the non-white population. Only 13% of whites said unemployment is one of the most serious problems.

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There is a less dramatic but still significant distinction in opinions held by blacks compared to whites over the degree to which apartheid and racial discrimination are considered among the most serious problems facing the nation. One-third of whites (32%) cite apartheid as a serious problem. This is the problem singled out by the largest proportion of the white population. While more than one in five (21%) blacks agree, this is a much smaller proportion than the 55% who name unemployment.

More than one in five non-whites (21%) also name housing as a serious problem compared to only 6% of whites. And 15% of non-whites say low education standards are a problem compared to 5% of whites who say the same thing.

While whites most frequently cite apartheid as a serious problem, the matter that is of major concern to the second largest proportion of whites is inflation (cited by 26%).

In the work-place, the major problem for all South Africans, cited by 56%, is the level of pay. While blacks and whites agree that low pay is a major problem, a substantial majority (59%) of blacks single out low pay. Only one-third (34%) of whites cite low levels of compensation as a major problem. Whites also name lack of communication between employer and employee (15%), poorly qualified or trained workers (14%), a lack of good jobs (13%), and a lack of job satisfaction (11%) as being major problems associated with work.

Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely than whites to say that racial discrimination (16%), jobs that are reserved for whites only (11%), a lack of equal pay for equal jobs (11%), poor benefits (11%), and poor treatment by whites (11%) are the major problems confronted in the work-place.

The changes South Africans would like to see most in their lives and their work are:

- an end to apartheid - 25%;
- higher salaries - 24%;
- newly created jobs - 14%;
- equal pay for equal employment - 12%;
- a better relationship between races - 9%;
- improved education - 9%;
- no job reservations - 7%;
- better housing - 7%.

While approximately equal proportions of whites and blacks express the desire for better race relations, blacks are significantly more likely than whites to name such concerns as ending apartheid (27% v. 11%), job creation (15% v. 3%), and equal pay (14% v. 2%) as changes they would like to see.

Ninety-one percent of blacks think that other countries should assist the black people of South Africa, but that view is shared by only two-thirds (68%) of the white population. One-third (32%) of whites think foreign countries should not help blacks in South Africa. Among those who think

foreign countries should assist blacks, forms of assistance most frequently named are:

- provide jobs - 19%;
- build new businesses or factories - 16%;
- provide education - 15%;
- build schools - 13%;
- help abolish apartheid - 12%;
- build housing - 10%.

SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

This Gallup survey of South Africans is based on face to face interviews with 2,192 individuals. The interviews were conducted in the preferred language of the respondent by interviewers of the same race as the respondent. The survey took place between March 11 and April 8, 1989.

The results of the survey contained in this report are based on 1,400 interviews representing a national sample of black South Africans. In addition, interviews with 392 white respondents are representative of the metropolitan white population of the country. One hundred interviews each were conducted with colored and asian race groups residing in the Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas respectively.

A separate survey using the same questionnaire and sampling methodology was conducted during the same time period of a representative sample of the squatter population residing in the Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas. A complete description of the sample design, survey methodology, and questionnaire used in this study are contained in the technical appendix to this report.

The survey was conducted by the Gallup Organization, Inc. located in Princeton, New Jersey in cooperation with Markinor, the Gallup International South African affiliate located in Johannesburg. This study was completed on behalf of the South African Chamber of Mines, also headquartered in Johannesburg.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS

Overall Opinion Concerning the Policies of Sanctions and Divestment

A Gallup survey of South Africans conducted in March 1989, indicates strong opposition to economic sanctions imposed on South Africa by foreign

governments and equally strong opposition to the idea of foreign divestment of corporate investment in South Africa. South Africans overwhelmingly believe that sanctions (84%) and divestment (85%) are bad ideas, and blacks and whites are equally likely to hold these views.

The possibility that sanctions and divestment will lead to higher unemployment and poverty is the reason most frequently given for thinking such policies are a bad idea.

Despite the strength of opposition to sanctions among blacks there are approximately one in six who believe sanctions are a good idea. The largest proportion of this group holds this opinion because they believe such a policy will pressure their government to abolish apartheid.

When respondents are posed with a variety of scenerios concerning the consequences of sanctions, the basis for and degree of opposition to sanctions is evident. Approximately six in ten blacks, for example, would oppose all sanctions even if such sanctions might cause the government to resign within five years. Opposition increases to two-thirds of the black population given a more stringent condition that "many people would lose their jobs" is introduced.

Given the possibility that the respondent might lose his or her own job because of sanctions, more than three-quarters of all South Africans, including 93% of whites and 76% of blacks, would oppose sanctions. The negative response to sanctions is also evident among the 73% of blacks who disagree that non-whites are "prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa."

Concerning the expected reaction of the South African government to sanctions imposed by foreign governments, eight in ten South Africans, including 77% of blacks, think their government will make only a few small changes (43%) or no changes (36%) in its apartheid policy. Only 16% believe sanctions will lead the government to end apartheid. Approximately the same proportion (17%), see sanctions as a very successful means of changing the apartheid policies of South Africa. One-third, on the other hand, including the majority of whites, believe a policy of sanctions would not be at all successful in this regard. Another third believe sanctions can only be somewhat successful in forcing change.

Opinion regarding divestment by foreign corporations follows the same pattern as that regarding sanctions. Eighty-three percent think overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. Sixteen percent believe companies should divest because the South African government does not want companies to leave and will be

persuaded to end apartheid if they do. Eighteen percent of blacks compared to only 7% of whites agree that divestment will force an end to apartheid.

In fact, the survey shows that South Africans believe there is an important role to be played by foreign corporations operating in South Africa. A substantial majority (58%) of South Africans, including 51% of whites and 59% of blacks, think that American companies in South Africa can help make the government change away from apartheid.

The negative aspect of the withdrawal of an American corporate presence in South Africa is reflected by the three-quarters, including 84% of whites and 73% of blacks, who believe ending American business operations would have a bad effect on the lives of blacks in that country.

Nearly three-quarters (73%) think that ending American business operations would seriously hurt the South African economy. This view is more prevalent among blacks (77%) than among whites (50%). Among Whites, 45% think such action by American companies will hurt their economy only a little.

While six in ten (60%) think divestment will seriously hurt the strength of the South African government, this view is most prevalent among blacks (69%). Whites are more likely to think divestment will effect the strength of the government only a little (42%) or not at all (37%).

Majorities of South Africans believe American business activity:

- contributes to a higher standard of living for black South Africans (78%);
- provides black workers with good jobs that would not otherwise exist (74%);
- does not contribute to the misuse of black workers (60%);
- does not help to continue racial segregation and discrimination (58%).

Summary of Major Findings

Overall Opinion Concerning the Policies of Sanctions and Divestment

Question #		
15/20	•	South Africans overwhelmingly believe that sanctions (84%) and divestment (85%) are bad ideas.
15/20	•	Blacks and whites are equally likely to think divestment (89% of whites and 85% of blacks) is a bad idea. But whites voice stronger opposition to the idea of sanctions (95%) than do black South Africans (82%).
16/21	•	The possibility that sanctions and disinvestment will lead to higher unemployment is the reason most frequently given for thinking such policies are a bad idea.

16 • Among the 14% of blacks who think divestment is a good idea, the largest proportion (approximately one-third) say they think so because divestment may help get rid of apartheid. Another one in five of this sub-group say divestment will put pressure on the government to bring about changes faster, and 13% say divestment will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

21 • Among the 16% of blacks who think sanctions are a good idea, the largest proportion (again, approximately one-third) say that such a policy puts pressure on their government to abolish apartheid. Another 18% say sanctions will bring change more quickly, 10% think sanctions will make all race groups suffer together, and 8% say that sanctions will make South Africa more self-sufficient.

Opinion of Sanctions Under Certain Conditions

22 • While 83% think sanctions are generally a bad idea, six in ten South Africans, including 78% of whites and 58% of blacks oppose all sanctions conditioned on the possibility that such policies would cause the South African government to step down within five years.

22 • Thirty-one percent support sanctions to some degree given the assumption that the government will resign as a consequence. This includes 16% who would support all sanctions and 16% who would support only sanctions that do not harm them personally.

Question #

22 • Blacks (33%) are generally more supportive than whites (12%) of sanctions that would result in the government resigning.

23 • Given a more stringent condition that "many people would lose their jobs," more than two-thirds (69%) would oppose all sanctions. Ninety percent of whites and nearly two-thirds (65%) of blacks hold this view.

24 • Given the possibility the respondent might lose his or her own job because of sanctions, more than three-quarters (including 93% of whites and 76% of blacks) would oppose these policies. But 14% of blacks say they would support sanctions and boycotts even under these conditions of personal hardship.

25 • Only one-quarter (25%) of South Africans, regardless of race, agree that non-whites are "prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa."

26 • More than three-quarters (79%) of South Africans think their government will make only a few small changes (43%) or no changes in policy (36%) in response to sanctions imposed by other countries.

26 • Only 16% believe sanctions will lead the government to end apartheid.

33 • Half (50%) of all South Africans believe that sanctions imposed by the U.S. against South Africa would be at least somewhat successful in forcing changes to South Africa's apartheid policies.

33 . Blacks (20%) are particularly likely compared to whites (2%) to think that sanctions would be very successful in changing apartheid. Only 28% of blacks think sanctions would not be successful at all. A majority of whites (57%), on the other hand, believe sanctions will not succeed in changing apartheid.

Opinion Regarding Divestment

Question #

17 . 83% think overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. Sixteen percent believe companies should divest because the South African government does not want companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if they do. Eighteen percent of blacks compared to only 7% of whites agree that divestment will force an end to apartheid.

18 . South Africans who believe that divestment will force their government to abandon apartheid are almost evenly divided between those who think blacks will suffer only a little (53%) as a consequence and those who think they will suffer a great deal (47%).

34 . A near majority (47%) think divestment by American companies would be very successful (16%) or somewhat successful (31%) as a policy to bring an end to apartheid, but 37% think divestment will not be at all successful.

34 . Whites (64%) are twice as likely as blacks (32%) to believe that divestment will not succeed in forcing an end to apartheid.

34 . Eighteen percent of blacks believe divestment could be very successful in bringing an end to apartheid. Only 2% of whites hold this opinion.

Role of American Companies

29 . A substantial majority (58%) of South Africans (including 51% of whites and 59% of blacks) think that American companies in South Africa can help make the government change away from apartheid.

30 . Three-quarters (75%) of South Africans (including 84% of whites and 73% of blacks) believe ending American business operations in South Africa would have a bad effect on the lives of blacks in that country.

31 . Nearly three-quarters (73%) think that ending American business operations would seriously hurt the South African economy. But this view is more prevalent among blacks (77%) than among whites (50%). Forty-five percent of whites think such action by American companies will hurt their economy only a little.

Question #

32 . While six in ten (60%) think divestment will seriously hurt the strength of the South African government, this view is most prevalent among blacks (69%). Whites are more likely to think divestment will effect the strength of the government only a little (42%) or not at all (37%).

35 . A near majority (48%), regardless of race, have a worse opinion of American companies that have left their country.

36 . Majorities of South Africans believe American business activity:

- contributes to a higher standard of living for black South Africans (78%);
- provides black workers with good jobs that would not otherwise exist (74%);
- does not contribute to the misuse of black workers (60%);
- does not help to continue racial segregation and discrimination (58%).

Problems Faced by South Africans

In open-ended or free-response questions, South Africans were asked to discuss what they think are the three most serious problems that people face in their country generally and the work-place specifically. In a third open-ended question, respondents were asked what changes they would like to see in the life and work of people like themselves.

1 . Unemployment is most often cited by South Africans as being one of the most serious problems that people in their country face. Overall, half (49%) of the South Africans surveyed name unemployment, while 23% cite apartheid or racial discrimination, and 19% say housing is one of the most serious problems.

1 . There are, however, significant differences in the perception of how important various problems are according to the race of the respondent. Non-white South Africans are much more concerned than whites about matters of day to day living such as unemployment, housing, and education. A majority of non-whites (55%) name unemployment as one of the most serious problems for South Africans. This is the problem named by the largest proportion of the non-white population. Only 13% of whites said unemployment is one of the most serious problems.

Question #

1 . There is a less dramatic but still significant distinction in opinions held by blacks compared to whites over the degree to which apartheid and racial discrimination are considered among the most serious problems facing the nation. One-third of whites (32%) cite apartheid as a serious problem. This is the problem singled out by the largest proportion of the white population. While more than one in five (21%) blacks agree, this is a much smaller proportion than the 55% who name unemployment.

1 . More than one in five non-whites (21%) also name housing as a serious problem compared to only 6% of whites. And 15% of non-whites say low education standards are a problem compared to 5% of whites who say the same thing.

1 . While whites most frequently cite apartheid as a serious problem, the matter that is of major concern to the second largest proportion of whites is inflation (cited by 26%).

2 . In the work-place, the major problem for all South Africans, cited by 56%, is the level of pay. While blacks and whites agree that low pay is a major problem, a substantial majority (59%) of blacks single out low pay. Only one-third (34%) of whites cite low levels of compensation as a major problem.

2 . Whites also name lack of communication between employer and employee (15%), poorly qualified or trained workers (14%), a lack of good jobs (13%), and a lack of job satisfaction (11%) as being major problems associated with work.

2 . Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely than whites to say that racial discrimination (16%), jobs that are reserved for whites only (11%), a lack of equal pay for equal jobs (11%), poor benefits (11%), and poor treatment by whites (11%) are the major problems confronted in the work-place.

3 . The changes South Africans would like to see most in their lives and their work are:

- an end to apartheid - 25%;
- higher salaries - 24%;
- newly created jobs - 14%;
- equal pay for equal employment - 12%;
- a better relationship between races - 9%;
- improved education - 9%;
- no job reservations - 7%;
- better housing - 7%.

Question #

3 . While approximately equal proportions of whites and blacks express the desire for better race relations, blacks are significantly more likely than whites to name such concerns as ending apartheid (27% v. 11%), new job creation (15% v. 3%), and equal pay (14% v. 2%) as changes they would like to see.

12 . Ninety-one percent of blacks think that other countries should assist the black people of South Africa, but that view is shared by only two-thirds (68%) of the white population. One-third (32%) of whites think foreign countries should not help blacks in South Africa.

13 . Among those who think foreign countries should assist blacks, forms of assistance most frequently named are:

- provide jobs - 19%;
- build new businesses or factories - 16%;
- provide education - 15%;
- build schools - 13%;
- help abolish apartheid - 12%;
- build housing - 10%.

QUESTION BY QUESTION REVIEW

OF SURVEY RESULTS

Question 1 *What would you say are the three most serious problems that people in South Africa have to face these days?*

Most Serious Problems	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Unemployment	49	13	55	54	43	62
Apartheid/Racial Discrimination	23	32	21	35	32	14
Housing Problems	19	6	21	36	25	46
Education Problems/ Low Standards	13	5	15	6	10	7
Cost of Living	11	19	9	34	24	4
Financial/Money Problems	10	13	9	6	14	3
Low Salaries	8	1	9	11	12	3
Shortage of Schools/ Universities	7	1	8	--	3	6
Starvation	6	*	7	2	1	4
Inflation	6	26	3	10	3	4
Insufficient Water Supply	6	--	7	--	1	17
Standard of Housing Is Poor	5	*	6	--	4	6
Unrest/Rioting	5	6	5	4	2	5
Crime e.g. Assault/ Robberies/Murder	5	3	5	12	7	17
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

* Less than one-half of one percent

Question 2 *What would you say are the three most serious problems that people have to face where their work is concerned?*

Most Serious Problems At Work	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Low Salaries	56	37	60	55	44	60
Apartheid	14	7	16	14	4	20
Retrenchment	12	9	12	12	6	22
Job Reservations/Jobs Reserved For Whites	10	5	11	7	16	6
Don't Get Equal Pay For Equal Work	10	2	11	23	9	15
No Good Benefits	9	3	11	5	2	13
Not Well Treated/ Oppressed by Whites	9	*	11	3	1	4
Unemployment	8	13	7	10	22	5
Transport Problems	6	7	6	19	14	7
Unfair Dismissal	6	--	8	--	--	13
Lack of Job Opportunities	6	7	6	9	6	6
Boss vs. Worker Relationship	6	7	6	2	6	2
Poorly Qualified Workers/Not Trained	5	14	3	3	8	3
Lack of Communication	5	15	3	4	3	2
Strikes/Boycotts	5	2	5	6	1	4
Poor Working Conditions	5	3	4	16	7	6
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

* Less than one-half of one percent

Question 3 *What changes would you like to see in the life and work of people like yourself?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Changes Would Like To See						
Get Rid of Apartheid	25	11	27	30	25	23
Better Salaries	24	17	25	36	26	25
Create Jobs	14	3	15	24	4	16
Equal Pay	12	2	14	24	9	19
Better Relationship Between Races	9	12	9	7	13	4
Improve Education	9	4	10	8	4	6
No Job Reservations	7	2	8	8	10	7
Better Housing	7	1	8	11	3	14
Better Job Opportunities	6	5	6	19	7	2
Improve the Townships	5	--	6	--	--	16
Build More Housing	5	1	6	9	2	23
Do Away With Group Areas Act	5	1	5	7	12	3
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 4 *Do you, at present, have a job that earns some money?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Have Job						
Yes	43	66	39	48	54	31
No	57	34	61	52	46	69
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 5 *How satisfied are you altogether with your job?*

Based on those who have a job

Satisfaction	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Very Satisfied	23	53	13	37	30	13
Fairly Satisfied	32	36	30	40	61	28
Neutral	18	4	23	17	6	33
Fairly Dissatisfied	13	5	16	6	2	10
Very Dissatisfied	14	2	18	--	1	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(919)	(258)	(556)	(51)	(54)	(61)

Question 6 *Which of these descriptions applies to you at present?*

Based on those who don't have a job

Description	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Student/At School	31	32	32	20	24	18
Housewife, Not Working	24	39	22	51	33	14
Out of a Job and Not Looking For New Job	14	25	13	18	13	9
Out of a Job and Looking For New Job	30	3	32	11	26	54
Out of a Job and Looking, But Working For Myself To Earn Money	1	1	1	--	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1073)	(134)	(844)	(49)	(46)	(139)

Question 7 *For how long have you been out of a job?*

Based on those out of work and looking for a job

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Length of Time Out Of Work						
Less Than 3 Months	8	23	8	--	14	11
3 Months to Less Than 6 Months	10	--	10	42	22	15
6 Months to Less Than 1 Year	18	60	17	--	28	17
1 Year to Less Than 2 Years	17	17	18	--	7	29
2 Years to Less Than 3 Years	15	--	15	37	14	10
3 Years and Longer	32	--	32	21	15	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(322)	(5)	(297)	(6)	(14)	(81)

Question 8 *As you may know, many companies in South Africa are owned by South Africans, but others are American-owned companies, British-owned, or they may be owned by some other country like Germany or Japan. If you could choose, in what kind of company would you like to work - a South African or an overseas company? Which country overseas?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Type of Company						
South African Company	64	73	64	59	47	57
Overseas Company	32	23	32	39	46	36
Don't Know	4	4	4	2	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Based on those who would like to work for an overseas company

Country	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
America	55	52	54	72	61	44
Britain	14	18	13	17	22	19
Germany	11	10	12	2	4	10
Japan	8	6	9	5	2	10
Any Other Country	6	11	6	4	9	8
Don't Know	6	3	6	--	2	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(625)	(89)	(450)	(40)	(46)	(72)

Question 9 *Thinking specifically of overseas companies operating in South Africa, what would you say are the good things about working for an overseas company?*

Good Things	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Better Salaries	31	27	31	55	40	29
No Racial Discrimination	15	6	16	28	25	21
Housing Subsidies	8	1	10	4	2	9
More Benefits	8	6	8	20	9	7
Better Job Opportunities	7	12	6	18	14	3
Better Training For Employees	7	3	8	2	6	4
Nothing	8	15	7	1	3	7
Don't Know	27	11	30	18	18	34
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 10 *And what are the bad things about working for an overseas company operating in South Africa?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Bad Things						
Disinvestment/Pull Out And One is Unemployed	21	45	17	26	19	25
Disinvestment Will Lead To Poverty	3	1	4	15	--	3
Sanctions Will Cause Unemployment	3	6	2	14	2	1
They Also Practice Apartheid	2	*	3	1	--	5
Leave South Africa Without Concern For Employees	2	*	3	--	--	1
Nothing	25	11	27	10	37	17
Don't Know	32	11	36	20	27	44
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

* Less than one-half of one percent

Question 11 *Is the company you work for a South African company or an overseas company?*

Based on those who are employed

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Type of Company						
South African	93	91	94	92	87	85
Overseas	6	9	5	6	9	5
Don't Know	1	--	1	2	4	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(919)	(258)	(556)	(51)	(54)	(61)

Question 12 *These days, the political and economic situation in South Africa is much discussed by politicians in America and other overseas countries. Many of them want to do things to help Black people in South Africa. Do you think these countries should or should not help Black people in South Africa?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Overseas Countries						
Should Help Blacks	88	68	91	89	92	89
Should Not Help Blacks	12	32	9	11	8	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 13 *What things should overseas people do to help Black people in South Africa?*

Based on those who think overseas companies should help blacks

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Should Help						
Provide Jobs	19	21	18	23	32	23
Build More Factories	16	5	18	36	8	17
Educate Them	15	34	12	25	17	9
Build Schools	13	12	13	15	4	13
Help Abolish Apartheid	12	3	13	9	7	19
Build Housing	10	18	9	20	11	20
Provide Scholarships	9	--	10	4	5	8
Better Salaries	8	3	8	9	16	10
Provide Welfare For Poor	7	7	7	12	6	3
Provide More Training Facilities	7	10	6	12	7	7
Provide Better Jobs	6	9	5	18	11	5
Raise Standard of Living	5	13	4	7	8	4

Question 14 *There has also been some talk as to whether overseas companies should leave South Africa and go back to their own country overseas, as a protest against apartheid. The words used to describe overseas companies leaving South Africa are disinvestment or disengagement. Have you ever heard of these words, disinvestment or disengagement?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Heard of Disinvestment						
Yes	62	93	56	69	66	69
No	38	7	44	31	34	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 15 *Do you personally think disengagement or disinvestment - that is overseas companies leaving South Africa - is a good idea or a bad idea?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Disinvestment						
Good Idea	13	10	14	11	8	19
Bad Idea	85	89	85	86	92	79
Don't Know	2	1	1	3	--	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 16 *Why do you say disinvestment is a good idea?*

Based on those who think disinvestment is good idea

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Disinvestment Good Idea						
Help Abolish Apartheid	32	3	35	14	38	39
Put Economic Pressure on Government To Make Changes Faster	14	8	15	11	36	16
Make South Africa More Self-sufficient	14	31	13	--	--	--
They Haven't Helped The People/No Need For Them	9	13	8	--	--	8
Pressure On Government	6	--	7	17	13	16
More Places For South African Companies	5	17	3	14	--	--

Question 16 *Why do you say disinvestment is a bad idea?*

Based on those who think disinvestment is bad idea

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Disinvestment Bad Idea						
Will Lead to Unemployment	44	46	42	50	45	59
Unemployment/Poverty	18	4	20	13	12	12
Causes Man In Street To Suffer	9	6	9	11	9	7
Will Harm Non-Whites Most	9	15	7	11	10	8
Economy Will Suffer	8	22	5	9	11	4
Unemployment Increases Crime	6	3	7	17	--	4

Question 17 *Here are two opinions. The one is in favor of overseas companies leaving South Africa, the other is against it. Please read this carefully and then tell me with which opinion you agree more.*

Overseas companies should leave South Africa because this is a good way to fight apartheid. The South African government does not want overseas companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if these companies do leave.

Overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. The South African government will not be persuaded to end apartheid and many South Africans, including Blacks, will lose their jobs.

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Opinions						
Overseas companies should leave	16	7	18	18	14	18
Overseas companies should not leave, won't help change	83	93	82	82	86	80
Don't Know	1	--	--	--	--	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 18 *Here are some other opinions on the problem. With which of these do you agree most?*

Based on those who think overseas companies should leave

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
If Overseas Companies Leave...						
Blacks Will Suffer A Little	53	62	53	32	49	72
Blacks Will Suffer A Lot	47	38	47	68	51	28
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(307)	(29)	(246)	(18)	(14)	(36)

Question 19 *Some people in America and other overseas countries want their governments to persuade the South African government to change the political system in this country. The way they want to do this is to ban and boycott all South African products, i.e. they want to stop overseas countries from trading with South Africa. This is called sanctions. Have you heard of sanctions?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Heard of Sanctions						
Yes	73	99	68	87	88	75
No	27	1	32	13	12	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 20 *Do you believe that sanctions are a good idea or a bad idea?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Ideas						
Good Idea	15	4	16	10	18	22
Bad Idea	84	95	82	84	80	75
Don't Know	1	1	2	6	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 21 *Why do you believe that sanctions are a good idea?*

	Based on those who think sanctions are a good idea					
	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Pressure on Government to Abolish Apartheid	34	6	35	38	38	47
Sanctions Will Damage Economy and Force Government to Change	13	6	13	18	22	5
All Races Will Suffer	9	--	10	--	--	14
Will Make South Africa More Self-sufficient	9	53	8	9	--	2
Threat of Sanctions Would Force Government to Change Apartheid	6	6	5	9	17	--

Question 21 *Why do you believe that sanctions are a bad idea?*

	Based on those who think sanctions are a bad idea					
	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Leads to Unemployment	32	29	33	33	25	38
Lead to Unemployment/ Poverty	16	4	19	5	15	17
Non-whites Will Suffer	11	19	10	7	15	4
Economy Will Suffer	11	23	9	15	10	7
South Africa Will Suffer Financially	9	9	9	18	8	10
Shortage of Overseas Products	7	7	7	12	12	11
Sanctions Will Not End Apartheid/Will Have Opposite Effect	7	14	6	2	3	6
Sanctions Cause Suffering	7	12	5	6	18	2
South Africa Needs to Export	7	11	5	23	13	8

Question 22 *If sanctions and boycotts caused the South African government to resign in, say 5 years time, would you support all sanctions and boycotts, support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you personally, oppose all sanctions and boycotts?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Sanctions and boycotts force govt. to resign in five years						
Support All Sanctions	16	5	17	6	27	24
Support Sanctions Which Do Not Harm You Personally	16	7	16	22	23	10
Oppose All Sanctions	60	78	58	42	48	47
Don't Know	8	10	9	30	2	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 23 *If sanctions and boycotts caused many people to lose their jobs, and also caused the South African government to resign after 5 years, would you support all sanctions and boycotts, support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you personally, oppose all sanctions and boycotts?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
If Sanctions Caused People To Lose Jobs						
Support All Sanctions	11	2	13	5	17	17
Support Sanctions Which Do Not Harm You Personally	12	3	13	5	14	13
Oppose All Sanctions	69	90	65	72	64	57
Don't Know	8	5	9	18	5	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 24 *Suppose you personally lost your job because of sanctions and boycotts, would you support or oppose such sanctions and boycotts?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Personally lose job						
Support	13	2	14	10	24	20
Oppose	78	93	76	71	74	73
Don't Know	9	5	10	19	2	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 25 *Some groups say that Black, Coloured and Indian workers are prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa. Please tell me whether you completely agree with this statement, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this statement.*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Suffer for sanctions						
Completely agree	10	8	10	9	8	20
Mostly agree	15	14	15	12	23	11
Mostly disagree	33	36	33	27	32	21
Completely disagree	40	41	40	49	36	43
Don't Know	2	1	2	3	1	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 26 *Different people have different views about what the South African government does and will do about sanctions. When I have read these views will you please tell me which one you think is most likely to happen?*

The South African government will criticize overseas countries that introduce sanctions but will not change what it does inside South Africa.

The South African government will make a few small changes in its policy.

The South African government will get rid of all apartheid laws.

The South African government will resign and hand over power to another government.

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Views on South African Government Reaction						
South African government will not change	36	29	37	42	21	35
South African government will make few small changes	43	58	40	41	65	39
South African government will abolish apartheid	16	11	17	13	14	19
South African government will resign and hand power to new government	4	1	5	3	--	4
Don't Know	1	1	1	1	--	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 27 *Which of the following leaders or organizations do you know or have you heard of?*

Aided awareness of leaders & organizations	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
ANC	82	99	78	93	98	85
UDF	74	92	70	86	98	81
AWB	40	97	29	42	68	31
ZCC	73	75	76	25	31	72
P.W. Botha	86	100	83	96	100	82
Tutu	79	99	75	83	96	80
Suzman	47	93	39	58	72	43
Hendrikse	39	95	27	69	98	31
Boesak	49	95	40	64	98	47
Buthelezi	82	96	79	91	84	86
COSATU	63	87	58	81	77	65
NUM	43	74	37	51	47	36
NAFCOC	43	64	41	43	30	48

Question 28 *Which of these leaders or organizations, do you think, want sanctions and disinvestment, and which ones do not want sanctions and disinvestment?*

Groups/Leaders you think want sanctions

Group/Leader	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
ANC	60	92	55	37	65	56
UDF	52	68	48	24	63	52
AWB	4	11	3	8	1	2
ZCC	4	6	4	5	6	3
P.W. Botha	5	2	6	2	2	4
Tutu	56	86	51	32	52	52
Suzman	12	24	10	6	14	3
Hendrikse	8	23	4	10	20	4
Boesak	29	57	23	19	54	22
Buthelezi	6	6	6	11	10	2
COSATU	35	47	33	23	40	29
NUM	17	21	17	12	15	11
NAFCOC	7	9	6	4	5	6

Question 29 *Do you feel generally that American companies in South Africa can help to make the South African government change away from apartheid, or is apartheid strengthened if American companies work in South Africa?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Do American companies help change						
Help change away from apartheid	58	51	59	58	55	56
Apartheid strengthened	8	8	8	10	16	7
No effect	17	32	15	15	24	10
Don't Know	17	9	18	17	5	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 30 *Do you think ending American business operations in South Africa would have a good effect or a bad effect on the lives of Blacks in South Africa or do you think it would have no effect one way or the other?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Effect of End of U.S. Business Operations On Blacks						
Good Effect	10	6	11	11	16	12
Bad Effect	75	84	73	71	76	66
No Effect	7	8	7	6	7	10
Don't Know	8	2	9	12	1	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 31 *The economy of a country is the amount of goods produced, jobs created and money earned. What about the economy of South Africa? Do you think ending American business operations would seriously hurt the economy of South Africa, hurt it only a little, or would it have no effect on the economy?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Effect of End of U.S. Business Operations On Economy						
Seriously Hurt	73	50	77	71	61	76
Hurt a Little	16	45	11	12	32	9
No Effect	5	4	5	8	5	6
Don't Know	6	1	7	9	2	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 32 *And what about the strength of the government of South Africa? If American companies withdrew from South Africa, would it seriously hurt, hurt only a little or have no effect on the strength of the South African government?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Effect of End of U.S. Business Operations on Strength of Government						
Seriously Hurt	60	15	69	59	38	69
Hurt a Little	17	42	12	18	45	12
No Effect	13	37	9	14	15	7
Don't Know	10	6	10	9	2	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 33 *If the United States Government decided on sanctions and boycotts against the South African Government, how successful do you think this would be in changing the apartheid policies of South Africa? Would it be very successful, somewhat successful, not at all successful?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Success of Sanctions						
Very Successful	17	2	20	17	17	24
Somewhat successful	33	36	32	36	49	28
Not at all successful	32	57	28	26	26	23
Don't Know	18	5	20	21	8	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 34 *If American companies disinvested (took their business out of South Africa), how successful do you think this would be in bringing an end to the apartheid policy? Would it be very successful, somewhat successful, not at all successful?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Effect of Disinvestment On Apartheid						
Very Successful	16	2	18	9	12	21
Somewhat Successful	31	29	31	28	39	30
Not at All Successful	37	64	32	50	45	27
Don't Know	16	5	19	13	4	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 35 *For you personally, has the fact that some American companies have gone away from South Africa, left you with a better opinion of these companies, a worse opinion of these companies or does it not affect your opinion of these American companies one way or the other?*

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
Opinion of U.S. Companies After They Leave South Africa						
Better Opinion	14	1	17	13	17	15
Worse Opinion	48	45	49	47	35	51
No Effect	23	51	18	28	44	17
Don't Know	15	3	16	12	4	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 36 *I'd like to read several statements to you about American business activity in South Africa. As I read each statement, please tell me whether you completely agree with the statement, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the statement.*

American business activity helps to continue racial segregation and discrimination in South Africa.

American business activity contributes to a higher standard of living for Black South Africans.

American business activity provides good jobs for Black workers which would not exist otherwise.

American business activity contributes to the misuse of Black workers.

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
American Business Activity Helps to Continue Racial Segregation						
Completely Agree	7	4	8	7	8	9
Mostly Agree	10	11	9	12	15	14
Mostly Disagree	15	25	13	18	33	8
Completely Disagree	43	54	42	46	38	29
Don't Know	25	6	28	17	6	40
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
American Business Activity Contributes to a Higher Standard of Living For Blacks						
Completely Agree	37	40	36	50	38	41
Mostly Agree	41	45	40	32	43	35
Mostly Disagree	4	8	4	6	8	5
Completely Disagree	3	5	3	6	6	3
Don't Know	15	2	17	6	5	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
American Business Activity Provides Good Jobs For Blacks						
Completely Agree	35	40	33	52	38	45
Mostly Agree	39	40	38	29	40	29
Mostly Disagree	6	12	5	4	11	5
Completely Disagree.	4	5	3	7	. 6	4
Don't Know	16	3	21	8	5	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
American Business Activity Contributes To Misuse of Black Workers						
Completely Agree	5	4	5	14	6	7
Mostly Agree	8	10	7	5	13	12
Mostly Disagree	16	26	14	18	30	9
Completely Disagree	44	54	42	47	42	33
Don't Know	27	6	32	16	9	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

Question 48 *Which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support most?*

Leader/Organization	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
ANC	11	*	13	5	6	19
UDF	6	--	7	5	6	14
AWB	*	2	--	--	--	--
ZCC	5	1	6	--	--	4
P.W. Botha	11	59	3	26	11	2
Tutu	6	*	8	--	2	8
Suzman	4	14	3	5	6	2
Hendrikse	*	*	*	--	2	--
Boesak	1	--	*	--	6	1
Buthelezi	10	5	11	1	3	10
COSATU	5	*	6	2	5	5
NUM	1	--	1	--	1	1
NAFCOC	1	*	1	--	--	3
Others	1	2	*	--	1	--
Refused	18	8	20	36	12	21
None	20	9	21	20	39	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(1992)	(392)	(1400)	(100)	(100)	(200)

* Less than one-half of one percent

Question 49 *Which other leaders or organizations, do you also support?*

Organization/Leader	Total %	White %	Black %	Asian %	Colored %	Squatters %
ANC	10	1	12	3	3	13
UDF	14	1	16	5	7	18
AWB	1	2	*	--	--	--
ZCC	4	3	4	--	--	8
P.W. Botha	5	7	5	2	2	5
Tutu	14	1	16	4	7	19
Suzman	6	7	6	5	7	9
Hendrikse	2	3	1	7	4	4
Boesak	7	1	8	3	9	17
Buthelezi	10	22	8	3	3	5
COSATU	12	1	15	9	7	16
NUM	5	1	6	3	2	4
NAFCOC	4	2	5	1	--	6
Others	1	1	1	4	2	1
None	58	64	56	79	72	49

* Less than one-half of one percent

THE VOICE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE

A Survey of South Africans on the Subject of Sanctions and Foreign Corporate Divestment

Survey Conducted Jointly by

The Gallup Organization, Inc.
Princeton, NJ

and

Markinor, South African Affiliate of
Gallup International, Johannesburg

on behalf of

The South African Chamber of Mines
Johannesburg

SURVEY METHOD

- Face to Face Interviews Conducted in Respondent's Preferred Language
- Interviewers of Same Race as Respondent
- Results Based on 2,192 Interviews
- Sample Includes Interviews With:
  - 1,400 Black South Africans
  - 392 Whites
  - 100 Coloreds
  - 100 Asians
- Separate Survey Conducted With 200 Squatters

OPINION OF SANCTIONS AND DIVESTMENT




DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SANCTIONS ARE A GOOD IDEA OR A BAD IDEA?
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
15%
4%
16%
84%
95%
82%
1%
1%
2%
GOOD IDEA
BAD IDEA
DON'T KNOW
TOTAL
WHITE
BLACK


WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SANCTIONS ARE A GOOD IDEA?
PRESSURE GOVERNMENT TO ABOLISH APARTHEID
34%
6%
36%
SANCTIONS WILL DAMAGE ECONOMY AND FORCE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE
13%
6%
13%
WILL MAKE S. AFRICA MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT
9%
53%
8%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
TOTAL
WHITE
BLACK
-BASED ON THOSE WHO SAY SANCTIONS ARE A GOOD IDEA-

WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SANCTIONS ARE A BAD IDEA?



-BASED ON THOSE WHO SAY SANCTIONS ARE A BAD IDEA-

SANCTIONS
Conditioned Support and Opposition Among Black South Africans



SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REACTION TO SANCTIONS



EFFECT OF SANCTIONS IN FORCING CHANGE TO APARTHEID POLICIES



EFFECT OF SANCTIONS IN FORCING CHANGE TO APARTHEID POLICIES



ROLE OF AMERICAN COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA




IMPACT OF DIVESTMENT ON LIVES
OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
10%
6%
11%
78%
84%
73%
7%
8%
7%
8%
2%
9%
GOOD
BAD
NONE
DON'T KNOW
EFFECT ON LIVES
TOTAL
WHITE
BLACK

SAMPLING PROCEDURE FOR SANCTION SURVEY

BACKGROUND

The population of the Republic of South Africa is made up of four major race groups, namely:

- Whites
- Blacks
- Coloureds
- Asians

South Africa is divided into four provinces:

- Transvaal
- Cape
- Natal
- Orange Free State

Within these boundaries are four independent Black national states, namely:

- Transkei
- Bophuthatswana
- Venda
- Ciskei

and seven Black homelands:

- KwaZulu
- Lebowa
- Kwa Ndebele
- Ka Ngwane
- Qwa Qwa
- Gazankulu

SAMPLING PROCEDURE

Method

The universe from which the sample was drawn for this survey was the All Media Products Survey (AMPS), which is recognized as the population source most widely used in major research studies requiring large sample sizes.

The universe from which the AMPS sample is drawn basically comprises all persons aged 16 and over in the Republic of South Africa, including the self-governing national states of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, and the population estimates are based on the 1985 official Census.

In the case of each racial group, certain areas were excluded from consideration, as containing no persons in a given group, or negligible numbers of them. For this reason, the sample for Asian and Coloured groups was drawn from AMPS on the basis of specific region, where the greatest population concentration of these groups is traditionally situated, i.e. Coloureds in Cape Town and Asians in Durban. Whites were drawn from the major metropolitan centers only.

24-072 0 - 90 - 5

A representative quota sampling method, with pre-selected locations was used. This type of sampling necessitated initial stratification by province, followed by sub-stratification to:

- Community size
- Suburb
- Street
- Dwelling type

In order to limit interviewer bias, interviewers were instructed to use pre-determined random starting points and follow a specified route and substitution method.

Coverage

The coverage for this survey comprised male and female adults of 16 years or older, and living in the Republic of South Africa.

Sample

The total sample of 2,000 respondents was stratified by race and geographic area; and quota controlled by sex, age and community size. Whites were further controlled by language, to proportionately include representatives of both official language groups. Females were further controlled by work status in order to reach proportionate representatives of both working and non-working women.

Sample size by race and geographic location was derived as follows:

	TOTAL	CITIES	TOWNS	VILLAGES	RURAL
Respondent Base	2000	1030	110	60	800
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Blacks	1400	430	110	60	800
Whites	400	400	--	--	--
Coloured	100	100	--	--	--
Asians	100	100	--	--	--

Weighting

Each race group was weighted up as follows:

Blacks:	To total adult population
Whites:	To population living in major metropolitan areas - representing ± 76% of the total White population
Coloureds:	To population residing in the greater Cape Town area
Asians:	To population residing in the greater Durban area

INTERVIEWER CONTROL

Interviewers were personally briefed by their Field Manager of Field Supervisor.

Interviews were conducted on a personal, face-to-face basis in the home of the respondent.

The questionnaire was translated from English into Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and Tswana. The interview was conducted in the language of choice by interviewers of the same race groups as the respondents.

For the Black languages, a reverse translation method was employed to ensure that correct meanings were translated as originally intended.

SAMPLING OF SQUATTERS

The number of squatters comprising the squatter population of South Africa has no official statistical frame of reference.

Various information sources were used to compile estimates of this population, including such sources as the Urban Foundation, Inkatha and the Center for Policy Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Squatters are defined as people who live in informal settlements or housing within, or outside, formally established urban townships and having ongoing access to an urban lifestyle.

Seven types of settlements have been identified. It is important to note that different types of settlements exist in different areas, with no one type predominating countrywide.

Types of Informal Settlements

1. Continuous belt of shacks around metropolitan area
2. Scattered-to-dense isolated pockets of constructions
3. Shacks in vacant tracts of land (buffer zones) between established urban townships
4. Shacks in backyards of established houses in Black townships - i.e. backyard squatters
5. Community with established laager formation, developing a communal infrastructure and community spirit - far from urban area
6. Emergency Camps - tents often provided by authorities
7. Shanty towns

It was decided to sample squatters in the areas of Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria and greater Johannesburg, with the intention of covering each type of informal settlement as listed above.

Method

A quota sampling method with pre-selected locations was used and interviewers were instructed to use pre-determined random starting points.

Due to the nature of these settlements interviewers were instructed to use each point of the compass on the outer perimeter of each settlement, as a starting point and then follow a specified route and substitution method.

Coverage

Coverage comprised male and female adults of 16 years and older, living in the informal settlements previously mentioned.

Sample

The total sample of 200 respondents was stratified by geographic area, and quota controlled by sex and age.

Interviewer Control

Interviewers were personally briefed by their Field Manager or Field Supervisor.

Interviews were conducted on a personal, face-to-face basis in the home of the respondent, in the language of respondents choice.

Weighting

The results were weighted up to estimated squatter population.

Sampling Error

In interpreting survey results, it should be borne in mind that all sample surveys are subject to sampling error, that is, the extent to which the results may differ from what would be obtained if the whole population had been interviewed. The size of such sampling errors depends largely on the number of interviews.

The following table may be used in estimating the sampling error of any percentage in this report. The computed allowances have taken into account the effect of the sample design upon sampling error. They may be interpreted as indicating the range (plus or minus the figure shown) within which the results of repeated samplings in the same time period could be expected to vary, 95 percent of the time, assuming the same sampling procedures, the same interviewers, and the same questionnaire.

The table shows how much allowance should be made for the sampling error of a percentage:

	Recommended Allowance for Sampling Error of a Percentage In Percentage Points (at 95 in 100 confidence level)* Sample Size								
	1400	1200	1000	800	500	400	300	200	100
Percentages Near 10	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	6	8
Percentages Near 20	3	3	3	4	5	5	6	8	11
Percentages Near 30	4	4	4	4	6	6	7	9	12
Percentages Near 40	4	4	4	5	6	7	8	9	13
Percentages Near 50	4	4	4	5	6	7	8	10	14
Percentages Near 60	4	4	4	5	6	7	8	9	13
Percentages Near 70	4	4	4	4	6	6	7	9	12
Percentages Near 80	3	3	3	4	5	5	6	8	11
Percentages Near 90	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	6	8

*The chances are 95 in 100 that the sampling error is not larger than the figures shown.

The table would be used in the following manner: Let us say a reported percentage is 33 for a group which includes 1000 respondents. Then we go to row "percentages near 30" in the table and go across to the column headed "1000". The number at this point is 4, which means that the 33 percent obtained in the sample is subject to a sampling error of plus or minus 4 points. Another way of saying it is that very probably (95 chances of 100) the true figure would be somewhere between 29 and 37, with the most likely figure the 33 obtained.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

MARKINOR

LIFESTYLE

JOB NO.: 89/CB: CLEAR2

INFORMANT NAME: .....

ADDRESS: .....

.....

.....

POST CODE: .....

TELEPHONE NO.: (H)..... (W).....

INTERVIEWER NO: 6- 7- 8- 9-

SAMPLE NO: 10- 11- 12- 13- 14-

INTERVIEW COMPLETED ON (DATE): .....

TIME TAKEN ON THIS INTERVIEW: (IN MINUTES) 15- 16-

(enter 99 if greater than 99)

INTERVIEWER: I hereby certify that this interview has been carried out by me according to the instructions I received from Markinor, and that it has been checked.

SIGNED: .....

BACK-CHECK:	Personal	17-V
	Telephone	-X
	Neither	-O
INTERVIEWER RATING		18-
AREAS:	Transvaal	17-V
	Natal	-X
	OFS	-O
	Cape	-1
SIZE OF COMMUNITY:		
	City	18-V
	Town	-X
	Village	-O
	Rural	-1
SEX:	Male	19-V
	Female	-X
SAMPLE POINT NUMBER		20-V -X
LANGUAGE:	English/Other	21-V
	Afrikaans/Both	-X
RACE:	White	22-V
	Black	-X
	Asian	-O
	Coloured	-1
AGE:	16 - 24	23-V
	25 - 34	-X
	35 - 49	-O
	50 +	-1
WORKING STATUS (FEMALE):		
	Yes	24-V
	No	-X

MARKINOR

LIFESTYLE

JOB NO. 89/021.CCCAR2

1

INTRODUCTION: I am from Markinor, a market research company. We are doing a survey for a company which studies people and their views about life, and events that are taking place both here and overseas.

TO BLACKS AND COLOUREDS: What you say will be completely secret. Only we know what each person says. We take all the answers to our offices where we add the results all together so that we will know how different groups of people feel and think.

TO WHITES AND ASIANS: What you say will be absolutely confidential. We will analyse the results in our offices and these results will give us information on how different groups of people feel and think.

** INLEIDING: Ek is van Markinor, 'n marknavorsingsmaatskappy. Ons doen 'n opname vir 'n maatskappy wat mense en hulle lewensbeskouinge, en plaaslike sowel as oorsese gebeure bestudeer.

AAN SWARTES EN KLEURLINGE: Wat u ook al sê, sal 'n geheim wees. Net ons weet wat elke persoon sê. Ons neem al die antwoorde na ons kantore waar ons al die resultate bymekaarvoeg sodat ons kan weet hoe verskillende groepe mense voel en dink.

AAN BLANKES EN ASIËRS: Wat u sê sal absoluut vertroulik wees. Ons sal die resultate in ons kantore analiseer en dié resultate sal inligting aan ons verskaf ten opsigte van hoe verskillende groepe mense voel en dink.

ALL GROUPS: LET US BEGIN.** ALLE GROEPE. KOM ONS BEGIN:

1. What would you say are the three most serious problems that people in South Africa have to face these days?

** Wat sal u sê is die drie ernstigste probleme waarmee mense in Suid-Afrika deesdae te kampe het?

VERNACULAR: 6-

..... 7-

..... 8-

..... 9-

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: .....

.....

.....

.....

2. What would you say are the three most serious problems that people have to face where their work is concerned?

** Wat sal u sê is die drie ernstigste probleme waarmee mense te kampe het in soverre dit hulle werk aangaan?

VERNACULAR: 10-

..... 11-

..... 12-

..... 13-

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: .....

.....

.....

.....

3.	What changes would you like to see in the life and work of people like yourself? ** Watter veranderinge sal u graag wil sien in die lewens en werk van mense soos u? VERVANGLAP: .... ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS:		14- 15- 16- 17-	
4	Do you, at present, have a job that earns some money? ** het u tans 'n werk waar u geld verdien?	Yes ** Ja	18-V	5
		No ** Nee	-X	6
5.	IF YES IN Q.4 SHOW CARD 1: How satisfied are you altogether with your job? ** INDIEN JA IN V.4 TOON KAART 1: Hoe tevrede is u in die algemeen met u werk?	Very satisfied	19-V	
		Fairly satisfied	-X	
		Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	-0	8
		Fairly dissatisfied	-1	
		Very dissatisfied	-2	
6.	IF NO: which of these descriptions applies to you at present? READ OUT ** INDIEN NEE: Watter van hierdie beskrywings is tans op u van toepassing? LEES HARDOP	1. Student/at school ** Student/op skool	20-1	
		2. Housewife, not working ** Huisvrou, werk nie	-2	8
		3. Out of a job and not looking for a new job ** Werkloos en soek nie 'n nuwe werk nie	-3	
		4. Out of a job and looking for a new job ** Werkloos en soek 'n nuwe werk	-4	7
		5. Out of a job and looking, but working for myself to earn money ** Werkloos en soek, maar werk vir myself om geld te verdien	-5	
7.	SHOW CARD 2 IF 4 OR 5 IN Q.6 AND ASK: For how long have you been out of a job? ** TOON KAART 2 INDIEN 4 OF 5 IN V.6 EN VRA: Hoe lank is u al werkloos?	1. Less than 3 months	21-1	
		2. 3 months to less than 6 months	-2	
		3. 6 months to less than 1 year	-3	
		4. 1 year to less than 2 years	-4	
		5. 2 years to less than 3 years	-5	
		6. 3 years and longer	-6	

8. ASK ALL: As you may know, many companies in South Africa are owned by South Africans, but others are American-owned companies, British-owned, or they may be owned by some other country like Germany or Japan. If you could choose, in what kind of company would you like to work - a South African or an overseas company? IF OVERSEAS: Which country overseas?

** VRA ALMAL: Soos u dalk weet, word baie maatskappye in Suid-Afrika deur Suid-Afrikaners besit, maar ander is in Amerikaanse of Britse besit, of nulle kan besit word deur n ander land soos Duitsland of Japan. As u kan kies - vir watter tipe maatskappy sal u graag wil werk - n Suid-Afrikaanse of n oorsese maatskappy? INDIEN OORSESE: Watter oorsese land?

South African company
** Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappy 22-V

Overseas company
** Oorsese maatskappy -X

NAME OF OVERSEAS COUNTRY:
** NAAM VAN OORSESE LAND:

..... 23-

24-

25-

9. Thinking specifically of overseas companies operating in South Africa, what would you say are the good things about working for an overseas company? PROBE FULLY.

** Spesifiek gedagtig aan oorsese maatskappye wat in Suid-Afrika werksaam is, wat sal u sê is die goeie dinge om vir n oorsese maatskappy te werk? VRA VOLLEDIG.

VERNACULAR: 26-

.....

..... 27-

.....

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: 28-

.....

..... 29-

.....

10. And what are the bad things about working for an overseas company operating in South Africa? PROBE FULLY.

** En wat is die slegte dinge om vir n oorsese maatskappy wat in Suid-Afrika werksaam is te werk? VRA VOLLEDIG.

VERNACULAR: 30-

.....

..... 31-

.....

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: 32-

.....

..... 33-

.....

11. IF EMPLOYED IN Q.4, ASK: Is the company you work for a South African company or an overseas company?

** INDIEN WERKSAAM IN V.4: Is die maatskappy waarvoor u werk n Suid-Afrikaanse of n oorsese maatskappy?

South African company
** Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappy 34-V

Overseas company
** Oorsese maatskappy -X

NAME OF OVERSEAS COMPANY:
** NAAM VAN OORSESE MAATSKAPPY: 35-

..... 36-

37-

12. ASK ALL: These days, the political and economic situation in South Africa is much discussed by politicians in America and other overseas countries. Many of them want to do things to help Black people in South Africa. Do you think these countries should or should not help Black people in South Africa? ** VRA ALMAL: Die politieke en ekonomiese situasie in Suid-Afrika word deesdae baie deur politici in Amerika en ander oorsese lande bespreek. Baie van hulle wil dinge doen om Swart mense in Suid-Afrika te help. Dink u hierdie lande moet/moenie Swart mense in Suid-Afrika help (nie)?	Should ** Moet Should not ** Moenie	38-Y -X	13 14

13. IF SHOULD IN Q.12: What things should overseas people do to help Black people in South Africa?

** INDIEN MOET IN V.12: Watter dinge moet oorsese mense doen om Swart mense in Suid-Afrika te help?

VERNACULAR: 39-

..... 40-

..... 41-

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: 42-

.....

14. ASK ALL: There has also been some talk as to whether overseas companies should leave South Africa and go back to their own country overseas, as a protest against apartheid. The words used to describe overseas companies leaving South Africa are disinvestment or disengagement. Have you ever heard of these words, disinvestment or disengagement? ** VRA ALMAL: Daar was ook praatjies of oorsese maatskappye Suid-Afrika moet verlaat en na hulle eie land oorsee moet terugkeer as n protes teen apartheid. Die woorde wat gebruik word om oorsese maatskappye wat Suid-Afrika verlaat te beskryf is disinvestering of onttrekking. Het u al ooit van hierdie woorde, disinvestering of onttrekking gehoor?	Yes ** Ja No ** Nee	43-Y -X	

15. Do you personally think disengagement or disinvestment - that is overseas companies leaving South Africa - is a good idea or a bad idea? ** Dink u persoonlik dat onttrekking of disinvestering - d.w.s. oorsese maatskappye wat Suid-Afrika verlaat - is n goeie of n slegte idee?	Good idea ** Goeie idee Bad idea ** Slegte idee	44-Y -X	

16. Why do you say it is a ..... (MENTION IN Q.15)?

** Hoekom sê u dit is 'n ..... (ANTWOORD IN V.15)?

VERNACULAR 45-

.....

..... 46-

.....

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: 47-

.....

..... 48-

.....

I Here are two opinions. The one is in favour of overseas companies leaving South Africa, the other is against it. I will read each opinion slowly. Please listen carefully and then tell me with which opinion you agree more. READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 2A

** Hier is twee menings. Die een is ten gunste van oorsese maatskappye wat Suid-Afrika verlaat, die ander is daarteen. Ek sal elke mening stadig lees. Luister asseblief noukeurig en sê my dan met watter mening u meer saamstem. LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 2A

1. Overseas companies should leave South Africa because this is a good way to fight apartheid. The South African government does not want overseas companies to leave and will be persuaded to end apartheid if these companies do leave
   ** Oorsese maatskappye moet Suid-Afrika verlaat, want dit is 'n goeie manier om apartheid te beveg. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering wil nie hê dat oorsese maatskappye moet onttrek nie en sal oorreed word om apartheid te beëindig as hierdie maatskappye onttrek — 49-1 — 18

2. Overseas companies should not leave South Africa because this is not a good way to fight apartheid. The South African government will not be persuaded to end apartheid and many South Africans, including Blacks, will lose their jobs
   ** Oorsese maatskappye moenie Suid-Afrika verlaat nie omdat dit nie 'n goeie manier is om apartheid te beveg nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sal nie oorreed word om apartheid te beëindig nie en baie Suid-Afrikaners, asook Swartes, sal hulle werk verloor — -2 — 19

18. IF AGREE WITH OPTION 1 IN Q.17: Here are some other opinions on the problem. With which of these do you agree most? READ OUT

** INDIEN SAAMSTEM MET OPSIE 1 IN V.17: Hier is 'n paar ander menings oor die probleem. Met watter stem u die meeste saam? LEES HARDOP

1. If overseas companies leave South Africa, Blacks will only suffer a little but it will help them politically
   ** Indien oorsese maatskappye Suid-Afrika verlaat, sal Swartes net 'n bietjie swaar kry, maar dit sal hulle polities help — 50-1
2. If overseas companies leave South Africa, Blacks will suffer a great deal but it will help them politically
   ** Indien oorsese maatskappye Suid-Afrika verlaat, sal Swartes baie swaar kry, maar dit sal hulle polities help — -2

ASK ALL: Some people in America and other overseas countries want their governments to persuade the South African government to change the political system in this country. The way they want to do this is to ban and boycott products made in South African factories for sale overseas. They also want to stop all money from overseas coming into South Africa to start new businesses and to stop overseas companies from working in South Africa. This is called sanctions.

** VRA ALMAL: Sommige mense in Amerika en anderoorsese lande wil hê dat hulle regerings die Suid-Afrikaanse regering moet oorreed om die politieke stelsel in hierdie land te verander. Die wyse waarop hulle dit wil doen, is deur produkte wat in Suid-Afrikaanse fabrieke gemaak word en oorsee verkoop word te verban en te boikot. Hulle wil ook alle geld keer wat van oorsee Suid-Afrika binnekom om nuwe sakebedrywighede te begin en om oorsese maatskappye te keer om in Suid-Afrika te werk. Dit word sanksies genoem.

19.	Have you heard of sanctions? ** Het u al van sanksies gehoor?	Yes ** Ja No ** Nee	51-Y -X	
20.	Do you believe that sanctions are a good idea or a bad idea? ** Glo u sanksies is 'n goeie idee of 'n slegte idee?	Good idea ** Goeie idee Bad idea ** Slegte idee	52-Y -X	
21.	Why do you believe that sanctions are ... (MENTION IN Q.20)? ** Hoekom glo u sanksies is ..... (ANTWOORD IN V.20)? VERNACULAR:		53-	
	.....		54-	
	ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS:		55-	
	.....		56-	
22.	SHOW CARD 3: If sanctions and boycotts caused the South African government to resign in, say 5 years' time, would you'... READ OUT ** TOON KAART 3: As sanksies en boikotte veroorsaak dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering binne, sê nou maar 5 jaar se tyd bedank, sal u ..... LEES HARDOP	1. Support all sanctions and boycotts 2. Support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you personally 3. Oppose all sanctions and boycotts 4. Uncertain/don't know	57-1 -2 -3 -4	→
23.	SHOW CARD 3: If sanctions and boycotts caused many people to lose their jobs, and also caused the South African government to resign after 5 years, would you ... READ OUT ** TOON KAART 3: As sanksies en boikotte veroorsaak dat baie mense hulle werk verloor, en ook veroorsaak dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering na 5 jaar bedank, sal u ..... LEES HARDOP	1. Support all sanctions and boycotts 2. Support sanctions and boycotts which do not harm you personally 3. Oppose all sanctions and boycotts 4. Uncertain/don't know	58-1 -2 -3 -4	

24. Suppose you personally lost your job because of sanctions and boycotts, would you support or oppose such sanctions and boycotts? ** Veronderstel u het persoonlik u werk verloor weens sanksies en boikotte, sal u sodanige sanksies en boikotte steun of teenstaan?	1. Support ** Steun 2. Oppose ** Teenstaan 3. Uncertain/don't know ** Onseker/weet nie	59-1 -2 -3	
25. SHOW CARD 4: Some groups say that Black, Coloured and Indian workers are prepared to suffer and to risk losing their jobs while sanctions and boycotts are used against South Africa. Please tell me whether you completely agree with this statement, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this statement. ** TOON KAART 4: Sommige groepe sê dat Swart, Kleurling en Asiër werkers bereid is om swaar te kry en om die risiko te loop om hulle werk te verloor terwyl sanksies en boikotte teen Suid-Afrika gebruik word. Sê my asseblief of u heeltemal saamstem, grootliks saamstem, grootliks nie saamstem nie, of glad nie saamstem met hierdie stelling nie.	Completely agree Mostly agree Mostly disagree Completely disagree	60-V -X -0 -1	
26. Different people have different views about what the South African government does and will do about sanctions. When I have read these views will you please tell me which one you think is most likely to happen? READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 4A ** Verskillende mense het verskillende sienings ten opsigte van wat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering doen en sal doen omtrent sanksies. As ek hierdie sienings gelees het, sal u my asseblief sê watter een u dink die waarskynlikste sal gebeur? LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 4A	1. The South African government will criticise overseas countries that introduce sanctions but will not change what it does inside South Africa ** Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sal oorsese lande kritiseer wat sanksies instel, maar sal nie verander wat hulle in Suid-Afrika doen nie 2. The South African government will make a few small changes in its policy ** Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sal 'n paar klein veranderinge in sy beleid aanbring 3. The South African government will get rid of all apartheid laws ** Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sal ontslae raak van alle apartheidswette 4. The South African government will resign and hand over to another government ** Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sal bedank en die mag aan 'n ander regering oorgee	61-1 -2 -3 -4	

27. SHOW CARD 5: Which of the following leaders or organisations do you know or have you heard of? MULTIMENTIONS POSSIBLE

** TOON KAART 5: Watter van die volgende leiers of organisasies weet u van of het u al van gehoor? VEELVOUDIGE ANTWOORDE MOONTLIK

1.	The ANC - African National Congress	62-1
2.	The UDF - United Democratic Front	-2
3.	The AWB - Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	-3
4.	The ZCC - Zion Christian Church	-4
5.	State President - P.W. Botha	-5
6.	Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church	-6
7.	Mrs. Helen Suzman - Progressive Federal Party	-7
8.	The Rev. Allan Hendrickse - Leader of the Labour Party	-8
9.	The Rev. Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church	-9
10.	Dr. M.G. Buthelezi - Chief Minister of KwaZulu	-V
11.	COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions	-X
12.	NUM - National Union of Mine Workers	-0
13.	NAFCOC - National African Federated Chambers of Commerce	63-1
	Refused to answer/** Geweier om te antwoord	-2

28. SHOW CARD 5: Which of these leaders or organisations, do you think, want sanctions and disinvestment, and which ones do not want sanctions and disinvestment? READ OUT

** TOON KAART 5: Watter van hierdie leiers of organisasies, dink u, wil sanksies en disinvestering hê, en watter wil nie sanksies en disinvestering hê nie? LEES HARDOP

		WANT	DO NOT WANT	DON'T KNOW
1.	The ANC - African National Congress	64-V	-X	-0
2.	The UDF - United Democratic Front	65-V	-X	-0
3.	The AWB - Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	66-V	-X	-0
4.	The ZCC - Zion Christian Church	67-V	-X	-0
5.	State President - P.W. Botha	68-V	-X	-0
6.	Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church	69-V	-X	-0
7.	Mrs. Helen Suzman - Progressive Federal Party	70-V	-X	-0
8.	The Rev. Allan Hendrickse - Leader of the Labour Party	71-V	-X	-0
9.	The Rev. Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church	72-V	-X	-0
10.	Dr. M.G. Buthelezi - Chief Minister of KwaZulu	73-V	-X	-0
11.	COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions	74-V	-X	-0
12.	NUM - National Union of Mine Workers	75-V	-X	-0
13.	NAFCOC - National African Federated Chambers of Commerce	76-V	-X	-0

29. Do you feel generally that American companies in South Africa can help to make the South African government change away from apartheid, or is apartheid strengthened if American companies work in South Africa? ** Voel u in die algemeen dat Amerikaanse maatskappye in Suid-Afrika kan help dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering wegdoen met apartheid, of word apartheid versterk as Amerikaanse maatskappye in Suid-Afrika werk?	1. Help change away ** Help om weg te doen 2. Apartheid strengthened ** Apartheid versterk 3. No effect (VOLUNTARY RESPONSE - NO PROMPT) ** Geen uitwerking (VRYWILLIGE REAKSIE - MOENIE VOORSê NIE) 4. Don't know ** Weet nie	6-1 -2 -3 -4	
30. Do you think ending American business operations in South Africa would have a good effect or a bad effect on the lives of Blacks in South Africa or do you think it would have no effect one way or the other? READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 5A ** Dink u as Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede in Suid-Afrika beëindig word, sal dit 'n goeie of 'n slegte uitwerking op die lewens van Swartes in Suid-Afrika hê of dink u dit sal geen uitwerking hoe ook al hê nie? LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 5A	1. Good effect ** Goeie uitwerking 2. Bad effect ** Slegte uitwerking 3. No effect ** Geen uitwerking 4. Don't know ** Weet nie	7-1 -2 -3 -4	
31. The economy of a country is the amount of goods produced, jobs created and money earned. What about the economy of South Africa? Do you think ending American business operations would seriously hurt the economy of South Africa, hurt it only a little, or would it have no effect on the economy? READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 5B ** Die ekonomie van 'n land is die hoeveelheid goedere wat geproduseer word, werk wat geskep en geld wat verdien word. Wat van die ekonomie van Suid-Afrika? Dink u deur Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede te beëindig sal die ekonomie van Suid-Afrika ernstig aangetas word, slegs 'n bietjie aangetas word, of sal dit geen uitwerking op die ekonomie hê nie? LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 5B	1. Seriously hurt ** Ernstig aantas 2. Hurt only a little ** Slegs 'n bietjie aantas 3. No effect ** Geen uitwerking nie 4. Don't know ** Weet nie	8-1 -2 -3 -4	
32. And what about the strength of the government of South Africa? If American companies withdrew from South Africa, would it seriously hurt, hurt only a little or have no effect on the strength of the South African government? READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 5B ** En wat van die mag van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering? As Amerikaanse maatskappye hulle uit Suid-Afrika onttrek, sal dit die mag van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering ernstig aantas, slegs 'n bietjie aantas, of sal dit geen uitwerking daarop hê nie? LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 5B	1. Seriously hurt ** Ernstig aantas 2. Hurt only a little ** Slegs 'n bietjie aantas 3. No effect ** Geen uitwerking nie 4. Don't know ** Weet nie	9-1 -2 -3 -4	
33. SHOW CARD 6: If the United States Government decided on sanctions and boycotts against the South African Government, how successful do you think this would be in changing the apartheid policies of South Africa? Would it be ... READ OUT ** TOON KAART 6: As die Verenigde State se regering besluit om sanksies en boikotte teen die Suid-Afrikaanse regering in te stel, hoe suksesvol dink u sal dit wees om die apartheidbeleid in Suid-Afrika te verander? Sal dit .... LEES HARDOP	1. Very successful 2. Somewhat successful 3. Not at all successful 4. Don't know	10-1 -2 -3 -4	

34. SHOW CARD 6: If American companies disinvested (took their business out of South Africa), how successful do you think this would be in bringing an end to the apartheid policy? Would it be: READ OUT ** TOON KAART 6: As Amerikaanse maatskappye disinvesteer (d.w.s. hulle sakebedrywighede uit Suid- Afrika wegneem), hoe suksesvol dink u sal dit wees om die apartheidbeleid te beeindig? Sal dit: LEES HARDOP	1. Very successful 2. Somewhat successful 3. Not at all successful 4. Don't know	11-1 -2 -3 -4	
35. For you personally, has the fact that some American companies have gone away from South Africa, left you with a better opinion of these companies, a worse opinion of these companies or does it not affect your opinion of these American companies one way or the other? READ OUT AND SHOW CARD 6A ** Het die feit dat sommige Amerikaanse maatskappye Suid-Afrika verlaat het u persoonlike mening omtrent hulle verbeter, versleg of het dit geen uitwerking op u mening omtrent hierdie Amerikaanse maatskappye hoe ook al nie? LEES HARDOP EN TOON KAART 6A	1. Better opinion ** Beter mening 2. Worse opinion ** Slegte mening 3. No effect ** Geen uitwerking 4. Don't know ** Weet nie	12-1 -2 -3 -4	

36. SHOW CARD 4: I'd like to read several statements to you about American business activity in South Africa. As I read each statement, please tell me whether you completely agree with the statement, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the statement.

** TOON KAART 4: Ek wil graag 'n paar stellings aan u voorlees omtrent Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede in Suid-Afrika. Soos ek elke stelling lees moet u my asseblief sê of u heeltemal saamstem met die stelling, grotendeels saamstem met, grotendeels verskil van of heeltemal verskil van die stelling.

	COMPLETELY AGREE	MOSTLY AGREE	MOSTLY DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
American business activity helps to continue racial segregation and discrimination in South Africa ** Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede help dat daar met rasseskeiding en -diskriminasie in Suid-Afrika voortgegaan word	13-V	-X	-0	-1	-2
2. American business activity contributes to a higher standard of living for Black South Africans ** Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede dra by tot 'n hoër lewenstandaard vir Swart Suid-Afrikaners	14-V	-X	-0	-1	-2
3. American business activity provides Black workers with good jobs which would not otherwise exist ** Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede verskaf aan Swart werkers goeie werke wat andersins nie sou bestaan nie	15-V	-X	-0	-1	-2
4. American business activity contributes to the misuse of Black workers ** Amerikaanse sakebedrywighede dra by tot die misbruik van Swart werkers	16-V	-X	-0	-1	-2

FINALLY SOME PERSONAL DETAILS

** TEN SLOTTE 'N PAAR PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE

37. SHOW CARD 7: Would you please indicate how old you are? ** TOON KAART 7: Dui asseblief u ouderdom aan.	1. 16 - 24 years 2. 25 - 34 years 3. 35 - 49 years 4. 50 years and older	17-1 -2 -3 -4	
38. SEX: ** GESLAG:	1. Male ** Manlik 2. Female ** Vroulik	18-1 -2	
. RACE: ** RAS:	1. White ** Blank 2. Black ** Swart 3. Asian ** Asiër 4. Coloured ** Kleurling	19-1 -2 -3 -4	
40. Which language do you speak at home? (You may give more than one) ** Watter taal praat u tuis? (U kan meer as een aangee)	1. Afrikaans 2. English/** Engels 3. Ndebele 4. North Sotho/** Noord-Sotho 5. Shangaan/Tsonga 6. South Sotho/** Suid-Sotho 7. Swazi 8. Tswana 9. Venda 10. Zulu 11. Xhosa 12. Other (SPECIFY) ** Ander (SPESIFISEER)	20-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -0 21-1 -2	

41. SHOW CARD 8. MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME: ** TOON KAART 8 MAANDELIKSE HUISHOUDELIKE INKOMSTE:	1. Up to R59 per month	22-1	
	2. R60 - R99 per month	-2	
	3. R100 - R199 per month	-3	
	4. R200 - R399 per month	-4	
	5. R400 - R699 per month	-5	
	6. R700 - R1 199 per month	-6	
	7. R1 200 - R1 999 per month	-7	
	8. R2 000 - R2 499 per month	-8	
	9. R2 500 - R3 999 per month	-9	
	10. R 4 000 - R5 999 per month	-0	
	11. R6 000 or more per month	23-1	
	12. Other (SPECIFY) ** Ander (SPESIFISEER)	-2	
42. Do you belong to a particular church or practise a particular religion? ** Behoort u aan 'n besondere kerk of beoefen u 'n besondere godsdiens?	Yes ** Ja	24-Y	
	No ** Nee	-X	
43. IF YES IN Q.42: Which church/religion do you belong to/practise? ** INDIEN JA IN V.42: Aan watter kerk/watter godsdiens behoort u/beoefen u?	1. Zion Christian Church	25-1	
	2. Anglican/** Anglikaans	-2	
	3. Methodist/** Metodisties	-3	
	4. Presbyterian/** Presbeteriaans	-4	
	5. Roman Catholic/** Rooms-Katoliek	-5	
	6. NGK (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk)	-6	
	7. Dutch Reformed Mission Church ** Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk	-7	
	8. Reformed Church/** Hervormde Kerk	-8	
	9. Islam/Muslim/** Islam/Moslem	-9	
	10. Hinduism/** Hindoeïsme	-0	
	11. Judaism/** Judaïsme	26-1	
	12. Other (SPECIFY) ** Ander (SPESIFISEER)	-2	

44. SHOW CARD 9: What is your highest formal education that you have achieved? If you do not know, please give the best estimate.

** TOON KAART 9: Wat is die hoogste formele onderwys wat u bereik het? As u nie weet nie, gee my u beste skatting.

1. None	27-1	
2. Up to Std.2	-2	
3. Std. 3 - 6	-3	
4. Std. 7 - 10	-4	
5. Higher education	-5	

45. What is your occupation at present? Please give full details of the type of work that you do

** Wat is u huidige beroep? Gee asseblief volledige besonderhede van die tipe werk wat u doen

VERNACULAR: 28-

..... 29-

..... 30-

ENGLISH/AFRIKAANS: 31-

.....

46. Do you belong to a Trade Union?

** Behoort u aan n vakbond?

Yes ** Ja	32-Y	
No ** Nee	-X	
Refused to answer ** Geweier om te antwoord	-0	

IF YES IN Q.46: To which Trade Union do you belong?

** INDIEN JA IN V.46: Aan watter vakbond behoort u?

Name of Trade Union:
** Naam van Vakbond

..... 33-Y

Refused to answer ** Geweier om te antwoord	-X	
Don't know ** Weet nie	-0	

COLS. 34 - 37 BLANK

48. SHOW CARD 5: Which one of the following leaders or organisations do you support most? SINGLE MENTION ONLY

** TOON KAART 5: Watter een van die volgende leiers of organisasies ondersteun u die meeste? SLEGS EEN ANTWOORD

1.	ANC - The African National Congress	38-1
2.	The UDF - United Democratic Front	-2
3.	The AWB - Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	-3
4.	The ZCC - Zion Christian Church	-4
5.	State President - P.W. Botha	-5
6.	Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church	-6
7.	Mrs. Helen Suzman - Progressive Federal Party	-7
8.	The Rev. Allan Hendrickse - Leader of the Labour Party	-8
9.	The Rev. Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church	-9
10.	Dr. M.G. Buthelezi - Chief Minister of KwaZulu	-0
11.	COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions	39-1
12.	NUM - National Union of Mine Workers	-2
13.	NAFCOC - National African Federated Chambers of Commerce	-3
	Refused to answer/** Geweier om te antwoord	-4

49. SHOW CARD 5: Which other leaders or organisations do you also support? MULTIMENTIONS POSSIBLE

** TOON KAART 5: Watter ander leiers of organisasies ondersteun u ook? VEELVOUDIGE ANTWOORDE MOONTLIK

1.	ANC - The African National Congress	40-1
2.	The UDF - United Democratic Front	-2
3.	The AWB - Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	-3
4.	The ZCC - Zion Christian Church	-4
5.	State President - P.W. Botha	-5
6.	Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church	-6
7.	Mrs. Helen Suzman - Progressive Federal Party	-7
8.	The Rev. Allan Hendrickse - Leader of the Labour Party	-8
9.	The Rev. Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church	-9
10.	Dr. M.G. Buthelezi - Chief Minister of KwaZulu	-0
11.	COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions	41-1
12.	NUM - National Union of Mine Workers	-2
13.	NAFCOC - National African Federated Chambers of Commerce	-3

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.
Ms. Eick.

STATEMENT OF GRETCHEN EICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR, IMPACT, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. EICK. I am Gretchen Eick. I speak on behalf of 16 national religious bodies, Protestant denominations and Catholic groups who have become involved very actively in supporting and working for sanctions out of a rather unique situation in the religious community. That is a request that has come repeatedly over the last 4 or 5 years, increasing in its frequency and its fervency from the churches within South Africa.

The church groups on this testimony and many others we were not able to get to because of the lateness of our notification of the opportunity to testify have been very strong in supporting additional sanctions, strengthening the present sanctions legislation, and they are doing that in response to the millions of South Africans with whom they are working. These are congregations that are particularly working with the majority population within South Africa.

I want to say a couple of things also just parenthetically about the origin of this current moment of opportunity. I think it is important for us to recognize the role that the 1986 legislation played in creating this moment of opportunity that we have talked about this morning.

It is the pressure of sanctions as partial and with as many loopholes as they presently have that has brought us to this point, and I think we need to be very aware of that. That has been recognized by the South African Government officials, the head of the reserve bank in South Africa, the Finance Minister, et cetera.

At this new moment of "reasonableness" it is critical to underscore that none of the conditions that the Mass Democratic Movement in South Africa has identified—that movement being the coalition of church, union, and popular organizations, community organizations, the UDF, some 700 organizations mentioned by Secretary Cohen—none of the conditions the Mass Democratic Movement has identified as critical for real dialog to begin have been met. I want to review those conditions for you because they are all conditions that could be met, as Senator Sarbanes was pointing out this morning, by the new state president by his own decision—not waiting for the parliament to meet in February, but by the state president making these happen.

The conditions are, one, an end to the state of emergency which has been in place since July 21, 1985; two, the release of all political prisoners and detainees; three, ending all banning orders and restrictions on political activity; four, allowing political exiles to return; five, the removal of bans on all political organizations, including the ANC, UDF; et cetera.

Within this context there are other conditions as well. I am sorry, I have lost a page here. [Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I can assure you that your whole statement will be printed in the record.

Ms. EICK. I know, but these conditions are so critical. Well, let me go on.

Within this context of the demands for the Mass Democratic Movement, within the context of the present realities within South Africa and discussions ongoing with religious and community leaders and trade union leaders, the coalition of religious groups that I represent are strongly supportive of S. 507 as the most important move to take out this point.

We also see the importance of following up 1986 legislation which called for the U.S. Government to push with its allies for sanctions to be extended multinationally. Within the framework of comprehensive sanctions there are certain provisions, however, that are particularly critical, and I want to stress those for you.

Banning existing loans, banning the rescheduling of existing loans. We talked about this this morning. I think there was a little bit of an inaccuracy, or a fallacy presented this morning to you in the logic.

The Secretary was talking about there not being money coming in from outside South Africa, and yet at the same time he was acknowledging that the foreign banks have been rolling over their loans and have in fact been giving a 10-year extension and moving these loans into medium-term loans. I think that is something the committee needs to look at, because it is pretty critical.

Banning short-term financing and other loans not currently covered by existing law. Banning the reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa by United States businesses and their subsidiaries, because that is a serious loophole in the current legislation. Closing other loopholes such as the narrowing of the definitions of "uranium" and "iron" created by administrative decisions. Banning imports of all forms of transportation equipment, and our testimony goes on to include recommending banning all intelligence sharing. Our testimony goes on to identify several other particular criteria that are very important in strengthening the current legislation.

We do reject all forms of legislation which regard the present sanctions as adequate, and we do reject also the call this morning for additional funds for black empowerment and economic development for the black community and I want to explain why.

In February 1988, 32 leading active above-the-ground political organizations were banned, and it is very clear that with those organizations banned and unable to speak, black empowerment is problematic—who do you give this money to? Who is empowered to speak? There are no democratic or antiapartheid organizations left to fund within South Africa.

We also do not support economic development funds for blacks as a sufficient response to the South African crisis. We are not saying that that should not be done in keeping with the Simon and Dellums legislation, but that that strategy needs to be questioned and carefully looked at in terms of the realities of who is around to speak in South Africa today.

I have also a statement from the Episcopal Church that I want to insert into the record as well. That statement stresses the importance of the loans that are coming up, the $7.5 billion that Senator Simon referred to, that is coming up for rescheduling and the importance of doing something about those loans—a cry from the

Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, Alan Boesak, and many others within the church community in South Africa that those loan rollovers be prevented and those extensions of credit be prevented.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Eick and addenda follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. EICK

A "kinder, gentler" apartheid remains apartheid. It is the concern of representatives of the various faith communities in the United States who are submitting this written testimony that the inauguration of the F.W. de Klerk administration in South Africa not be permitted to justify a lessening of international pressure, pressure that has been unquestionably effective, upon what remains a fundamentally immoral racist regime.

There are what have been seen within the faith communities as "fatal ambiguities" in the statements of Mr. de Klerk. In the midst of new images of South African governmental "reasonableness" it is crucial to underscore that none of the conditions identified by the Mass Democratic Movement in South Africa as necessary for real dialogue and change has been met:

1. An end to the state of emergency;
2. The release of all political prisoners and detainees;
3. An end to all banning orders and restrictions upon political activists;
4. The allowing of all political exiles to return;
5. The removal of bans upon all political organizations, including the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the United Democratic Front;
6. A lifting of censorship of the press;
7. The granting of freedom of speech and assembly; and
8. The beginning of meaningful negotiations with the authentic leadership of the black majority for the formation of a democratic, non-racial South Africa.

It is also essential to recall that Mr. de Klerk's inaugural statement that "the door to a new South Africa is open" is contrasted with election-night police violence in which twenty-nine persons were killed. The permission for marches in Johannesburg and Cape Town is contrasted with the coils of barbed wire and the placements of water cannons around the Anglican cathedral in Pretoria to prevent a women's march. The

anticipation of a government initiative on negotiations is contrasted with the continued detention without charge of hundreds of movement activists. The desegregation moves by the Johannesburg city council are contrasted with the Broederbond's plan for change that involves the retention of "the right of self-determination to the various peoples, population groups and communities;" segregation, Mr. de Klerk maintains, need not lead to discrimination. UDF leader Azhar Cachalia, who met with Mr. Bush in Washington in July, reminds us that

> a political strategy has already been evolved, having as its end the creation of the impression that apartheid is being dismantled and that the political aspirations of the black majority are being accommodated. But, it can be no more than an impression for there is as yet absolutely no evidence that there is any intention on the part of the nationalist government to give up or even share power.

Mr. de Klerk's five year plan confirms Mr. Cachalia's argument; so too do post-inauguration actions by the government of South Africa.

Within this context, and drawing upon our continuing discussions with leaders of South African democratic organizations, trade unions, and churches, we are convinced that continued and additional economic pressure upon South Africa will be a critical factor in helping to resolve the political and moral crisis of South Africa. Comprehensive, mandatory, and universal sanctions are the crucial center of effective international action to end apartheid.

We support S.507 and H.R.21, the Simon and Dellums comprehensive sanctions bills. We also call upon the Bush administration to take the lead at the United Nations in making sanctions universal.

Within the framework of comprehensive sanctions, certain provisions stand out as of critical importance:

1. A ban on the rescheduling of existing loans;

2. A ban on short-term financing and other loans not currently covered upon existing law [ref. sec. 103 (b) (4) of S.507];
3. A ban on re-investment of profits earned in South Africa by U.S. businesses and their subsidiaries, wherever they may be located;
4. The closing of other loopholes in the existing sanctions law, such as the narrow definitions of uranium and iron created by administrative decision;
5. A ban on exports of all forms of transportation equipment, including aircraft and aircraft parts;
6. The prohibition of U.S. or foreign business leases of oil, gas, coal, or geothermal lands owned or controlled by the U.S. if the business exports to South Africa, directly or indirectly, any crude oil or refined petroleum products, or if it maintains investment or non-equity relationships in South Africa or with any South African entity (non-equity ties include licenses, franchises, technology sharing, distribution rights, management services, and trade agreements [including the use of trade names and marks]);
7. A ban on all high technology exports, a prohibition that should be broadly defined to include not only computers but also all sophisticated data systems, electronics, semi-conductor technology, patents, scientific expertise (unless humanitarian in application), and any other items that would assist South Africa's internal security apparatus (the prohibition should include all end uses, not simply those directly related to the state);
8. A ban on all intelligence sharing and nuclear cooperation; and
9. A denial of access to U.S. markets of any foreign business which continues to invest or do business in South Africa in ways which are forbidden to U.S.

> entities by our laws or regulations: For example, if a Swiss, German, or Japanese bank reschedules or makes loans to South Africa that are forbidden to a U.S. bank, it should be denied the privileges of the U.S. securities markets; similarly, if a foreign aircraft manufacturer or high technology company makes sales to South Africa that are forbidden under U.S. law to U.S. business it should be penalized by an offsetting disallowance of their exports to the United States.

We reject all forms of legislation which regard present sanctions as adequate and alternatively provide funds for "black empowerment" and "economic development" for blacks.

We do not support "black empowerment," standing alone, as a sufficient response to the crisis in South Africa. In February 1988 thirty-two of the leading "above-ground" anti-apartheid organizations were banned. As the judgment in the recent Delmas trial makes clear, it is a treasonable offense in South Africa for any person or organization to advocate an end to apartheid. Funding "black empowerment" under these circumstances is ludicrous. There are no democratic anti-apartheid organizations of any integrity left to fund.

Nor do we support "economic development" for blacks as a sufficient response to the South African crisis. Standing alone, it creates no pressure for change. So long as blacks cannot own property freely and do not have equal political rights, such funding strengthens the institutional inequalities and the systemic injustice of apartheid.

Nor do we support additional funding for scholarships and education for South Africa, for such funding does not address the basic issue of segregation and unequal education. "Bantu education" is still primarily designed to create limited vocational training for blacks. Six million blacks are illiterate; few whites are. The National Education Crisis Committee, which was organized to create an alternative to "Bantu education" through negotiation, has been banned. Until such

organizations are allowed to operate freely, funding education inside South Africa underwrites the apartheid system and relieves it of financial and moral responsibility.

These caveats are not intended to undercut the "assistance for disadvantaged South Africans" (sec. 110) of the Dellums/Simon bills but rather to argue against such funding if it is disconnected from a sanctions strategy.

Some have concluded that now is the time to call for dialogue rather than sanctions. We support dialogue but not as a substitute for sanctions. Some call for the release of Nelson Mandela. We support that call but not as a substitute for the release of all imprisoned, banned, and detained persons. Dialogue and the release of individuals do not by themselves end apartheid. We believe that the conditions for real dialogue can only exist when the South African government acts substantively and meaningfully upon the crucial conditions of the Mass Democratic Movement itemized above. We are convinced that these conditions will not be met thoroughly and urgently without the continuation and expansion of international pressure. Until they have been met, we believe that comprehensive, mandatory, and universal sanctions are necessary and desirable, and we are in accord with additional measures to exert maximum economic pressure upon South Africa. Mr. Cachalia declared in Washington in July that

> a choice lies before the international community either to sit back passively and watch the steady decline of [South African] society or intervene actively to precipitate the early capitulation of the apartheid government to the process of negotiations in a genuine nonracial democracy. And that can be done while the economic structure of South Africa is still intact. It lies within the power of the international community, including the United States of America, to pursue [the option] to use all possible pressure on the apartheid government.

We believe that such pressure will send a signal to South Africa, to Africa, and to the world that the United States is prepared to

take the firm and committed steps needed to end apartheid. Such a stand marks a position of moral integrity, and is one which the religious communities presenting this testimony endorse.

- American Baptist Churches, U.S.A.
- Bread for the World
- Church of the Brethren, Washington Office
- Church Women United
- Episcopal Church, Washington Office*
- Jesuit Social Ministries, National Office
- Mennonite Central Committee, Washington Office
- National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
- Network: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby
- Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Washington Office
- Unitarian Universalist Association
- United Church of Christ, Office of Church in Society
- United Church of Christ, United Church Board for World Ministries
- United Methodist Church, Division of Issues Development and Advocacy, General Board of Church and Society
- United Methodist Church, Women's Division, Office of Public Policy, General Board of Global Ministries
- Washington Office on Africa

* Additional testimony appended

Thank you Mr Chairman and members of the sub-committee.

My name is Terry Crawford-Browne. I am a former International Banking Manager for Nedbank in Cape Town, and an Anglican representative to the Western Province Council of Churches. I am now serving as an advisor to Dr Allan Boesak and to Archbishop Desmond Tutu on the matter of international financial pressure against apartheid.

In as much as apartheid is incompatible with Christianity, so it is incompatible with sound banking practice. The University of Stellenbosch Economics Department estimates the direct and indirect annual costs of apartheid as R80 billion ($30 billion).

In addition, the capital outflow from South Africa during the past four years has been R27 billion. The national debt has risen from R12 billion in 1978 to R65 billion this year. The Civil Service pension funds are some R35 billion in deficit. The litany goes on and on.

State-owned corporations such as SA Transport Services, the Post Office, the Wool Board, the Maize Board etc. have incurred extraordinary foreign exchange losses thanks to gross mismanagement of foreign loans. These losses are now having to be borne by South African taxpayers.

The point I wish to make is that now is the time for more and urgent pressure against apartheid, not an easing-up so that Mr FW de Klerk can be "given a chance." International financial linkages have been identified by a variety of authorities as being apartheid's greatest vulnerability, hence the focus on international banking ahead of the debt rescheduling negotiations.

When the Church leaders: Archbishop Tutu, Dr Boesak and Dr Naude visited Washington in May and met President Bush, they said that the purpose of sanctions is not to destroy the South African economy. The goal is constitutional negotiations for a democratic, non-racial and prosperous South Africa.

We do not relish sanctions any more than a cancer patient looks forward to surgery. But only when apartheid is behind us can South Africa begin to meet its potential. And only when South Africa has overcome apartheid can it begin to contribute to the development of southern Africa. International banking pressure is a link in a comprehensive strategy.

Mr Chairman, the Committee will be aware of the destabilisation programme against the front-line states. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Mr Herman Cohen, has referred in recent days to the ongoing activities of Renamo in Mozambique and of Koevoet in Namibia.

Every economist, every banker recognises that the impediment to South Africa meeting its economic potential is apartheid. Unfortunately, some bankers for the benefit of short-term gain continue to collaborate with the apartheid system despite their ritual public condemnations. They also plead that they have no leverage.

That Sir, is nonsense. $40 billion a year passing through the New York banking system not only lubricates the South African economy, but also provides a lot of leverage.

Unfortunately, via nominees and shadow accounts a relatively small number of European banks use their New York branches to disguise South African transactions. Such banks include Commerzbank and Bayerische Vereinsbank of Germany, Standard Chartered and Barclays banks of Britain, and the Swiss banks and also Bank of Tokyo, New York.

Such payments include arms sales and other transactions prohibited in terms of the 1986 anti-apartheid legislation. I submit that in disguising South African transactions passing through their New York branches, such banks are flouting the intention of Congress. We would suggest that such banks are obliged to desist from such practices. We believe that if it comes to a choice between collaboration with South Africa or the loss of their American business, such banks will, on the instruction of Congress, quickly realise where their interests lie. The SWIFT system which handles

inter-bank transfers is one mechanism to identify South African transactions.

Because of South Africa's credit ratings, virtually all letters of credit business is now conducted against cash cover. An exception is Commerzbank, New York which, in addition, continues to confirm South African letters of credit.

As regards major American bank involvements:- Manufacturers Hanover continues to reimburse South African letters of credit for third country trade invoiced in dollars--for instance imports from Taiwan.

Morgan Guaranty is the major market maker for the American Depository Receipt system through which portfolio investments of gold and mining shares are held by North American investors. These amount to approximately R15 billion, and so far exceed the value of direct United States investment in South Africa.

Both these banks have loans which are caught up in the standstill and are acutely uncomfortable. Morgan has been involved in Africa since early this century. It is very much aware that its facilities to Mozambique, for instance, are jeopardised by Renamo and destabilisation.

From the South African perspective however, it is the actions of Citibank which are particularly despicable. Please forgive the harshness of this description, but we consider Citibank's policies to be rather comparable to that of a drug dealer. On the one hand, Citibank gets us "hooked" on easy credit of $700 million. Then the going gets rough. Rather than attempt to rehabilitate us, Citibank completely knuckles under pressure from the South African government and reschedules its facilities under the 10 year exit clause.

It pleads that it has no leverage, and that its sole responsibility is to safeguard the interests of its shareholders. In the process, it has enabled the South African government to trumpet that Citibank--the largest New York bank--has confidence in its economic and political policies, and ~~temporarily~~ lets the Government completely off the hook.

This is a total contradiction of the plea from South African church leaders for more pressure against apartheid. I submit to the Committee that in taking the 10 year "exit clause" and in rescheduling its facilities from short term to long term, Citibank has violated the intention of the 1986 sanctions legislation.

Even worse, Citibank has signaled that it expects the future South Africa to degenerate into anarchy. As long as Citibank thinks it will eventually gets its money back, it just doesn't care what happens to South Africa. In its eyes, South Africa has become a "financial junkie' of no further use, and Citibank then wishes to "wash its hands of us."

I believe that Citibanks's policies have been particularly irresponsible This, I'm afraid, is not unique. In a different context, Britain's largest bank, National Westminster, has a week ago been censured by the British Department of Trade and Industry. The Bank's chairman and three directors have resigned because of "conduct below that to be expected from responsible senior executives."

Even prior to this development, British church workers have designated National Westminster as the British bank upon which particular focus is to be given because of its collaboration with apartheid.

May I submit that Citibank should be censured by this sub-committee and by Congress for its irresponsible conduct in South Africa?

As regards the debt rescheduling due before June 1990, may I again repeat the requests of church leaders that any rescheduling becomes conditional upon:-

a) The ending of the state of emergency.
b) The release of all political prisoners and detainees.
c) The unbanning of all political organisations.
d) The repeal of the Group Areas, Separate Amenities and Population Registration Acts (and other flagrantly racist legislation).
e) Negotiations for a new constitution for a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.

We appreciate the implications of default. We hope that South Africa isn't the cause of another nightmare for the New York banking community. The South African government is however, even more aware that in event of default there would be a chaotic scramble for assets and trade proceeds, and that legal questions would be asked only later.

Given South Africa's dependence upon international trade, even our government won't take that risk. We believe that the end of apartheid is worth the risk.

Irrespective however, of what shadow accounts and paper trails are established via collaborating banks in order to disguise South African transactions, eventually the payment system has to "break cover." There can be no trade if the suppliers don't get paid, either for imports or exports. Eventually, payment for South African exports must be transferred via the South African banking system. It serves no purpose for balances to be held in shadow accounts outside South Africa.

At this point in the chain the funds are transferred to South Africa via the SWIFT system in Brussels. I have here a list of SWIFT addresses of South African banks. Unlike the breakdown of the CHIPS system in August 1985, a planned and coordinated intervention via SWIFT to intercept South African funds would not lead to the collapse of other payments and transactions.

I appreciate however, that you have your own banking/ savings and loan problems here in the United States. Plus the Third World Debt. Mexico will lead to

a potential 35% write-off. Then there is Argentina and Brazil. The last thing either bankers or political leaders in the U.S. need right now is the risk of a South African default.

But South Africa is different. Our debt problems stem from political rather than financial reasons. And the solution is political. The longer apartheid continues, the greater the prospect that South Africa will become a financial basket case, like Argentina. The numbers are deteriorating rapidly.

Hence our belief that it is essential to address the apartheid issue urgently and now. Hence the request that rescheduling is conditional upon constitutional negotiations.

One of the consequences of apartheid is that South Africa is excluded from virtuall every world grouping. One of the priorities of post-apartheid South Africa must be to rejoin the international community, for instance the Commonwealth. Then, with IMF, World Bank, BIS and other structures in place and the economy beginning to meet its potential,South Africa should have no difficulty in rescheduling and in rebuilding its financial reputation.

I would ask you to balance the unlikely loss of American loan facilities against the cost to Africa of destabilisation, of the squandering of South African resources of some R80 billion annually. And then also consider the cost of apartheid in terms of human misery on which no monetary value can be placed.

Apartheid is an international menace beyond the borders of South Africa. I believe the international community is entitled to take exceptional measures in the interests of peace. I urge this sub-committee to do so as a matter of urgent priority.

Thank you.

PRESS STATEMENT

It is crystal clear that the unjust and violent Apartheid regime that has held this fair country of ours in its grip for the past 40 odd years has declared an open war on the Church and the people. Church leaders and Ministers are threatened with death and destruction, their houses and offices are searched, and some have had to abandon their homes in Pretoria. A Church service has been banned in Pretoria. Church leaders are arrested, teargassed and sjamboked in Cape Town. The Church has been violently prevented from holding a service for peace in our country. These are the signs of our times. We have read them and they tell us that the apartheid regime has turned its back on peace, non-violence and the kingdom of God. They tell us that De Klerk and his friends is giving peace and negotiation a bad name by mouthing it when he knows that his rule cannot be anything other than the rule of the whip, the rule of coercion. He may speak to whomsoever and deceive some. To us he has spoken with the crack of the whip on the flesh of a cleric and a school girl. To us he has spoken with the hateful violence of the Wit Wolwe who have attacked us with impunity. To us he has spoken with the almost tangible trigger happinness of the Police who fail to protect our children from criminals but are ubiquitous whenever apartheid is condemned.

The National Church rally for peace that would have been held at the Jabulani Amphitheatre this afternoon (02.09.89) was called by the Church Leaders at a meeting held in Johannesburg on August 4, 1989. The rally was organised under the auspices of the Standing for the Truth Campaign. People from all over the country were expected to attend the rally. Confusion was created towards the end of the week when the Media reported incorrectly that all meetings under the banner of the Standing for the Truth Campaign were banned until the 7th of September. In fact meeting that were banned were those of the Riverlea Human Rights Committee and the Transvaal anti-PC Committee which would have been held under the Standing for the Truth Campaign. This banning of the meetings of the anti-PC Committee and the RHRC at a time when those who are in the business of self-service apartheid are busy electioneering in these communities illustrates the apartheid regime's view of participation - it is participation only in support of one's own oppression. Many people did come to the rally in the belief that it was banned.

When the decision to hold the peace service at the Jabulani Amphitheatre was taken we also decided to inform the Minister of Justice of what we were going to do and why. It was our view then as it is now, that we did not and do not need in the future the permission of a government functionary such as the magistrate to hold a church service. Given the brutality of the police against the people in Cape Town and the real possibility that the action of the Police could result in a massive dislocation we decided to inform the Minister of the meeting and its aims and to appeal to him to restrain those under his command from creating a situation of violence and confrontation as we were determined to do the same with our people. We went through this process fully conscious of the fact that at least two senior ministers have had to retract allegations they had made against the MDM and COSATU to the effect that acts of violence were planned or contemplated by those who defy. In such a situation there could be an interest in some quarters to fulfill prophecies made that have turned to embarrass people.

The Minister's response to our entreaties referred us back to the magistrate. The Magistrate told us last night that 'in so far as his consent may be required to allow the meeting he was not granting it'. The Magistrate's choice of words left us rethinking. We were advised by our legal representatives that what was at issue really was whether the Jabulani Amphitheatre constituted a building or not in the context of what the legislator had intended. That argument was taken up in an interdict this morning. The judge ruled against us. The implication was that in so far as it could be argued that we needed permission for the service such permission had been refused. The meeting elsewhere was not necessarily banned. All legal possibilities were considered and pursued so that no one could argue that we blindly entered into defiance without exhausting all the legal possibilities. We are convinced more than ever before that one cannot derive justice from unjust law. The only way in which one can derive justice from an unjust law is to defy it. The Apartheid regime has again left us no option but to defy its unjust laws

When we arrived at the Amphitheatre this afternoon we found that the army, the riot-squad and other security forces were deployed in the stadium, in the rockage around the Amphitheatre and in the long grass in the vicinity. One could have thought that South Africa was under attack from a foreign force. One could not associate what one saw there with a church service conducted by ministers whose only shield was their faith in God. The aggression of the army against those who arrived at the Amphitheatre was shocking and disgraceful. In those circumstances Church Leaders decided that the people be directed to a nearby church where a short prayer could be said and people could get an explanation as to what had happened. The people were accordingly directed to the Catholic Church in Moletsane. Before the people had all been moved to the church the police broke the agreement and threatened to shoot the people.

In the church a short prayer service was conducted and the events of the day were narrated to them. As the people were singing the National Anthem they were told that Police were moving in. They went to negotiate with Lieutenant-Colonel Stapelberg and reminded him of the agreement with the Police. As they were speaking one of the Policemen around him was heard saying words to this effect "Ons gaan nie weg nie .... ons bly hier...". Thus was the itchiness of the police throughout the day.

The events described above took place in a country in which an election campaign is taking place. Everyday politicians make speeches about the future of South Africa. The first lie about these elections is that they are "general elections". They are exclusive and racist. The disenfranchised are refused even the right to hold a church service for peace. The impression that those who want to register their protest are disrupting the democratic process is a disgraceful lie. Apartheid elections are a sinful ritual which will always leave this country divided, bitter and nearer the brink of disaster. Those who believe in these elections and lies that characterise the campaign must realise that they are supporting a process that will leave this country bleeding.

Today a church service was stopped by gun toting policemen. This is an assault on the freedom of the Church to worship. This has serious implications for the life and witness of the church in South Africa.

SACC COMMUNICATIONS

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY'S MANIFESTO ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

I am writing this open letter to appeal to you to seriously consider the proposals put forward by the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) manifesto on negotiations for South Africa and to respond positively to them.

I have studied the proposals contained in their manifesto and I am convinced that they provide an opportunity for South Africa to resolve its problems peacefully.

At the SACC National Conference, held at the end of June 1989, I was mandated to consult with the leadership of the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Council of Trade Unions, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress on the issue of negotiation. It was abundantly clear from our consultations that there is a willingness on the part of the oppressed and the disenfranchised black people of South Africa to enter into meaningful negotiations if these would facilitate the ending of apartheid and the establishment of a new, just, non-racial, and democratic South Africa.

During the course of my discussions with the people's organisations and with members of our churches, I detected an extra-ordinary level of good will amongst South Africans, particularly black people to resolve the problems of South Africa peacefully. It was clear to me that with this level of goodwill there is no reason for whites to have fears regarding a future, non-racial South Africa.

Should you and your party decide to enter into negotiations on the basis of the OAU manifesto, I believe that the whole Southern African region and the entire continent of Africa would be transformed from a region devastated by war, pain, suffering and poverty to a peceful and prosperous region.

It is clear to me that the chances of securing a just and peaceful future for all South Africans through negotiations with the legitimate leaders of blacks in this country are higher than ever before with the OAU decision, as opposed to efforts of trying to maintain the present unjust and undemocratic system against the will of the people.

I appeal to you in God's name to respond positively to the call to create conditions that will be conducive for genuine and meaningful negotiations as stated in the OAU manifesto. This is for the sake of our beloved country and all those who live in it, both black and white, and for the sake of the coming generation of our children, and finally, for the sake of the whole of Southern Africa.

I pray that God will give you the courage to go forward into history to be remembered as the State President who rescued South Africa from the path of death and destruction, by ending the era of white, racist, minority rule, and replacing it with a government elected democratically by all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

May God bless you and your colleagues as you contemplate this matter.

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Testimony Submitted by: The Episcopal Church, Washington Office
On the Subject of: Economic Pressure to End Apartheid.

The Episcopal Church has long been involved in a partnership with our sister Province, the Anglican Church of Southern Africa, now led by the courageous witness of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Our goal has always been to see the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democratic society.

In pursuit of that goal, we have embraced the necessity to apply economic pressure against South Africa as the only effective non-violent action that can bring the South African Government to the negotiating table. In a speech given last July by Adrian Vlok, the South African Minister for Law and Order, he admitted that sanctions are hurting the economy of his country.

While the Episcopal Church supports comprehensive sanctions and recommends passage of S. 507 and H.R. 21, it urgently calls your attention to the need for immediate action on financial sanctions.

The Most Reverend Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak, among others, are asking our government for legislation to prohibit the roll over, or extension, of loans by U.S. banks which fall due with South Africa next June 30. We encourage legislation that would apply maximum pressure on U.S. banks not to extend South Africa's loans unless its government is prepared to enter into serious negotiations with the authentic leadership of black South Africans for a non-racial, democratic society.

While the loans must be renegotiated by next June 30, there is nothing to prevent negotiations on the bank debts from being completed before that date. Therefore, the need for Congress to address the issue now is clearly manifest.

We believe such an effort is an opportunity to forge a bi-partisan legislative effort to apply pressure on South Africa. We have been asked by The Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility to add its complete support of any effort by the Congress to force maximum repayment of the loans. The I.C.C.R. would welcome the opportunity to provide expertise in this area to this distinguished committee.

Historically, from our own civil rights struggle in the United States, we note that no one gives up power voluntarily. We ask the Congress to apply that pressure to break the chains of apartheid and begin peace negotiations for a free and democratic South Africa. We ask for the passage of financial sanctions without delay.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. Your statement and also the Episcopal Church's statement will also be printed in the record.

We now come to Mr. Martin.

STATEMENT OF JIM MARTIN, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY (CORE)

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Jim Martin and I do speak on behalf of my organization. I am National Legislative Director of the Congress of Racial Equality.

Additionally, I am a member of the board of an organization called Peaceful Progress in South Africa, which is a multiracial, multiparty organization with offices in Pretoria and in the United States, as well as advisor to the National Christian Development Fund of Southern Africa, headquartered in Pretoria.

Additionally, I will recognize and request that the full statement be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. MARTIN. With an addendum which I need to make in regard to statements that have occurred here today, and I hopefully will have a couple of days to get that text submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. MARTIN. I note that there are some concerns about the posture, the current posture of the Republic of South Africa in regard to its nonaligned citizenry, as though the passage of laws will in fact make things better.

The University of Chicago in late August published a survey concerning something called hypersegregation. Hypersegregation in the United States is simply where 80 percent of the population of a stated SMSA reside in a community that is 80 percent or more one ethnic group.

The No. 1, or the most hypersegregated city in the United States is Chicago, IL. The fifth most segregated city in the United States is Boston, MA. The eighth is Baltimore. The ninth is Oakland. The eleventh is East St. Louis, IL. The 16th is San Francisco, CA. The 23d is Peoria, IL. The 55th is Cairo, IL. The 91st is Alton, IL, and 104th is Springfield, IL. 118 is Edwardsville, IL.

What I am suggesting is that 120 years later, after constitutional equality has been stated for all Americans, there seems to be some problem in making that equality a reality. What I am suggesting also is that perhaps there may well be some factors in the South African context of which we may not be aware, that waving a magic American wand just might not change South Africa the way we want it to be changed.

I also note with great interest not only this committee but this Congress great interest in changes and developments that are occurring within the eastern bloc, within Poland and within Hungary, and at the demonstrations in the Soviet Union and in its ethnic republics.

Those demonstrations are manifestations of potential progress. Those demonstrations and the people leaving East Germany and people going in for free enterprise in Hungary and asking for debt

rescheduling in Poland, we seem to want to rain dollars on those people because they are asking for democratization.

When legislation that was passed in 1956 codifying the 55 apartheid laws had been repealed by 1986, some 52 of those laws—the last three pillars, group areas, separate amenities, and population registration still being left—when those laws were repealed they were not hailed as progress. I fail to understand the analogy there.

This is not to suggest that all is well in South Africa, it is to suggest that perhaps we are looking at South Africa with glasses tainted by our own guilt for the way we have treated black Americans here, and perhaps we want to solve problems 8,000 miles away because we do not want to solve them here.

Further, I am going to suggest that I happen to endorse Assistant Secretary Cohen's philosophy that we may well want to assist the 42 black teacher training colleges in South Africa, the universities in South Africa, all of which have African or black students, none of which is racially segregated today.

Most recently, of course, the University of Orange Free State happened to open its hostels to students of all races.

So, I think we need to read the facts a little differently. Perhaps we need to take off the glasses of disdain and contempt and possibly apply the same desires for progress and democratization as we look to the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and its ethnic republics, and maybe look at South Africa, keep the current batch of sanctions and if it takes 120 years—I am not suggesting that is what we want if it takes 20 years, if it takes 5 years, perhaps it may take time to develop that cadre of personnel to administer a society. Perhaps it may take time, even as the city of Chicago has found since constitutional equality, to be able to integrate its society.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin and addenda follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MARTIN

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Jim Martin, National Legislative Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and member of its national Board of Directors, Vice President, International, The Committee For New Beginnings, a Manhattan-based public policy research center, Chairman of the American Society Against Sanctions in South Africa (ASASSA), member of the Board, Peaceful Progress in South Africa, and advis.r The National Christian Development Fund of Southern Africa.

I consider this opportunity to appear today an honor and recognition of a point of view increasingly difficult to discern in the din of current political debate regarding U.S./South African relations, that being that imposition of further sanctions on South Africa represent a further manifestation of a fundamental hypocrisy in our external relations - an unwillingness to recognize progress toward change in third-world nations unless that change has our approval or has been crafted by Americans. The subject legislation, S.507, continues this trend of supervised selective social engineering of third world countries by the U.S. Congress, engineering not for the benefit of the subject persons, but for domestic constituencies whose consciences will be soothed by legislation, not by deeds.

Observations about the South African scene since passage of the CAAA of 86 have been made to this Committee before, by both this witness and many others. To repeat perceptions of the changes in South Africa will belabor the obvious. Suffice it to say, that the South Africa of 1986 in the socio-economic spheres is not the South Africa of October, 1989.

The Central Business Districts (CBDs) of the almost all metropolitan areas have been opened to businesspersons of all races.

Two issues of black-owned firms trade daily on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Yabeng Investment and Lebowa Bakeries, Ltd.) Restrictions against Hawkers, Spaza shops and other participants in the informal sector have been removed resulting in a significant increase in employment opportunities and small business growth totalling by some estimates as much as 4 billion Rand or 4.4% GNP.

The de facto residence of blacks in urban areas has resulted in the passage of the Free Settlement Areas Act, which will have the effect of legitimating non-white residency in heretofore white areas.

Multi-racial demonstrations have been held to protest the National Elections of September 6, 1989, as well as the results thereof; some of those demonstrations were resisted vigorously by police forces, resulting in loss of life. However, the right of all peoples to peacefully protest the acts of the South African government has been recognized by the de Klerk government.

Johannesburg, the largest city in South Africa, has opened her parks, pools, and buses on a non-racial basis.

The number of blacks in all language Universities has increased by 9% in the past three years to over 61,000, the white increase in the same time being less than 4%.

The 42 black Teacher Training Colleges are now all operating at 100% capacity, and special curricula has been developed at Vista University, the largest black university in South Africa (over 18,000 students) to increase the number of black teachers being graduated and certified for employment.

Extra parliamentary organizations, multi-racial, are meeting with banned black organizations and their leaders as the process of discussion toward the drafting of a Constitution proceeds apace.

By no means is the above list exhaustive, only illustrative towards a fundamental change in the socio-economic sphere of South Africa that is occurring as we speak that leads all but the blind to conclude that a similar change dynamic will occur in the political context.

The Congressional response to those South African changes have, however, been revealing of a mind-set which opens fa more questions than some U.S. leaders want to answer.

As those changes are occurring in South Africa, America's foreign relations community has to face unpecedented changes occurring in the heretofore rock-solid Communist bloc.

In Poland, a ravaged economy devastated by socialist mismanagement, consumer goods shortages, external borrowings, and labor unrest has lead to a new form of Communist-Socialist governance.

In Hungary, a similar scene plays itself. An economy previously hailed for the ability to merge Marxist-Leninist principles with free enterprise practices, has begun to unravel under the combined burdens of higher debt, no growth, and extensive labor/consumer unrest.

In both nations, the citizenry has begun a process which, east bloc watchers assert, will result in potential restructuring of those economies and national political processes.

The American response to these popular changes - no, uprisings - in Hungary and Poland has been remarkable Recognizing that this popular groundswell for change must be encouraged and nurtured if these members of the Warsaw Pact are ever to revise their military postures toward the U.S. and our NATO allies, the American Congress has rushed through legislation that rains U.S. taxpayer dollars on the fertile soil of tumult in the hope that a freer Poland and Hungary will emerge and the people of those lands will benefit from that freedom.

When demonstrations, unrest, or other occurrences which we believe will lead to a process of change in the Soviet Union or any of its republics, we in the U.S. laud those demonstrations for the future world of freedom which is hinted. Our media, print and electronic, and our political leaders, rush to the fore to hail a new spirit of change and trumpet their hopes for a new future. Even when the disturbances have ethnic bases, as in Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, et al., we are eager to trumpet the changes for the future the demonstrations promise.

Performance, in the form of changes, is not what we in America applaud. The potential for change in the Soviet bloc is all that is important to America's politicians when viewed as a change process.

Contrast that view of the Eastern world through "rose-colored glasses" which America has, with the view of South Africa through glasses tainted by self-serving design.

When multi-racial demonstrations have occurred in South Africa in the past several weeks, those demonstrations have been met with calls for more demonstrations, more sanctions, and more societal unrest by Americans, not hailed as evidence of progress toward a fundamental societal change.

When South African Central Business Districts are opened to all races in South African cities, American political leaders demand more changes in South Africa and deny that the opening is a step in a process toward societal changes.

When the report of Health Conditions in the Bantustans, mandated by the CAAA of 1986 was issued, the American Congressional response was a yawn, none of the forty-six (46) USAID programs that could have been utilized to begin to combat the serious health conditions received an appropriated dollar.

The political response, then, to nations of the Communist/Soviet bloc as they experience a process which may lead to change, the same bloc that is responsible for ever increasing military expenditures, and South Africa, where demonstrable change has occurred and is occurring as we speak, is remarkable.

The Congress and the people of the U.S. have determined that they will be "change agents" in the Soviet bloc and will manifest that desire with appropriations, trade concessions, and technical assistance to maximize influence.

The Congress has determined that the best way to facilitate change in South Africa is to withdraw investments, appropriate paltry sums for selected groups, curtail trade, and minimize influence. Specific legislation was passed to impose additional tax burdens on American firms operating in South Africa to make such operations more costly to the firms, creating an environment where those firms find business simply too burdensome.

It is the belief of the Congress of Racial Equality that significant opportunities exist for the U.S. Congress to serve as change agents in South Africa in the same way determined to be beneficial in the Soviet bloc. We believe that the greater wisdom rests with a policy that requires the U.S. to participate in the process which will lead to a multi-racial free-market democratic society in a post-apartheid South Africa.

We believe that a U.S. structured, multi-dimensional aid program, coordinated at the highest levels of our government with the express purpose of facilitating the process of change will bear the most benefits for the peoples of South Africa as they go about the process of creating a new constitutional framework for all the people.

We believe that instead of forcing U.S. based firms to leave South Africa, tax policies should be revised which makes operating in South Africa economically feasible. We believe tax incentives can be devised wherein tax breaks can be awarded to U.S. based firms on the bases of non-white employment, non-white managerial employment, and expenditures to create a better life for non-white employees and population of South Africa.

As we believe that business, education, and social institutions can be catalysts for democratization in the Soviet bloc, so too can they be catalysts for democratization in South Africa.

There are discussions concerning possible targeted sanctions to be directed toward South Africa, particularly in regard to the area of finance.

South Africa faces in the next fifteen-eighteen months, negotiations on long-term debt repayment as well as payment on short-term debt. It is thought that pressure on institutions to fail to roll-over that debt will force the "white NP government" to negotiate in a meaningful way with blacks to create a future South Africa.

Lessons from the recent past should be instructive.

Several nations, Peru, Brazil, Mexico among them, have restructured or repudiated debt and failed to make debt payments, resulting in some jeopardy to banking institutions. By exerting pressure on institutions to fail to roll-over South African debt, we can put South Africa in the position of debt repudiation creating a potential $2.4 billion windfall for South Africa.

The banks involved in South African lending will lose, the banking system will loose, and those losses would have to be made up from some source. Taxpayers beware!

Further, South Africa's blacks could lose if financial sanctions were imposed, continuing a capital starvation program begun with the best of intentions.

The South African economy is at once first and third world. The predominately urban first world economy, if further starved of capital, will find interest rates and inflation proceed apace, real wages and purchasing power decreasing daily. The third world economy, peri-urban and rural in nature, would face similar ravages since growth and its lack will spill over from the urban economy.

The rural peri-urban economy is essentially non-white, working vigorously to become first world in complexity and diversity. These are the people our policy is designed to help, yet we will enact policies which will not be beneficial, save to certain constituencies.

In sum, we do not believe that S.507 is in the best interest of the people of South Africa. We recognize that there are elements which favor further sanctions. We further recognize that, in addition to public polls, leaders of organizations far greater in size than those who often grace our shores, oppose any sanctions [illegible]all for the repeal of the CAAA of 1986. We do not question the legitimacy [illegible]hose calling for sanctions, as we do not question the legitimacy of those who oppose sanctions. Legitimacy is not an issue for Americans to determine.

We believe that a policy of "targeted engagement" in South Africa, targeted toward the disadvantaged victims of apartheid, would yield the multi-racial democratic fully participative post-apartheid society to be desired by us all. CORE stands ready to assist in that process in every way.

Thank you for this opportunity.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The following are the remarks made by Hon. Dan Burton in the U.S. Congress on the subject of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

In his address, Congressman Burton enters into the congressional record a letter he received from Bishop B.E. Lekganyane.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
HON. DAN BURTON
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday August 2, 1988

Mr. Burton of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with my colleagues a letter I have received from the leader of the largest black church in South Africa, Bishop B.E. Lekganyane. Bishop Lekganyane is head of the Zion Christian Church in South Africa, with a membership of over 5 million black South Africans. He is an authentic leader with a real following. A couple of years ago his church held an Easter Gathering that according to Dan Rather of CBS News was attended by about 2 million people - it was the largest such gathering in the world that year.

I wrote to Bishop Lekganyane to ask for his perspective on the proposal for further economic sanctions against South Africa, and on my substitute bill. I explained in my letter that here in America, proponents of sanctions were saying that South African blacks supported sanctions, but that I thought we should take a different approach.

His response, I believe, speaks for itself. I include his remarks in the RECORD at this point, and commend them to my colleagues attention.

ZION CHRISTIAN CHURCH

Zion City Moria, July 24, 1988

DEAR CONGRESSMAN BURTON:

Although this reply to your letter will reach you much later than expected, I wish to thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views on sanctions and disinvestments. I also want to commend you for your courage in preposing to look beyond immediate domestic political capital and to offer meaningful assistance to those quarters of our community where help is most needed.

Allow me to say at the outset that my views on sanctions and disinvestment have been reinforced by the countless reports that I have received from leaders of all walks of life in our country. Community leaders, spiritual leaders, businessmen and many others all are deeply concerned about the effects of sanctions in their communities. Without fear of contradiction I can consequently claim to accurately reflect the opinion of the 5 million plus of the members of my church in Southern Africa. We are totally and irrevocably opposed to sanctions: The principle and effects of sanctions and disinvestment are diametrically opposed to what we stand for and what we believe in.

I am encouraged by the growing awareness among the black people of this country for the need to openly oppose sanctions. Even those organizations that have initially been the most ardent supporters of sanctions and who, it could be said, played a major role in having sanctions imposed have either recently toned down their public support for sanctions or have refrained from making any statements at all. Some of these have even admitted privately that sanctions are counterproductive.

You state in your letter that the proponents of the near-total embargo approach contend that they have the support of the majority of South African blacks. They do not have such support and if they honestly believe that they do, they have been misled. They have never had such support and I cannot foresee that they will ever have it. You should therefore not even think of changing your position.

I do not even wish to think of the impact of the total embargo approach on my country. I cannot reconcile myself as a leader of millions with the principle of suffering as a means to an end even if that end is the abolition of apartheid. There is another way - the positive approach. Only economic development, more jobs, social upliftment, improved housing, better education for all, increased and equal opportunities will help us destroy apartheid. Just as the stroke of a pen abolished slavery but failed to destroy racism, the stroke of a pen would help in ending apartheid, but it will not destroy it. We ourselves are the only ones who can eradicate it. You can certainly help if you associate with our plight by involving yourselves, by visibly and tangibly extending assistance, know-how, by creating jobs, by expanding the capacity of the economy to offer prosperity. Sanctions have done just the opposite.

We do not want hand outs. We also have our pride. The least we ask of you is not to inflict more desperation on us by even harsher sanctions. Because we share your lofty ideals and appreciate your compassion we dare ask you to allow your businessmen to freely trade with South Africa, to invest here, to create jobs, opportunities, build houses for employees, sponsor bursaries and improve and provide transport. Congress can contribute to the promotion of freedom and justice for all South Africans by extending your freedom of association to the people of this country. Allow your businessmen, your financial institutions, your foundations, your society and your people to associate with us and our plight. Congress can help in refraining from deepening our sense of despair caused by existing sanctions legislation.

Finally, may I once again commend you not only on the honesty you have shown by proposing the Burton substitute but also on the substance thereof. Your proposals constitute a real and meaningful support for Blacks in South Africa. It preserves our faith in your intentions and strengthens our hope in the future.

May you succeed in your endeavours and may you be sustained in the course you have chosen. Be assured of our esteem and appreciation.

B.E. Lekganyane,

Bishop of Zion Christian Church in South Africa. ❑

ADVERTISEMENT

SOUTH AFRICAN BISHOP ISAAC MOKOENA

APPEALS FOR LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

A black South African Bishop, whose congregation numbers some 4.5 million black Christians arrived in Vancouver to appeal for the lifting of sanctions against his country. Bishop Isaac Mokoena is life President of the Reformed Black Independent Churches of South Africa and recently appealed to Commonwealth leaders for the lifting of sanctions. Bishop Mokoena served on the South African Council of Churches with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, but later resigned over principles of policy.

SAYS THE BISHOP,

"I am opposed to apartheid. I want apartheid to be destroyed, but I do not want my people to be destroyed by sanctions."

"Over the past year certain South African church leaders, as well as the leader of a terrorist organization, have visited your fair country to ask for more and harsher sanctions to be applied against South Africa."

"As the leader of a church organization representing 864 denominations with some 4.5 million black Christian members, I know far better than they the results that such actions by Canada and other countries have on my people."

"I live among my church members in Soweto. I do not live in luxury and from the support provided by a variety of foreign interests. I have yet to meet any of the innocent victims of sanctions who was prepared to accept that he and his family must suffer in the vain hope that sanctions might one day offer greater benefits. Sanctions breed poverty, and poverty breeds despair and violence. We don't want a revolution. We want a decent and peaceful future. A future which depends on more jobs, more food, more education, and more housing – and not on the senseless destruction of our livelihood."

"Do not, I beg of you, on behalf of my flock, be swayed by those who would have you believe otherwise. The ordinary people of South Africa, both blacks and whites, are just like you. Our needs and our hopes are no different from your own. All we ask is that you would do to us what you would have others do to you."

"Those Christian bishops and leaders, who are wealthy and secure in the knowledge that foreign agencies will keep them in luxury and travelling the world, provided they deliver another message, neither know nor care about the results of their work."

"I have never seen or heard of these men moving among those black Christians who are suffering, rendering either Christian spiritual comfort or human aid. They do not represent, or care about, those for whom they advocate poverty and hunger – the black people of South Africa for whom they claim to speak."

"I do. And I am in daily touch with the terrible consequences that the actions, taken by your country and others, hold for the black South Africans you believe you are helping."

Bishop Mokoena recently visited Canada at the invitation of
The Canadian Friends of South Africans Society. The CFSAS aims to foster understanding and goodwill between Canadians and South Africans without promoting any particular policy, ideology or sectarian interest.

For membership information about CFSAS, please write
CANADIAN FRIENDS OF SOUTH AFRICANS SOCIETY
4579 Woodgreen Court, West Vancouver, B.C., V7S 2V8

JESUS CHRIST FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

ANTI SANCTIONS CAMPAIGN BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

WHY AN ANTI SANCTIONS CAMPAIGN?

[1]
Sanctions have been proved to be ineffective in forcing the South African government to succumb to the dictates of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The people who have called for sanctions against South Africa have said these sanctions would serve to force the South African white government to hand over power to a so called black majority rule or alternatively to release Mandela (and all other political detainees and prisoners), unban the ANC and allow all other exiles to return.

To date, since the imposition of punitive sanctions by America and other countries, the South African government has not shown any signs of bowing to any of these demands.

Instead, we have seen many black people lose their jobs as a direct result of sanctions. We have seen many black breadwinners deprived of the chance to make a living for their families and this in turn has deprived some black youth of a decent education as they depended upon these people for their schooling.

[2]
Sanctions is a method called for, especially by revolutionary or communist based organisations, as another weapon to be used in breaking a target government. The argument or reasoning behind this is that if the country's economy is brought down and destroyed, that country will be forced to its knees. FOR THIS REASON THE SANCTIONS WEAPON IS TOTALLY UNCHRISTIAN AND UNBIBLICAL.

The Lord Jesus Christ does not call for punishment of the offender, but rather calls for understanding, love and forgiveness, even for one's enemies.

According to the Bible TRUE CHRISTIANS among all the people calling for punitive sanctions against South Africa should search in their hearts to reach a truly CHRISTIAN SOLUTION AND NOT JUST A NON VIOLENT ONE.

If you are a CHRISTIAN or IF YOU CALL YOURSELF A CHRISTIAN and find yourself among the evil chorus calling for punitive sanctions against all the South African people, you ARE ASKED TO BIBLICALLY RECONSIDER YOUR STANCE (IF YOU ARE A REAL CHRISTIAN). THANK YOU.

BUT ALL THE SO CALLED CHRISTIANS (IN NAME ONLY) - EVEN DEMONS BELIEVE THERE IS ONLY ONE GOD AND THEY SHUDDER - WILL KEEP ON CALLING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY and the destruction of the means to earn a livelihood for many Christians in South Africa. MAY OUR GOD BLESS THEM IN JESUS' NAME, AMEN.

[3]
The call for sanctions parallels the call for the total isolation of the South African people. All the people of South Africa are isolated by some from the rest of the world through CULTURAL BOYCOTTS, EDUCATIONAL BOYCOTTS, SPORTING AND TALENT ISOLATION ETC.

SOME EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS

BUSINESS PEOPLE, COMPANIES, GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONS ETC. are invited and encouraged to invest in community or social based projects such as non white housing and businesses. There is a great growth and advancement in the non white sector, especially the black sector and there is a great need and demand for better housing throughout the country. PROVIDING ON A VERY LARGE SCALE FOR BLACK PEOPLE WILL EFFECTIVELY DISMANTLE APARTHEID.

BUSINESS

BLACK PEOPLE ARE ADVANCING RAPIDLY AND ARE NOW EVEN ALLOWED IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE FINANCIAL CLOUT NOR BASE FOR ALL THAT WILL HELP THEM TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID.

They need the financial help of the outside world and the investment along with it INSTEAD OF SANCTIONS WHICH WILL NOT HELP THEM IN ANY WAY.

EDUCATION

NON WHITE PEOPLE NEED SCHOLARSHIPS OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA for them to learn from outside the country to counteract the inferior type of education previously offered.

ACADEMIC BOYCOTTS AND ISOLATION WILL NOT HELP THEM IN ANY WAY.

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND FACILITIES

INSTEAD of sanctions black people should be allowed by the outside world to obtain health care education and facilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I would add that Mr. Randall Robinson was asked to be with us but had a scheduling conflict and hence could not be here as a witness today.

I would like to turn for a moment to Mr. Upmeyer and the poll, which I found very interesting indeed. To digest it, what you are really saying here is that the vast majority of Africans abhor apartheid but also dislike sanctions. Would that be a correct digest?

Mr. UPMEYER. Yes, I think that is right. The results of the survey are really a reflection of self-interest, which is to say that obviously the respondents are interested in repealing apartheid laws, but at the same time are concerned about the consequences of methods that we have imposed in the form of sanctions and divestment—concerned about the impact that it has on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ascertain the depth of feeling? Do they dislike apartheid more than they dislike sanctions?

Mr. UPMEYER. They are relatively the same. People are more familiar with the concept of sanctions than they are with the divestment and consequently if you look at specific numbers you would see a slight difference, but the range of disagreement with the ideas of both sanctions and divestment is the same, which is to say, in the range of about 84 or 85 percent who say that they oppose both of those concepts.

Now, I think it is also important to point out that there is a group within the black community—and you can see this throughout the survey—who do support the concept of sanctions and divestment for exactly the reasons that we might imagine: they believe that, if imposed, they will result in the removal or the dismantling of apartheid and that core of support runs in the range, if you look at the black population as a whole, runs in the range of about 15 to 20 percent who say that they favor sanctions and divestment.

If you look at more sophisticated populations, urban populations, people who are better educated, people who are more politically attentive, then the range of support rises to between a quarter and a third of the blacks who fall into those categories who say that they support the concept of sanctions and divestment.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of the respondents were Zulus?

Mr. UPMEYER. I honestly cannot tell you that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not broken down that way?

Mr. UPMEYER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Who paid for the poll?

Mr. UPMEYER. The poll was paid for by the Chamber of Mines, which is a mining industry trade association in South Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions. Senator Simon?

Senator SIMON. Yes. Just a brief response. First, to Mr. Martin. I am old enough to have remembered the days of segregation in the South. We heard the same arguments then. You should not stand up against segregation in the South because you have problems in Chicago and elsewhere, and the reality is, those of us who are standing up against apartheid in South Africa are the same people who were standing up for justice in the United States, and we are going to continue to do that.

If I may ask you, Mr. Upmeyer——

Mr. MARTIN. Do I get an opportunity to respond?

Senator SIMON. I want to ask Mr. Upmeyer a question.

Mr. MARTIN. Certainly.

Senator SIMON. I have been involved in polling over the years. I guess all of us in this business have. What we try to do is let people know when polling pleases us we frame the questions in such a way that we get results that we want. I think you would acknowledge the reality of both of those.

Mr. UPMEYER. Well, I think it can be done. I certainly would not suggest that the Gallup organization does that. I have known some other pollsters who have done it. I hope you do not hire political pollsters who do that for you.

Senator SIMON [presiding]. Well, I would say that any pollster is somewhat sensitive to who hires you.

Mr. UPMEYER. No sir, I do not agree with that. I think people come to Gallup, at least, because their assumption is that they can get unbiased assistance in conducting the surveys and in fact that the public will perceive that the results of the survey are not influenced the way you are describing. That is what we are about.

Senator SIMON. If I may ask, did you not go over the questionnaire with the people who paid for the questionnaire——

Mr. UPMEYER. Yes, indeed.

Senator SIMON. And how you would frame those questions?

Mr. UPMEYER. I did do that.

Senator SIMON. Did they not have any input on how those questions were phrased?

Mr. UPMEYER. Yes, indeed, they did have input on it. I originally drafted the questionnaire. The survey was conducted in conjunction with an affiliate of Gallup International in Johannesburg—Markinor is the company—and they also added questions and worked through a draft of the questionnaire.

We provided that draft to our client, just as we would with any client, for their review and comment and in fact there is a political science professor in South Africa whose name is Lawrence Schlimmer, who served as a consultant to the Chamber of Mines for this project.

He reviewed the questionnaire, made comments on it, and I thought that all of his comments were very interesting and good and worthwhile, but that does not mean, by any stretch of the imagination, that we—well, first that they suggested modifying the questionnaire in any way which would bias the questions wording or the survey as a whole. They did not do that. They did not attempt to do that, and we certainly did not do it in response to anything they said.

Senator SIMON. How many countries have you taken polls in where the government has the arbitrary right to just imprison you if you give answers to people that the government does not happen to like?

Mr. UPMEYER. Well, I suppose the only other country that might conceivably fall into that category would be the Soviet Union. I have surveyed there, but I do not think that that is even the case there. We have never had a respondent in the Soviet Union arrested for participating in a poll.

Senator SIMON. I understand. But you are aware that you can—for advocating sanctions, that you can be imprisoned arbitrarily in South Africa?

Mr. UPMEYER. Well, I understand that it is illegal to address the public, for instance, and to advocate sanctions, but it is not at all clear to me from a strictly legal point of view whether giving one's opinion about sanctions is also illegal. But whether it is strictly legal or not, I feel confident that in the administration of our survey the respondents were forthcoming and freely responded to the questions.

Senator SIMON. You earlier said there was some hesitancy by blacks in responding.

Mr. UPMEYER. Yes, that is correct.

Senator SIMON. Did that give you any clues, at all?

Mr. UPMEYER. Sure it does, and then I also followed that by saying that once they found out that we were not government representatives, that we were in fact interested in conducting a survey in an unbiased fashion, then they participated. But yes, you are correct, they were worried about it.

Senator SIMON. Let me just finally say that the one part of your poll that I do have confidence in is when you asked South Africans—and it does not say in your testimony which this is, black or white, but you said "the changes South Africans would like to see most in their lives and work are," and an end to apartheid is No. 1.

Mr. UPMEYER. That is correct. Well, obviously, we asked the same questions of everybody, but that is exactly right.

Senator SIMON. But presumably, in terms of the black population that would just be overwhelming, and that is higher even than getting higher salaries or anything else in their lives.

Mr. UPMEYER. Well, it is about the same range as getting better salaries. I think the thing that comes through from the surveys as a whole is blacks" concerns about their economic situation, but you are absolutely right, they are about the same range and that is also one of the three top responses of whites as well—concern about apartheid.

Senator SIMON. We thank all of you. Our hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF MR. COHEN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

Question. The administration's report on progress in South Africa concludes that "significant progress" has not been made in dismantling apartheid. Under section 501 of the Anti-Apartheid Act, the President is required to recommend one or more additional sanctions if he finds no significant progress.

Does it concern the administration that the refusal to make such a recommendation is a violation of the act?

Answer. We do not believe that the report's recommendation that no additional sanctions be imposed violates the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Section 501 (a) of the Act provides that it "shall be the policy of the United States to impose additional measures . . . if substantial progress has not been made in ending apartheid." The provision's legislative history, however, makes crystal clear the possibility that the President might recommend no additional sanctions. In particular, Senator Biden said that section 501 would direct the President, "in the case of insignificant progress, to recommend what sanctions, if , should be imposed." 132 Congressional Record 51182 (daily ed. August 15, 1989) (emphasis added). This makes clear that the Congress intended for section 501 to authorize the President to recommend no additional sanctions, even if no significant progress has been made in ending apartheid. Moreover, a different interpretation of this provision would have raised constitutional questions under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, which gives the President the discretion to recommend such measures to the Congress as are judged by the President to be "necessary and expedient." Therefore, in accordance with general principles of statutory construction, we have adopted the interpretation consistent with the Constitution.

Question. The administration's report states that international pressures have been a "major factor" in limiting South Africa's economic growth. It also states that for whites, deteriorating economic conditions have helped focus attention on the relationship between long-term white economic well-being and positive political change.

Would such change have occurred in the absence of sanctions?

Answer. I think you would agree with me that the apartheid economy is inherently flawed. Sanctions have undoubtedly helped focus some whites' attention on the relationship between their deteriorating standard of living and the need for political change. External pressures , including financial sanctions, have helped slow economic growth and thus highlight some of the major weaknesses in South Africa's economy, notably the inefficiency and heavy cost of duplicative bureaucracies. Even apart from sanctions, these inherent problems have caused many white South Africans to appreciate the need for positive political change, although sanctions may have played a role in speeding this process. However, as was stated in the report, increasing white economic hardship has hardened attitudes among some whites and more sanctions might be counterproductive at a time when there are signs that positive political evolution may be taking place. Further weakening the South African economy does nothing to address long-term structural inequalities in black education, healthcare, housing and skills development that are crucial to the success of a post-apartheid society.

Question. Was the security issue important in the September parliamentary elections? Could this have contributed to some of the success of the Conservative Party?

Answer. The security issue may well have been a factor in the September elections. For many white South Africans this is the single most important issue they confront. Many white South Africans, especially among the Afrikaner segment of the population, appear to view the prospect of a black majority government as a challenge to their own political and cultural survival. Fears associated with a loss of white power thus probably contributed to the Conservative Party's electoral gains. The decline in standard of living among middle and lower-class whites, and the

belief that a loss of white political power would hasten that decline, was also an important election issue.

Question. The administration's report argues that one result of sanctions is a stronger conservative opposition to the government's reform plan. The report also notes that a high percentage of white voters supported the liberal Democratic Party.

Is it possible that sanctions are partly responsible for this shift to the left among whites? If not, why not?

Answer. As was noted in the report, external pressures and a declining economy may have led many whites in South Africa to better appreciate the relationship between their long-term economic, political and security interests, and the need for rapid positive political change. Deteriorating economic performance may have caused some voters to move left and others to move right. This is one of the ways in which sanctions and other external pressures have had a mixed effect. Now that the election is over our goal should be to continue to urge the government to move decisively to address South Africa's long-term problems by creating a climate in which negotiations can get underway on the transition to a non-racial society. We have seen some encouraging early signs that the new government is taking steps to permit a greater degree of opposition political activity. At this crucial moment of political evolution, we should avoid actions that only increase white fears and may, in fact, limit the government's ability to implement its stated agenda for political change.

Question. You've indicated in your testimony that a key element in the administration's policy is a deeper level of contact with the black opposition inside and outside South Africa.

Would the administration have been able to achieve this without the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act?

What role did that legislation play in improving the atmosphere for contacts?

Answer. It's always difficult to speculate about what might have happened. Perhaps the perception on the part of the ANC of an evolving U.S. policy helped ease the opening of a dialogue. As was noted in the report, the CAAA sent a strong signal that we rejected apartheid and were committed to its rapid replacement by a democratic political system that fairly represented all South Africans. Some black leaders may have questioned the commitment of the U.S. government to this goal. The CAAA helped dispel this misconception, but it's only one element in our policy. Secretary Shultz's 1987 meeting with Oliver Tambo also symbolized out commitment to dialogue with key black leaders. Through the active leadership of Ambassador Ed Perkins, and now Ambassador Bill Swing, we have sought a more active dialogue with black leaders inside South Africa. President Bush's meetings with Archbishop Tutu, Mrs. Albertina Sisulu and other anti-apartheid leaders reaffirmed our commitment at the highest level to contact with important leaders of the black opposition. We believe that our contacts with the black community will continue to improve as more black leaders become convinced that the United States government is unified and sincere in its determination to see apartheid end and to promote negotiations toward that objective.

Question. You have indicated that consultations with our allies is an important part of the administration's South Africa policy.

What consultations have taken place with our allies regarding South Africa? What is the goal of these consultations?

Does the administration subscribe to a coordinated Western policy for South Africa?

If so, must the sanctions inevitably be a part of this policy since the United States and the European community have them on the books, although with varying degree of severity?

Answer. Consultations with our allies are an important part of our South Africa policy. We have coordinated our South Africa policy multilaterally through a series of bilateral consultations with our allies, most of whom are South Africa's major trading partners. Past and pending consultations have included London, Bonn, Paris and Tokyo. We also have regular contacts in New York at the U.N., and here in Washington. In addition, we consult regularly with Front Line State governments and with other African governments about our efforts to promote negotiations in South Africa. This goal, promoting negotiations between blacks and whites leading to a democratic post-apartheid society in South Africa, is our primary objective. Sanctions also have been a part of our policy toward South Africa for 25 years. This administration is committed, as I have said, to enforcement of U.S. law on this subject, including the CAAA.

Question. The administration's report and your testimony accept the thesis that pressures, both internal and external, are pushing the South African Government

and its supporters toward realization that negotiations must be held with genuine black leaders.

If the South African Government fails to act upon the agenda you have outlined, that is release of political prisoners etc., will the administration increase the pressure on the Government?

How will you do this?

Would additional sanctions be warranted at this point?

Answer. The report outlined our current assessment of the impact of existing sanctions and discussed some of the benefits and limitations of a sanctions-based approach to South Africa. We have seen some significant early indications that Mr. de Klerk is serious about moving toward negotiations with legitimate black leaders. Whether his initial small steps are followed by substantial further movement is yet to be demonstrated. The administration is fully committed to using all appropriate means to promote negotiations. This should include both pressure as well as incentives to reward true progress. I would like to defer specific discussion about enhanced pressure or increased incentives until the new government has had sufficient time to demonstrate the extent of its political vision and its preparedness to move rapidly to translate that vision into reality. Our most appropriate responses can only be discussed in light of actual events on the ground at that time, just as current developments warrant a cautious wait-and-see attitude. The administration will maintain close contact with Congress on these issues.

Question. You have stated that the administration's policy will "balance pressure and incentives." How do you intend to do this? What constitutes "pressure"? What incentives do you have in mind and when would they be offered?

Answer. We currently have a number of very serious pressures directed against South Africa. Key among these are the sanctions mandated by the CAAA. Our arms embargo dates back almost 25 years. The administration will continue to implement all of these measures fully. Another less tangible pressure is our continued unwillingness to accord to South Africa any recognition as a member in-good-standing of the Western community of nations. The gross injustice of apartheid makes this impossible. Conversely, the CAAA calls for the lifting of sanctions if certain conditions are met. That is an important incentive. We should be prepared to recognize other significant interim steps, such as the release of remaining political prisoners and the lifting of the state of emergency, if and when these actions occur. The exact nature of our responses can only be determined in the context of the actual events in South Africa.

We have now had 3 years experience with the CAAA. At the appropriate moment, we should be prepared to take a fresh look at the CAAA with a view to possibly refining, or retargetting the Act's provisions. Our ultimate goal is to see a successful, democratic post-apartheid South Africa. We want to avoid actions that might inadvertently hinder prospects for rapid change and which might deny to blacks the opportunities to gain the education and skills necessary to successfully manage that society. A careful look at prohibitions on assistance to "open" universities is warranted. We might want to consider modification of our investment prohibitions such that there was greater scope for positive investment in firms controlled by blacks, or firms that adhered to a special code of conduct. Our policy toward South Africa needs to have a dual focus, directed both at achieving positive political change in the near-term without neglecting the pressing longer-term needs that exist, and will continue to exist, within the black community.

Question. The administration has indicated that it would consult fully with the Congress before announcing a new policy toward South Africa. What specific steps have you and others in the administration taken to this end?

Answer. Secretary Baker, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Under Secretary Kimmitt and I have discussed our policy toward South Africa specifically and during frequent exchanges on foreign affairs with the leadership of the Senate and House, including Chairmen and ranking minority members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. For example, the Secretary met with House Republican members on April 27 to discuss South Africa, with key Senate Republicans and Democrats on June 22 and with House Democrats on June 29. Additionally, Congress and State Department officials regularly correspond on South Africa.

Question. How would you characterize the administration's current approach to South Africa? How does this approach differ from "constructive engagement?"

Answer. I tried to lay out our current approach in my statement. The sanctions report goes into our analysis and our approach in further detail. Basically, our principal role should be as a facilitator of negotiations between blacks and whites in South Africa. At its most fundamental level, the problems of South Africa are for South Africans themselves to resolve. We are ill-equipped to dictate solutions. While

our ability to influence events inside South Africa is limited, we do occupy an important position as a champion of freedom and democratic ideals. Our economic and political might, coupled with the growing trust and respect that we have gained in southern Africa through our mediation of the Angola/Namibia accords, can help us use our influence toward promoting negotiations inside South Africa with maximum effect.

Our actions will necessarily be governed by events as they unfold. We are encouraged by some of the initial steps of the de Klerk government toward creating a climate conducive to real negotiations with legitimate black leaders. These are only first steps and we will press the government to go further and more rapidly. We will encourage our black interlocutors to recognize positive signals from the government when they occur, to seize opportunities as they are presented, and to be creative and bold in their responses to positive government actions. Confidence building is crucial. Encouraging the establishment of new patterns of trust and dialogue will be one of our key objectives. We will maintain our existing sanctions pressures, but should be prepared to recognize in tangible ways major positive movement. This is a new U.S. policy keyed to significantly changed conditions in South and southern Africa. Only by appreciating this new dynamic, and the opportunities inherent in it, will the United States continue to be relevant to the solution of South Africa's problems.

Question. Do you regard sanctions as integral to an overall policy toward South Africa, or do you see sanctions as a mutually exclusive approach?

Answer. Sanctions are, and have been for 25 years, an integral part of our overall policy toward South Africa. Imposing sanctions on South Africa has sent a clear signal that we reject apartheid. Sanctions are not an end, however. They are one of many tools at our disposal in our effort to see an end to apartheid and its replacement by a democratic, non-racial society. Our analysis of the ability of current sanctions to contribute to our goals in South Africa was covered fully in our annual report. Sanctions have not been completely unhelpful, but they are clearly a mixed bag and our use of this tool, as with other tools, should always be governed by the changing political dynamic in South Africa.

Question. What kind of message does the administration plan to send to South Africa at the United Nations? Will this administration propose and/or support Security Council resolutions advocating sanctions similar to ours? If not, why not?

Would the administration support such sanctions at the United Nations next year if the de Klerk government fails to achieve the steps you have outlined?

Answer. We are looking at the possibility of working with other interested governments in support of a United Nations resolution that would call on all parties in South Africa to commit to peaceful negotiations. With regard to mandatory U.N. sanctions, our view is that additional punitive economic sanctions at this time have very little role to play in reducing white fears or in encouraging the parties to come to the negotiating table. In light of the de Klerk government's recent willingness to permit a greater degree of peaceful political expression, and its stated commitment to opening a dialogue with black leaders, it seems appropriate to defer discussion of possible additional punitive measures. Once again, we will maintain close contact with the Congress as we assess the significance of developments on the ground in South Africa over the coming months.

Question. Approximately $11 billion of South Africa's debt will come due in June 1990. Of this, $2.4 billion is owed to U.S. banks. Some $700 million of the U.S. share has already been rescheduled, leaving $1.7 billion due. Studies done for the Commonwealth and several other sources suggest that the debt owed to the U.S. and other foreign banks, taken together, provide a useful form of leverage to move the South African Government toward political reform.

Will the administration take steps to encourage U.S. banks to make debt rescheduling conditional on political progress?

Wouldn't this send an important signal not only to the South African Government but also to South African businesses of the need to pursue serious reform?

Answer. In light of the October 18 short-term rollover of the bulk of the debt South Africa owed in 1990, the issue of our pressing the banks to urge more rapid political change as a condition for debt rescheduling is largely moot. Nevertheless, there have been several widely held misperceptions about this recent event that deserve comment. A similar situation existed in 1985 when South Africa was pressed to repay large outstanding loans on short notice. The South Africans simply refused to do what they were clearly unable to do and eventually imposed their own repayment schedule unilaterally, albeit with a rubber stamp from the banking community. Faced with a similar situation in 1990, we have every reason to expect that the South African Government would have once again imposed its own terms. In fact,

this is just about what happened, though by agreeing to negotiate, the banks probably achieved slightly better terms than if left completely to the mercy of the South African negotiators. There was never much scope for using this apparent leverage to press for major political change because the threat of withholding new lending is no longer available.

As I have already explained, the real pressure of financial sanctions is the massive outflow of capital from South Africa and the almost complete absence of money coming in. This process continues. I've already discussed the various impacts of this and other sanctions on the prospects for positive political change. Forcing the South Africans into default would only have the ironic impact of reducing the outflow of capital from South Africa, thereby reducing financial pressures on the regime.

Question. What contacts has the administration had with officials of the African National Congress? What role does the administration expect the ANC to play in bringing about a "new" South Africa?

Answer. The administration has long recognized the ANC as one of several South African organizations with substantial political support in South Africa. We have had regular contact with the ANC since Secretary Shultz met with ANC president Oliver Tambo in 1987. Our Embassy in Lusaka has been one point of regular contact with the ANC's political leadership, and as such, provides valuable insight into ANC thinking. We have met with ANC officials resident in Washington and New York as well. Most recently, I met with ANC international department director Thabo Mbeki as a part of this continuing dialogue. We discussed prospects for negotiations in South Africa and the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela.

Responses of Mr. Cohen to Questions Asked by Senator Lugar

Question. Some have suggested that one way to continue sanctions without damage to the black majority would be to devise "targetted" or "strategic" sanctions. These would be selective sanctions intended to exclude black owned businesses or even black operated businesses from the sanctions. Is it possible to identify such firms in South Africa and, if so, would it them be possible to implement such "strategic" sanctions?

Answer. We share the concern that our actions directed at hastening the end of apartheid in South Africa not inadvertently hurt those who have already been victimized by that cruel system for so many years. Of equal importance is assuring that our actions do not damage the ability of a democratic post-apartheid society to succeed. We also believe that black owned or operated businesses should be given every encouragement to grow and assume a more prominent place in South Africa's economy. Unfortunately, some of the sanctions that have been enacted are relatively blunt instruments incapable of distinguishing white from black economic interests.

The slowdown in the South African economy, partly attributable to outside pressures, puts limits on economic growth with implications for employment, government revenues (and spending) and general economic opportunity. The administration would be happy to work with Congress to examine the impact of our sanctions on black business and discuss possible ways to better focus all of our efforts on measures that will hasten the end of apartheid and its replacement by a democratic post-apartheid society that offers equal opportunity to all South Africans.

Question. Many commentators have described the economy of South Africa as more socialist than capitalist. There are reports that as many as one-third of the white population is employed by the state, for example. Is this a fair description of the South African economy?

Answer. It is true that the South African economy exhibits both capitalist and socialist elements. A large percentage of the white population is employed in the public sector. The government controls a number of major industries. The South African government has stated its intention to privatize major industries and there have been some moves in that direction. There have also been some steps toward reducing the size of the public sector payroll. Many observers have argued that apartheid and capitalism are mutually exclusive. Capitalism demands an ever more efficient use of material and human capital, while apartheid is inherently inefficient in both respects. As demographic and economic forces push the manifestations of apartheid aside, as happened with influx control, job reservation, and pass laws, the potential for more efficient utilization of resources under a capitalist system increases.

Question. Earlier this summer, the South African Law Commission completed a draft Bill of Rights for South Africa. It prohibits discrimination and recognizes that

all people are equal before the law. It grants all adults the right to vote, recognizes the right to freedom of speech, the right to assembly, the right to form political parties and other fundamental human and legal rights we are all familiar with in the United States. If recognized and implemented in South Africa, they would bring significant change to that society. What are the prospects that these recommendations would be implemented and what would be the likely consequences of doing so? What should we be doing to encourage South Africa authorities to adopt this draft?

Answer. In 1986 the Minister of Justice instructed the South African Law Commission to investigate the possibility of the introduction of a bill of rights for South Africa. The most striking element of the resulting 500-page report is an unequivocal call for extending the vote to blacks and a recognition of the concept of individual, as opposed to group, rights. The proposed bill of rights stands little prospect of being implemented unless all existing apartheid institutions and legislation are abolished, a condition which the white minority government would be unlikely to accept at this time. The publication of the report, however, indicates that its concepts of constitutional reform have some support within the government and in many sectors of the white community.

We welcome the report as a vehicle for promoting public discussion on constitutional reform, and we hope that the concepts in the bill will become a permanent feature of the dialogue on South Africa's future. We believe that our efforts to encourage blacks and whites to enter into negotiations on ending apartheid and structuring a democratic post-apartheid society will hasten the day when the rights embodied in this report will be shared by all South Africans.

Question. Can you describe the demographics and geographics of recipients of U.S. assistance in South Africa? What is the likelihood that a higher percentage of U.S. funds could go to the rural non-urban disadvantaged, to blacks in settlements or blacks in the homelands 'such as, for example, to Kangwane? Should more U.S. assistance be programmed through non-governmental organizations and should some of this be directly funded to recipients, e.g., to South Africa universities?

Answer. The recipients of A.I.D. assistance are typically distributed geographically as follows: Regional percentage; Trannsvaal 54 percent; Natal 30 percent; and Cape 16 percent.

A.I.D.'s program is primarily "urban focused" because this is the area where there are the most community groups and where political activity by anti-apartheid groups is most prevalent. Rural areas have few such groups to potentially assist. In addition, A.I.D. has been cautious in moving into rural areas because these areas are mostly in the so-called "homelands", and there are few credible non-governmental organizations in the homelands that are not financed or controlled by the South African Government (SAG). Various provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (the CAAA) prohibit various types of assistance with various types of funds to SAG-supported organizations. These prohibitions are contained in the general ESF authorization for assistance to disadvantaged South Africans (FAA Section 535), the human rights authorization (FAA Section 116(e)), and the FY 87–89 $4 million earmark for "education, training, and scholarships for the victims of apartheid . . . who are attending universities and colleges in South Africa" (FAA Section 105). FAA Section 117 provides that "priority shall be given to working with and through South African non-governmental organizations whose leadership and staff are selected on a non-racial basis, and which have the support of the community being served." There may be certain activities with particular funding sources that could be supported without a statutory amendment, which would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. However, because of the pervasiveness of these prohibitions in the FAA/CAAA, it has been A.I.D.'s consistent policy to apply these statutory 11 prohibitions as a policy matter in all cases. A.I.D. does not want to be perceived by the credible anti-apartheid leadership as lending support to the "homelands system".

Operation Hunger, with financing from A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, is working extensively in the Kangwane area with communities supporting Mozambican refugees fleeing RENAMO forces.

All A.I.D funding is programmed through non-governmental organizations. A.I.D. is not opposed to providing assistance to selected South African universities. However, because many South African universities receive substantial subsidies (up to 80%) from the SAG, they are considered to be organizations "financed or controlled by the SAG" and subject to the statutory restrictions, discussed above, concerning such organizations. Statutory amendments would be required before any U.S. assistance could be provided to these institutions. Because of the strong Congressional policy indicated by the pervasiveness of these statutory restrictions, A.I.D. believes

that it would be prudent to have a statutory amendment before providing any assistance to or through South African universities.

Question. Many have stated that, in the end, economics and demographics will shape the struggle in South Africa for power-sharing. Is this what is pushing Mr. de Klerk in the direction of reform?

Answer. It is difficult to know Mr. de Klerk's motivations. Our analysis of the economic realities in South Africa convinces us that that country has serious long-term structural problems, many of which are legacies of apartheid. Demographic realities played a role in bringing and end to some apartheid structures such as influx control and job reservation. They are influencing debates on group areas and separate amenities. Mounting economic pressures, in part generated by external factors, have slowed economic growth with serious long-term consequences for all South Africans. Mr. de Klerk must also appreciate these issues. No single factor will shape the struggle for power sharing in South Africa. U.S. policy will be guided by both an appreciation for a process of change and negotiation, and concern for the longer-term economic and social issues that will continue to affect South Africa after apartheid is gone.

Question. How would you characterize the position of the ANC as it gears up for negotiations with South Africa over the future of their country? What is the role of the armed struggle both in its strategy and in practice?

Answer. There is much with which we can agree in the ANC negotiation document released in Harare recently. Many in the ANC are actively considering modalities for discussions with the South African Government. Informal contacts between ANC and prominent South Africans continue. We note the attention important issues, including the nature of a new constitution, an independent judiciary, and bill of rights, are receiving throughout these informal consultations. We encourage the ANC to study carefully recent suggestions of shifts in the government position on the issue of negotiations with legitimate black leaders, and to respond constructively to positive government initiatives.

There is clearly a major debate within ANC leadership on the utility and wisdom of continuing the armed struggle during a period of political fluidity. Some within the ANC believe the armed struggle maintains pressure on the SAG to negotiate. We have repeatedly condemned the use of violence by all parties in South Africa and reiterate that violence has no useful role to play toward resolving South Africa's problems.

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